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Abstract
EFFICIENT INVESTMENT ALLOCATION FOR IMPROVING NUCLEAR
POWER PLANT PERFORMANCE
by Feng Li
Thesis Co-Supervisors: Professor Michael W. Golay
Professor Neil E. Todreas
In order to survive in a deregulated market with increasing
competition, nuclear plant managers need a methodology to structure their
decision-making process in a systematic, explicit manner so that they can
ultimately allocate their limited resources efficiently for improving nuclear
plant performance.
This thesis developed a methodology to structure the decision-making
process. In this methodology, the decision-maker's risk aversion and the
uncertainty of decision-making attributes were addressed explicitly and
consistently. This methodology also provided a method to quantify the
"imponderable" factors, such as regulator attention, plant rating, public
concerns, in a rational way and incorporated consideration of these factors into
the decision-making process.
For illustrative purposes, the methodology developed in this thesis was
applied to two real cases of decision-making in a PWR plant. By applying the
methods step by step, the problems of these two examples were identified and
characterized. The importance of these problems was ranked. The proposed
engineering improvements to resolve those important problems were ranked
according to their economic returns and the uncertainties associated with the
economic returns; then the final recommendations for improvement
implementation were reached.
The methods were successfully applied to these two example projects
for improving plant performance. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that
the methodology developed in this thesis is an explicit, systematic decision-
making tool for nuclear plant managers to enhance their decision-making
capabilities of allocating the limited resources, and reach rational, explicit
decisions for improving the plant performance.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. IMPETUS
In a deregulated power generation market, nuclear utilities are faced
with increasing competition from the coal and gas power industry. In order to
maintain its competitiveness, the nuclear industry must focus on strategies that
can improve its economic performance and make it attractive compared with
the other conventional power generation options. Only by pursuing such
strategies, will nuclear industry be able to survive in such a tough competitive
and regulated environment.
Conventional power plants have some inherent economic advantages
over the nuclear power because of low initial investment for plant
construction, less regulation costs, less decommissioning costs, and usually
less staff. If costs to meet environmental constraints are not internalized, the
only advantage of nuclear power over other forms of power generation is its
low fuel cost. As other costs are fixed, nuclear utilities can improve its
economic performance only by staying on-line as long as possible, so that their
advantage of low fuel costs can be maximized. This will require that the plant
equipment be maintained at a high reliability and capability level. On the
other hand, as the operation safety is always the top priority of the nuclear
industry, the high reliability of equipment must be ensured.
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High operational reliability and capability requires effective
maintenance, repairs, and upgrades. However, there is a dilemma in practice.
While nuclear plants are aging and thus need more equipment maintenance
and replacement, the availability of the operation budget is getting tighter
because of the pressure from market competitions. Hence, nuclear plant
managers need to be more concerned about spending efficiency than ever.
However, so far there is not a method that can evaluate the economic
efficiency of an investment made for improving the plant performance which
include uncertainties in a consistent, explicit manner. When nuclear utility
managers are confronted with the requirement to decide which alternatives
they should invest for plant upgrades, repairs and maintenance activities, they
usually make these decisions based upon their experience and the subjective
judgements. These decisions are usually made without complete consideration
of all decision-making attributes, especially without a clear, consistent
treatment of the uncertainties associated with these attributes. Some decision-
making attributes, such as socio-political implications of a severe plant failure,
are highly uncertain and very difficult to quantify. The lack of a method that
can treat these decision-making attributes explicitly and consistently may
ultimately degrade both the plant economic performance and plant safety.
Therefore, it is necessary to have a methodology that enables managers
to structure their decision-making process in a systematic, explicit manner so
that they can ultimately allocate their limited resources in the most efficient
way. Only with such a methodology can nuclear utilities achieve high plant
performance and at same time minimize the necessary expenses for operation
and maintenance.
2
1.2. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The difficulties to achieve the efficient investment allocation are the
treatment of uncertainties associated with the decision-making attributes, the
degree of decision-maker's risk aversion and those "imponderable" factors
that are usually difficult to quantify and highly uncertain. These difficulties
are often treated in an informal way and are often mixed with other
considerations in the decision-making process. Decision-makers are often
confused by the complication introduced by these factors in their decision-
making process.
In order to provide a tool for nuclear utility decision-makers to
overcome these difficulties, the following primary goals and objectives for this
thesis have been developed:
" Provide a structured decision-making process for nuclear utility managers
to allocate resources for improving the plant performance;
" Develop a method to address the decision-maker's risk aversion explicitly
and consistently;
" Develop a method that enable decision-makers to trade off the expected
economic returns with the uncertainty of the returns;
" Provide a method to quantify the "imponderable" factors, such as regulator
attention, plant performance rating, public concerns in a rational way and
incorporate the consideration of these factors into the decision-making
process.
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1.2.1. Provide A Structured Decision-Making Process
A four-step decision-making approach is developed to achieve an
efficient investment allocation. These four steps are: 1) Identify and
characterize the problems in the plant; 2) Rank the importance of the
problems; 3) Formulate engineering solutions and improvements for the most
important problems; 4) Rank the optimality of solutions and improvements
and then allocate the investment to those improvement options with the best
economic returns. The method for each step will be developed in this thesis.
These four steps compose a logic approach to good decision-making.
Although a decision-maker may have already informally covered some of
these steps in his decision-making, it is recommended that a decision-maker
should follow these steps formally and explicitly. By doing this, a decision-
maker will be able to gain as much as possible information about decision-
making attributes and cover all the factors that should be considered in the
decision-making.
1.2.2. Develop A Method to Address Risk Aversion
A decision-maker's risk aversion is an important factor that affects the
decision he will make. In practice, a decision-maker's risk aversion is usually
addressed by the form of his utility function. However, for the specific
problems that we are typically faced in a nuclear plant, the utility function
approach is not adequate, especially for those problems with extreme high
consequences and low probabilities. Therefore, a new approach to address
risk aversion is necessary.
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An alternative is developed in this thesis by using a risk function
approach. A new concept, named the Risk Aversion Index (RAI), is
developed to address the decision-maker's risk aversion. This concept is
defined based upon two assumptions. The first assumption is that the
decision-maker's preference to an event is determined by the risk value of the
event. The second assumption is that a decision-maker's risk value of an event
is given by the form R = Ca -P, where R is the event's risk value, C is the
consequence if the event occurs, P is the probability that event may occur, and
a is the Risk Aversion Index of this decision-maker. If a decision-maker's
RAI value, a, is greater than one, the decision-maker will attach a higher risk
value to an event than its expected value, which is given by the product of C
and P. The difference between an event's risk value and its expected value
reflects the decision-maker's aversion to uncertain risk. The higher the "a"
value, the higher the difference (i.e., the risk aversion). Thus, the value of a
exhibits the decision-maker's degree of risk aversion.
1.2.3. Develop A Method to Treat the Uncertainty of Return
In current practice, decisions for improving plant performance are
mostly based upon the expected economic returns without considering the
uncertainties associated with the return. This practice may yield imprudent
decisions because the magnitude of the uncertainty of implementing some
improvements may be so large that it will offset the economic advantage that
is expected. Therefore, a good decision making process should include
consideration of the uncertainty of the investment return and it is necessary to
have a method that can reasonably trade off the expected return and the
uncertainty.
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1.2.4. Develop A Method to Incorporate "Imponderable"
Factors
In many cases, the "imponderable" factors play an important, and
sometimes a dominant role in decision making. However, these factors have
never been formally addressed in an explicit, consistent way. This may be due
to the difficulty of quantifying these factors and the high uncertainty
associated with these factors. This thesis is to develop a method that will
enable decision-makers to quantify the effects of these factors thus allowing
rational consideration of these factors to be incorporated into the decision-
making process.
1.3. SCOPE OF RESEARCH
The concept of Risk Aversion Index (RAI) is the basis of the
methodology developed in this thesis. Therefore, a good understanding of
RAI patterns is essential for the success of the methodology. A study of
nuclear plant decision-makers' RAI values was conducted as a part of the
thesis work. Two groups of decision-makers in nuclear plants were
interviewed to elicit their responses to a set of hypothetical events. Based
upon the results from the interviews, the RAI values were calculated. By
analyzing these RAI values, the general patterns of RAI change with event
consequence and probability were obtained. At same time, the factors that
affect a decision-maker's RAI were also identified.
In order to develop a practical decision making process that can be
used by nuclear plant managers, a comprehensive understanding of current
practices is also necessary. The research work of this thesis includes the
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investigation of current decision-making practices in the US nuclear industry.
The author closely worked with engineers and managers in two US nuclear
plants, observing and participating in the decision-making process in these two
plants. Based upon the investigation, needed improvements in the decision-
making process were identified. A systematic approach thus was proposed
and specific steps in this approach have been refined through close interactions
with plant staff relative to use of real plant decisions.
The treatment of uncertainties and "imponderable" factors was covered
in this research. The sources of uncertainty were identified and a method to
evaluate the uncertainty and incorporate the uncertainty into decision-making
process was developed. The types of "imponderable" factors were studied and
the current practices of treating these factors were investigated. Based upon
the results of investigation, a method to quantify the "imponderable" factors
was developed.
For illustrative purpose, the methodology developed in this thesis was
applied to two real decision-making cases in a PWR plant as examples of
application. These examples are the project of upgrading the moisture
separator reheater system and the project of upgrading the switchyard SF6
system. In order to provide solid examples for illustrating the methodology,
detailed studies on these two systems were included in the scope of research.
The studies of these systems included a comprehensive understanding of the
system structures, functions, problems and an investigation on historic
performance of the system, as well as the possible engineering solutions that
can improve the system performance.
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1.4. CONTRIBUTIONS
The unique contributions of this thesis are as follows:
Development of a probabilistic methodology that enables nuclear plant
managers to allocate their limited resources to those improvements with best
economic efficiencies in a consistent, explicitly fashion. This is a pioneering
effort of applying probabilistic method into the area of improving nuclear plant
economic performance.
Consideration for the first time of uncertainties associated with the
decision-making attributes into the decision-making process for improving
nuclear plant performance.
Treatment of "imponderable" factors, such as regulator attention, plant
performance rating and public relation concerns, in a quantitative, consistent
and explicit manner. These "imponderable" factors are important and
sometimes dominant attributes of the decision-making process in a nuclear
plant. However, they have never been taken into account in the decision-
making in a rational way.
Development of a new measure named Risk Aversion Index (RAI) to
incorporate decision-maker's risk attitudes into the decision-making process.
The RAI method considers the dependency of risk attitudes on the probability
of event. This is different from the traditional decision analysis methods, in
which the decision-maker's risk attitudes are regarded independent of the
probability of event occurrence.
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1.5. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 will summarize the relevant
literature on decision analysis techniques and the current practices of budget
allocation in two US nuclear power plants. Chapter 3 will describe details of
the methodology developed in this thesis, including the study of RAI values.
Chapter 4 will present two examples of applying the methodology described in
Chapter 3. Chapter 5 will summarize the thesis work and present the
conclusions obtained from the study. Chapter 6 will point out some directions
for future work.
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Chapter 2
LITERATURE SURVEY IN DECISION-
MAKING AND CURRENT PRACTICES IN
US NUCLEAR PLANTS
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Decision-making analysis is a relatively new field of science and
technology. Over the past three decades, researchers have developed various
methods to help determine preferred plans and designs for constructing
complex, often large-scale systems, or for improving the performance of such
systems. These methods have been applied in many areas such as large-scale
construction projects, the petroleum industry, agriculture, the medical industry,
high-hazard missions, even in the financial industry. However, there is scant
evidence showing that these methods have been adopted in the decision-
making process for enhancing the performance of nuclear power plants. This
is partially because there was not need for such sophisticated methods in the
regulated power generation market, and partially because as formulated
current existing methods are not well suited for the specific problems
encountered in nuclear power plant operations.
This chapter illustrates the existing decision-making methods that are
commonly applied in other industries, and then assesses the applicability of
these methods to the specific problem of enhancing nuclear power plant
performance. This chapter also examines current practices of US nuclear
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industry decision-making for plant performance enhancement. We will assess
the current practices to find weaknesses and identify areas for possible
improvements.
2.2. ExISTING DECISION-MAKING METHODS AND
APPLICATIONS
2.2.1. Existing Methods
A common problem that a decision-maker (DM) often faces is that of
how to select the best choices among the many alternatives that enable him to
achieve the goal. The difficulty of making such decisions includes evaluation
of costs and benefits, the uncertainty of outcomes, tradeoff among different
attributes, and sometimes the uncertainty associated with the time. In
particular, the fact that most person's valuation of benefits and costs are often
distinctly nonlinear makes the selection among alternatives more difficult and
seemingly inconsistent. In order to help DMs to make their decisions
explicitly and consistently, researchers have conducted studies on decision-
making analysis, psychology, socioeconomics, and many other fields relative
to decision-making during the past three decades. Many methods have been
developed for evaluating decision options. Basically, these methods can be
summarized into two categories: the Utility Function Method and the Risk
Function Method. Due to some drawbacks in conventional utility theory,
recently researchers also developed a theory called the Prospect Theory to
overcome the drawbacks. In this section, we discuss these methods and their
applications.
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2.2.2. Utility Function Method and Applications
2.2.2.1. Basis of Utility Function Theory
The Utility Function, U(X), is a special function that quantifies the
DM's preference for a specific quantity of desirable benefits, which is the X in
the function expression. The utility function theory depends on the following
four basic axioms.
The first basic axiom assumes the existence of relative preferences for
all possible outcomes. It asserts that
For every pair ofpossible outcomes, X and X2, a person will either prefer one
to the other or be indifferent between them.
The relative preference between sets of consequences can be expressed by the
difference in their utility function values, U(X1) and U(X2). For example, if
X1 is more preferred than X2, then U(XI) will be greater than U(X2); if the DM
is indifferent between X, and X2, then U(X1 ) equals to U(X2), and vice versa.
The second axiom is that of transitivity. It assumes that
For any three sets of consequences, X, X2 and X, ifX is more preferred than
X2, andX2 is more preferred than X3, then the preference is transitive such that
X, is more preferred than X3 .
This means the utility function value is also transitive. Namely, if U(X1) >
U(X2 ) and U(X2) > U(X3), then we have U(X1) > U(X 3). In fact, we can
understand this axiom in a reverse way. Since the utility function values are
numbers, for which the transitivity holds, then the DM's preference for
outcomes should be transitive as long as the first axiom is valid.
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The third axiom is that of monotonicity. This means that more
desirable outcome is better, or more undesirable outcome is worse. For
example, assuming X is the attribute in interest, if X2 > X3 will make the
outcome of X2 more preferred than the outcome of X 3, i.e., U(X2) > U(X3),
then given X1 > X2, we can conclude that outcome of X, is more preferred
than the outcome of X3, i.e., U(X 1)> U(X 3).
The fourth axiom is sometimes called the substitution or independence
axiom. This is the key axiom of utility theory. This axiom asserts that
If a person places an equal (utility function) value on two possible options, A
and B, then these can be substituted for each other in any combination with
other option without changing the preference of the original combination.
For example, if a DM faces to a situation that gives him two possible options,
A with a probability of P and C with a probability of (l-P), then for another
situation, which gives him option B with a probability of P and option C with a
probability (1 -P), he will consider the second situation is indifferent to the first
one.
This axiom simply states that a person's preference only depends on
the option's utility function value, regardless of the nature of these options.
These options may have totally different consequences and probabilistic
distributions. For this reason, the substitution axiom is also called the
independence axiom. Under this axiom, the words "consequence", "outcome"
and "option" will be substitutable for each other as long as the "consequence",
"outcome" or "option" have the same utility function value.
The importance of this axiom is that it enables us to determine the
preference between options that at first glance may not seem directly
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comparable. This axiom also implies that the only criterionfor determining the
preference among possible choices is the expected utility function values of
choice. The choice with the higher expected utility function value will be
preferred.
2.2.2.2. Basic Functional Approximation of the Utility
Many studies have been conducted in order to obtain a good generic
approximation of the utility function [de Neufville, 1990]. Formulation of the
utility function usually takes into account a person's attitudes toward risk
(uncertainty). Another common practice is that the utility function is usually
normalized to equal one for the best possible outcome and zero for the worst
possible outcome. Such normalization makes the absolute value of utility
function meaningful so that the utility value of various options can be used for
comparison with others. Three non-linear functional forms of utility are
commonly used to address the risk attitudes and normalize the utility easily.
These forms are presented next.
The first form is the Power Utility Function. The utility function is
expressed in the following functional expression:
U(X)= a+ b -X', (2.1)
X is the amount of benefit, y is the risk aversion coefficient, which is usually
less than 1 for X > 0, (i.e., a gain in benefit), and a and b are parameters for
normalizing the utility function.
The second form is the Negative Exponential Utility Function. The
utility function is expressed as follows:
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U(X)= 0-- b -e a, (2.2)
X is the benefit, a is the risk aversion coefficient, 0 and b are parameters for
normalizing the utility function.
The third form is the Expo-Power Utility Function. The utility
function is expressed as follows:
U(X) = 0 - b -exp(-, -X"), (2.3)
X is the benefit, a and P are the risk aversion coefficients, and 0 and b are
parameters for normalizing the utility function. The parameter restrictions for
Expo-Power Utility Function are 0 > b and a - 6 > 0.
2.2.2.3. Consideration of Risk Aversion in Utility Function Method
Among many alternatives available, most people are inclined to choose
the option with a lesser average benefit, but which is more certain. This
behavior is generally described as "risk aversion". In another situation, the
risk aversion is expressed as the amount that a person is willing to pay more
than the average for avoiding an uncertain loss. The risk aversion in the utility
function exhibits a diminishing marginal utility value. It reflects the fact that
people attach less and less value to each additional unit of a benefit they might
receive. Risk-averse behavior incamates the psychology of human nature
relative to decision-making.
The utility function theory takes into account the risk aversion through
its functional expression of the utility values. A utility function that exhibits
risk aversion usually has a shape as shown in Figure 2.1, since this shape of
utility function implies that for two options with equal utility values,
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U(X 2)
SU(X 0 )= PU(X1  -P)U 2)
U(X1)
0
Xmjn XO PX1 +(1-P)X 2  X2 Xmax
Benefit, X
Figure 2.1. A Typical Risk-Averse Utility Function (Normalized). The
curve of the function is concave (U"(x) < 0)
the benefit of the option that gives the gain for certain is less than the average
benefit of the other one that gives gains that are distributed in a probabilistic
manner. For example, assume that we have two options. One option will give
us the outcome of X0 for certain, the other one has two outcomes: X1 with a
probability of P and X2 with a probability of (1-P). As shown in Figure 2.1,
the utility value of the first option, U(Xo), is same as that of the second option,
which is equal to P -U(X 1 ) + (1- P) -U(X 2 ). However, the benefit of the
first option, Xo, is less than the average benefit of the second option, which is
P -X 1 + (1 - P) - X 2 These relations of the utility values and benefits between
two options exhibit the risk aversion of this DM. The difference between the
average benefit of an option and the benefit for certain that gives the equal
utility value is defined as the risk premium (RP), i.e.,
RP=P-X1 +(l-P)-X 2 -X 0
given
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U(X 0 ) = P -U(X1)+(1- P) -U(X 2)
In the power utility function, risk aversion is quantified through the
risk aversion coefficient, y. If 0<y<1, the function
U(X) = a + b -X' expresses a risk aversion utility. For example, given
X1>XO>X 2 , a person may be indifferent between Option A, which gives Xo for
certain, and Option B, which will give X1 with a probability of P or X2 with a
probability of (1-P). Then we know the utility function values of this person
have the following relation:
U(X) = P -U(XI)+ (1- P) -U(X 2 ) . (2.4)
If his utility can be expressed in the power utility function
U(X) a + b -X', then we have
X' = P -X( +(1-P) -X . (2.5)
If 0<y<1, the function f(X) = X" has a shape as shown in Figure 2.1, then
we know have
X 0 <P .X +(1-P)-X 2 . (2.6)
The left hand side of the inequality is the benefit that this person can obtain
from Option A for certain. The right hand side of the inequality is the average
benefit that this person can obtain from Option B. This means that if
coefficient, y, satisfies the condition of 0<y<1, the power utility function is
able to represent the risk aversion of a person. The value of y reflects the
degree of the risk aversion.
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For the negative exponential utility function U (X ) = 9 - b - e -a X
we can similarly demonstrate that this functional form can address a person's
risk aversion. The value of oc represents the degree of the risk aversion. The
higher cc is, the more risk averse a person is.
The expo-power utility function U(X)=9-b. exp(-,-- X') exhibits
risk aversion preference when its parameters meet certain specific conditions.
Under the restriction of c43>l, parameters must meet the relation of
a - a/X" -1 < 0 in order to exhibit the risk aversion for the expo-power
utility. The degree of risk aversion is measured by the quantity of
(1-a+a,#Xa)/X.
2.2.2.4. Application of Utility Function Method
The utility function method has been applied in many areas to help
DMs make their decisions. The broad applications of utility theory include but
are not limited to the following areas. In decisions for large-scale construction
projects such as construction of a dam, an airport, a port facility or a power
plant, the utility method is very helpful in evaluation of design alternatives,
such as site selection, capacity planning, construction scheduling, and many
other aspects. In agriculture, utility theory is applied to optimize the
producers' responses to changes in prices, income, or other risk environment.
In medicine, the application of the utility theory is focused on optimizing the
procedure of surgical operation, protocol of treatment or other activities with
risk. In the petroleum industry, utility theory is applied to help DMs to select
the location for drilling. In finance, the more sophisticated time-dependent
utility function method is a useful tool for optimizing a security portfolio from
time to time.
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However, there have been few applications of utility theory related to
the nuclear industry. From the literature survey, the utility theory has only
been applied to assess the environmental risk associated with nuclear projects,
such as construction of the waste repository.
2.2.3. Risk Function Method and Applications
2.2.3.1. Basis of Risk Function Method
The utility function expresses the preference value of the wealth (or
benefit) that a DM can obtain from an outcome. A rational DM will choose
the option that can give him the maximum (utility) value. However, in many
cases, a DM faces the question of how to choose an option that gives him
minimum hazard. In these cases, it is not convenient to evaluate the DM's
preference by the utility function. Instead, another form of value function
called risk function, R(Y), is better for this purpose. The quantity Y in the
function represents the hazard (or cost) of an option, and the value of risk
function, R(Y), is the risk value of this option.
The basic axioms for existence of the risk function are similar to those
for the utility function. As in the utility function method, the only criterion to
determine the preference among many alternatives is the comparison of their
expected riskfunction values. The lower the expected risk function value that
an option has, the more preferred this option is.
The risk aversion in the utility function exhibits a diminishing marginal
utility value. It reflects the fact that people attach less and less value to each
additional unit of a benefit they might receive. In contrast, the risk aversion in
the risk function gives an increasing marginal risk value. Namely, people
attach more and more risk value to each additional unit of a loss they might
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receive. A typical risk function that exhibits risk aversion is shown as Figure
2.2.
0
Ymin Hazard, Y Ymax
Figure 2.2. A Typical Risk-Averse Risk Function (Normalized)
The risk function can be considered as a transform of the utility
function. We may consider that receiving hazard Y is equivalent to obtaining
benefit (Ymax-Y) since the maximum hazard, Ymax is avoided. Given that both
the utility function and risk function are normalized, we may consider that
R(Y) is equivalent to 1 -U(Ymax-Y). Therefore, the risk function is another
form of expressing a person's preference value. Risk function value and utility
function value can compliment each other for a given option.
2.2.3.2. Forms of the Risk Function
There are not many forms of the risk function in common use. From
our literature survey, we find that the form used to date is relatively simple.
[Bohnblust and Slovic, 1998] It is expressed as follows:
R(Y) = Y.o(Y) -co, (2.7)
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where o is the cost of unit hazard (for example, the value of a human life)
which is relative to the nature of the hazard but independent of the quantity of
hazard; (p(Y) is the risk-aversion factor as a function of the hazard Y. p(Y) is
a segmental uniform function.
Given an outcome with consequence Y and probability P, the expected
risk function value of this outcome is given by P -R(Y). Practically, the
expected risk value is usually taken as an outcome's risk value. In many
cases, the risk function is defined with consideration of the probability that an
event will occur. For example, in the reference [Bohnblust and Slovic, 1998],
the risk function is defined as
R=P-C -(C)-co ,(2.8)
where C is the consequence, P is the probability, p(C) is the risk aversion
factor, and o is the marginal cost.
2.2.3.3. Consideration of Risk Aversion in the Risk Function Method
The risk function method takes risk aversion into account by means of
the risk aversion factor, T, which is usually a segmental uniform function of
the hazard Y. Figure 2.3 gives some examples of risk aversion factors which
have been used in recent safety studies by European railway companies.
It is important to keep in mind that the value of the risk aversion factor
depends on the activity considered. The risk aversion factors used by railway
companies may be different from those used by chemical plants or other types
of activities.
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Figure 2.3. Examples of Risk Aversion Factors Used by European Railway
Companies
The shortcoming of this method for considering the risk aversion is
that the risk aversion factors obtained from one activity cannot be generally
applied to other activities. Moreover, it is often too simple even just for one
activity. For example, the risk aversion factors of Tunnels Germany ignores
the difference in risk aversion between the consequences of 30 fatalities and
100 fatalities.
2.2.3.4. Application of Risk Function Method
The risk function method has been mostly applied to assess the risk of
highly hazardous activities such as risks of transporting highly hazardous
materials, or the potential risks associated with a chemical plant.
22
2.2.4. Prospect Theory and Applications
2.2.4.1. Description of the Theory
Conventional utility theory has difficulties in explaining how people
make decisions. Particularly, DMs tend to overweigh outcomes that are
considered certain, relative to outcomes that are merely probable. This
phenomenon, named the Certainty Effect, indicates that people assign more
weight to sure gains and sure losses. Another common behavior that violates
conventional utility theory principles is that risk aversion in the domain of
gains is accompanied by risk taking in the domain of losses. This
phenomenon is called the Reflection Effect. The third common decision-
making behavior is that DMs often disregard components that options share,
and focus on the components that distinguish the options in order to simplify
choosing among different options. This phenomenon is called the Isolation
Effect. The isolation effect leads to inconsistency in DMs' preferences when
the same choice is presented in different forms.
In order to overcome these difficulties, Prospect Theory was
developed in order to provide DMs a theoretical basis for their choices without
violating the basic principles of decision theory. [Kahnman and Tversky,
1979] After the theory was established, many follow-up studies were
conducted in order to strengthen the basis of the theory. [Tversky and
Kaheman, 1992], [Tversky and Fox, 1994] and [Tversky and Wakker, 1995].
Prospect theory departs from conventional utility theory in two major
respects. First, the value, v(x), of an option is assigned by the gains or losses,
x, that this option will bring to the DM with respect to the status quo. This is
different from utility theory in which the value of an option is given by the
final state that this option will bring to the DM. Second, probability is
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substituted by a weighting function '(P) which is a function of the probability
P. The weighting function gives a value of decision weight for a given
probability. The decision weights are generally lower than the corresponding
probabilities, except in the range of low probabilities where the decision
weights are higher than the corresponding probabilities.
In prospect theory, the DM's preference for an event is determined by
the summations of the values of each outcome multiplied by the corresponding
decision weights. If the event has outcome, x1, with a probability, P1,
outcome, x 2 , with a probability, P2, ... and so on, which can be denoted as (xi,
P1 ; x 2, P2; ... , xn, Pn), then the preference value of this event is given by the
relationship:
n
V(x, P;..X, P) = v(x) -W(P) .(2.9)
j=1
The most significant difference between prospect theory and
conventional utility theory is that prospect theory acknowledges the
dependency of the DM's risk attitudes upon the probabilities of the event
outcomes. This departs from a basic principle in conventional utility theory,
which states that the DM's preference is determined solely by the values of the
outcomes of the decisions. The probabilities of outcomes are only the
measurements of the beliefs and are taken into account in estimation of an
expectation value basis.
2.2.4.2. Applications of Prospect Theory
We have not found many real application cases of prospect theory yet.
Most literature about prospect theory is limited to baring theoretical
discussions. In one application, prospect theory was applied to investigate
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"acceptable risk" limit lines for nuclear reactors [Wu-Chien and Apostolakis,
1982].
2.2.5. Limitations of Existing Methods
In previous sections, we have summarized existing methods for
decision-making and their applications. However, these methods are not
directly applicable to the problem that we intend to solve in this thesis because
of their limitations. These limitations are as follows:
" The utility function method is not convenient nor is it amenable to
illustrating the risk of losing wealth (i.e., receiving hazard) graphically.
Therefore, it is not a good method for decision-making in nuclear plant
performance enhancement, in which the ultimate problem is the loss of
generating capability.
" In the existing risk function method, the way that risk aversion is taken
into account is too simple and subjective, and is not generally applicable.
Moreover, the existing risk function method is inconvenient to illustrate
the risk graphically.
2.3. CURRENT PRACTICES IN US NUCLEAR PLANTS
In order to understand the current practices of decision making for
improving plant performance, the author closely worked with plant engineers
and managers in two US nuclear plants. The following paragraphs summarize
the observations that the author obtained from these plants.
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2.3.1. Practice at PECO Energy
PECO Energy, formerly Philadelphia Electric Co., has been active in
systematically improving nuclear plant performance. PECO Energy has four
BWR-4 nuclear plants. They are Limerick Generating Station (LGS) Units 1
and 2 and Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Units 2 and 3. In
1996, PECO Energy started an initiative entitled Balance of Plant 700 (BOP-
700) in order to support its move to extend the operating cycles at all four
plants from eighteen months to two years and maintain its ability to execute
refueling outages within 20 to 30 days length. The goal of BOP-700 is to
ensure that the balance of plant systems could support continuous 700-day
operation. In order to achieve this goal, PECO Energy started thorough
investigations of BOP systems by a practice entitled Focus on Improvement
Team (FIT Team). The resources for improving plant performance are
allocated based on the results from FIT Team investigations.
FIT Teams are organized based on the systems that need to be
reviewed. Systems that need to be reviewed are chosen based on their direct
impacts on plant operational reliability. A joint effort between PECO Energy
and MIT had identified those systems with the most significant impacts on the
plant reliability through an extensive analysis of industry-wide and plant-
specific historic operational data. These systems either have caused or have
the ability to cause plant shutdowns or load drops.
The goals of FIT Team activities are to identify weak or potentially
weak areas within a system, develop methods to strengthen these areas, and
improve overall system reliability. A FIT Team meeting is usually targeted
for a three-day commitment, during which the cross-disciplined team members
will meet and review the design, maintenance, and operation of the system.
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The FIT Team review includes an in-depth review of the system design,
historical corrective maintenance on system components, and the preventive
maintenance activities currently in place for the system.
The FIT Team usually consists of the appropriate System Manager and
Backup System Manager, PBAPS (or LGS) counterparts, and representatives
from the applicable organizations such as Design Engineering, Component
Engineering, Operations, Maintenance, Nuclear Maintenance Division,
Instrument & Control and Health Physics. When possible, plant staff with the
most knowledge of the system being reviewed are selected for the FIT team.
Usually, the system manager is selected as the team leader.
A typical FIT Team three-day review usually includes activities
as:follows:
Day 1:
" Overview the system and subsystems;
* Review the industry experience;
* Discuss known "weak links" or problem areas;
" Develop a list of problems and proposed improvements.
Day 2:
" Review system design and logic;
" Continue developing the list of problems and improvements.
Day 3:
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* Review system experience (including corrective maintenance and
preventive maintenance);
" Continue developing the list of problems and improvements;
* Separate out the "Just Do It" items (which do not need further
management approval,) and items requiring further investigation;
* Assign the "Just Do It" items and items requiring further
investigation to appropriate individuals for action;
* Prioritize the major problems and the engineering improvements
proposed for these problems.
The results of the FIT Team review include minutes documenting the
attendees, topics discussed, proposed solutions, items requiring further
investigation, and "Just Do It" items. Items that can be considered "Just Do
It" items are typically of low cost. There include procedure revisions, minor
changes to preventive maintenance activities, changes to preventive
maintenance frequencies, and the addition of new preventive maintenance.
From the minutes, the items requiring further investigation and the "Just Do It"
items are documented and assigned for evaluation under a system FIT Action
Request.
The major problems, and associated proposed solutions, are prioritized
into categories of high, medium, or low priority, and will be documented
separately. Each team member has five votes to select five items that he thinks
are most important based on the impact on system reliability, the feasibility of
implementing the idea, and the associated cost. The ranking of a particular
problem's priority is obtained by the number of the votes it wins from the
team. Those items with highest voted preference are documented by the
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system manager. These items then follow the normal process for plant system
improvements.
Through the FIT Team activities, PECO Energy stations had reviewed
many systems. The systems that have been reviewed or been planned to be
reviewed as of June 1998 are listed in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2.
Limerick Generating Station (LGS):
Generator and Auxiliaries Feedwater Heating
Air Removal and Offgas Electrical Hydralic Control (Joint
with PBAPS)
Condensate Drywell Chilled Water
Instrument Air 13 KV
220/500 KV Fire Protection
Table 2.1. List of Systems That Have Been Reviewed or Been Planned to Be
Reviewed By FIT Teams at Limerick Generation Station
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS):
Generator and Auxiliaries Condenser
Feedwater Electrical Hydraulic Control (Joint with
LGS)
Condensate Circulating Water
Service Water Feedwater Heating
Table 2.2. List of Systems That Have Been Reviewed or Been Planned to Be
Reviewed By FIT Teams at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
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The FIT team practice at PECO Energy is one of the most intensive
efforts that US nuclear utilities have tried to systematically improve their plant
performance. However, we found that the method they adopted is not
quantitative. In particularly, the way they determined the importance of issues
is too subjective. In addition, the issues of risk aversion and uncertainty were
not explicitly addressed.
The follow-up of FIT team recommendations has been weak. In fact,
most of FIT team recommendations to higher management were bit acted upon
for at least six months after their formulation. This appears to be because the
plant management is not fully committed to this new approach and because the
FIT team approach does not provide management with a complete and
convincing enough basis for decision making.
2.3.2. Practice at Seabrook Station, North Atlantic Energy
Service Corporation (NAESCO)
The Seabrook Nuclear Power Station (SNPS) of North Atlantic Energy
Service Corporation (NAESCO) is located in Seabrook, New Hampshire. It is
a Westinghouse design 4-loop PWR station with rated power of 1220 MWe.
Resources for improving plant performance are allocated at this plant through
a committee entitled Seabrook Modification Resource Committee (SMRC).
The SMRC consists of representatives from different organizations in
the plant. The members of the SMRC include a chairperson, who is assigned
by the station director, the budget control services manager, the chemistry and
health physics manager, the director of nuclear engineering, the maintenance
manager, the maintenance service manger, the operations manager, the
technical support manager and the work control manger. In addition, other
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North Atlantic personnel may be requested to attend committee meetings as
needed to support deliberations.
The goal of the SMRC is to prioritize and direct the use of North
Atlantic resources in the implementation of funding requests. Its basic duties
include 1) Request and obtain appropriate funds to be allocated for all SMRC
controlled funding requests; 2) Approve or disapprove all proposed and scoped
funding requests; 3) Monitor budgetary performance for SMRC approved
funding requests during development and installation; 4) Provide
recommendations to the Budget and Long Range Planning Committee
(BLRPC) for major projects which have estimated funding requests greater or
equal to $250,000; 5) Assign SMRC rankings to funding requests and
prioritize the preliminary schedule for implementation to allow allocation
planning, and designate the appropriate groups of personnel for the
implementation; 6) Periodically review the facilities budget, refurbishment
budget, minor maintenance budget, and others as necessary to ensure adequate
budgeting; 7) Periodically review the open industrial safety issues as presented
by a member of the Industrial Safety Action Team (ISAT); 8) Periodically
review the operations workarounds list and longstanding equipment issues
matrix; 9) Perform initial development and review of the rolling 5 year major
project plan.
Figure 2.4 shows the flow path of the SMRC decision process
regarding funding requests. The criteria for the decision making are estimated
costs, the cost/benefit ratio and the SMRC ranking of the issue. The SMRC
ranking is dependent on which category this issue falls into. The values of the
importance ranking of each category are given in Table 2.1. These values of
ranking are assigned by the plant management. These are done subjectively,
often without solid quantitative background.
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Engineering/Requesto
Originator/Sponsor Develops Detailed
Initiates Funding Request ReCuest
with Justification No
Engineering >$10k
Develop Preliminary (Material & labor)
Solution/Cost
Yes
SMRC ,, Yes Work Control GroupAuthorizes "Go Ahead" Provides SMRC Estimatefor Funding Request Classifies Expenditure
No (O&M or Capital)
SMRC
Places on Defers
"Potential" SMRC Defers or SMRC Review
List for Disapproves and Approves
Consideration
Disapproves Yes
Yes No
Copy Provided to Item Sponsor Obtains
Originator/Requestor $250K BLPRC Approval
SMRC Member No
Communicate Directly
;I, i t-4 +- f- -Yes
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Ensure Feedback Loop
Exists
Engineering
Develop Engineering
Schedule and
Implementation Schedule,
Assign CIE
Voidds Lj Open Work Order and
Appropriate Tasks
SFnd Develop DCR and
n Engineering
Obtain SORC Approval
(DCRs Only)
Develop Definitive Estimate
Level 2 Implementation
Schedule and Cost Benefit
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Engineering No Exceeds SMRC
End Voids Estimate by 10%
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Originator/Requestor
SMRC Member
Communicate Directly
with Originator to
Ensure Feedback Loop
Exists
Yes
Seabrook Modification Resource Committee (SMRC) Funding
Request Review Flow Chart
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Figure 2.4.
Category
Importance Category
Ranking
10.0 Industrial Safety
9.8 Licensing/MUST DO/Broken
9.7 Maintenance Rule
9.5 Trip Avoidance
9.3 Significant Outage Reduction
9.2 Plant Optimization - Payback of 5 years of less
9.0 TMOD Closeout
8.9 Recurrent Deficiency
8.8 Equipment Reliability - Plant trip
8.7 Equipment Reliability - Power reduction
8.6 Equipment Reliability - Equipment failure
8.5 Enhancement - Highly wanted
7.0 - 8.0 Enhancement - Others
Table 2.1 Seabrook Modification Resource Committee (SMRC) Ranking Of
Different Categories of Issues
2.3.3. Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Electrical Power Research Institute developed a software package
entitled "Regulatory and Administrative Burden Reduction (RBR)" [EPRI,
1997] to help nuclear utilities assess and make changes to regulatory and
administrative activities. This program is basically an automatic cost/benefit
analysis tool without clearly stated consideration of risk aversion and
uncertainty associated with the decision attributes.
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2.3.4. Direction for the improvement of current practices
From our literature survey and the examination of current practices in
US nuclear power plants, we know that there is lack of a systematic method in
the nuclear industry to help decision-makers allocate their resources with
consideration of risk aversion and uncertainty. Nuclear utilities managers need
such a method so that they can establish the priorities consistently and use
their resources efficiently for the maximum return on the investment.
The objective of this thesis is to reduce this shortcoming of current
practices in nuclear plant investment allocation. We will develop a structural
method to prioritize issues and efficiently allocate the investment with
consideration of risk aversion and uncertainty in a consistent way.
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Chapter 3
DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODOLOGY
3.1. INTRODUCTION
A good decision-maker (DM) should go through four steps in order to
achieve an efficient investment allocation. These steps are: 1) Identify the
problems that degrade performance; 2) Rank the problems that are identified
in order of importance; 3) Formulate engineering improvements for those
problems with high importance rank; 4) Select the best engineering
improvements in term of economic criteria, such as return rates on investment
and uncertainties associated with return rates.
In addition to these four steps, a good decision-making process should
incorporate a consistent method for quantifying decision-making attributes in
each step. The first step of the decision-making process can be implemented
through extensive investigation of operational history and discussion by a
group of experts in the plant. Usually many problems will be identified after
this step. However, due to limited resources in manpower and capital
investment, not all problems can be nor should be equally addressed. Efforts
should focus on those problems with high impact on plant performance. Thus,
the second step - ranking the importance of problems - is necessary.
Unfortunately, there is a lack of a systematic, quantitative method to rank the
importance of different problems in current practice. This chapter describes a
new method developed in this thesis for quantifying the importance of
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different problems. After the importance of the problems has been quantified,
it is obvious that maximum effort should be focused on those problems with
the most significant impact on plant performance. Engineering solutions for
each problem can be formulated via a thorough investigation of the problems
and a group discussion, such as the brainstorming process. This chapter will
provide some directions for the investigation and guidelines for the discussion.
In order to solve a certain problem, usually several engineering improvements
will be technically possible. Hence, at the plant level, since many problems
exist at a same time, we will have even more technically possible
improvements which compete for the limited resource to fund upgrades and
repairs. However, technically feasible improvements may be not
economically efficient. In order to identify the most economically efficient
engineering improvements for plant performance enhancement, a consistent
method needs to be developed for ranking these competing engineering
improvements. The limited investment typically available should be allocated
only to those engineering improvements with relatively high economic
efficiency.
In this proposed decision-making process, two important issues need to
be considered. They are the attitude of decision-makers toward risk (which is
risk-aversion in most cases) and the uncertainties of all quantified parameters.
Although there are many other factors affecting a DM's decision, these two
factors are the most common which have not been well addressed in the
literature and current practices. When we studied the decision making process
in nuclear plants, we found that most decision-makers addressed these two
issues using their intuition rather than through a structured approach. It is
desirable to develop a systematic method to take into account the decision-
maker's risk attitudes. In addition, such a method should enable a DM to deal
with the uncertainties of quantification. This chapter presents such a method
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to address these two important issues based upon a new measure developed in
this thesis work termed the Risk Aversion Index - RAI.
Through our study in nuclear plants, we found that a DM makes
decisions based upon not only the direct economic impacts, such as materials,
labor and replacement power costs, but also other "imponderable" factors,
such as regulator attention, INPO rating, and the attitudes of the Board of
Directors. In most cases, the consideration of these "imponderable" factors is
implicit and informal. For the same issue, DMs with different backgrounds
may apply different weights to the same factors in the decision-making
process. For example, a DM with an engineering background may place more
weight on safety issues than a DM with a financial background, who may
place more weight on the impact on power generation. On the other hand, the
same DM may use different weights for the same factor at different times. It is
understandable that a DM would worry less about the INPO rating when there
are other problems in the plant competing for his attention and resources than
when there are not. All these differences have never been explicitly,
consistently addressed.
This chapter describes the method developed in this thesis to quantify
these "imponderable" factors so that the considerations of these factors can be
formally assessed. This method elicits all involved DMs' beliefs on the
consequence of these factors in the form of probability distribution functions
(pdf-s), and utilizes such a vocabulary in seeking consensus among all DMs.
Through this method, the biases among different DMs can be reduced.
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3.2. BASIC CONCEPT: RISK AVERSION INDEX (RAI)
3.2.1. Risk-averse, Risk-neutral, And Risk-taking
To introduce the RAI risk aversion measures, we must clarify what risk
attitudes a decision-maker may have. In order to define the risk attitudes, we
need to introduce the definitions of Preference and Indifference in decision
making.
Preference: Assume that a decision-maker (DM) has more than one option,
each option having one or more possible outcomes. If Option A
is preferred to Option B by the DM, we state that the DM has
higher preference (value) for Option A than Option B. This
situation is denoted as:
A>B.
Indifference: If a DM has no preference between two options C and D, we
state that the DM is indifferent to Option C versus Option D.
This situation is denoted as:
C~D.
For all options that a decision maker has, says A, B, C, D, E, ... , we
always can place them in the sequence of their preference (values). For
example, we can rank these options in the following order:
E>C~D>A>B>F ......
if their preference values are in such an order.
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Before we define risk attitudes, we need to introduce a notation for
characteristics of future events. If a future event has a net consequence of C
with an occurrence probability of P, we denote this event as Event (C, P) or
simply (C, P). The product of C and P is called the Expectation Value of this
event.
We next define risk attitudes. There are three basic risk attitudes -
Risk-averse, Risk-neutral, and Risk-taking. Assume that the consequence C of
event (C, P) is the loss in resource for a DM, and this DM considers that event
(C, P) is indifferent to the event of consequence Co which has a certainty of
occurring, i.e.,
(CP) ~ (CO,1).
The risk attitudes are defined as follows:
Risk-averse: If CO is greater than the expectation value of event(C, P), i.e.,
CO > CP,
then this DM is risk-averse.
Risk-neutral: If Co is equal to the expectation value of event(C, P), i.e.,
Co =C.P,
then this DM is risk-neutral.
Risk-taking: If CO is smaller than the expectation value of event(C, P), i.e.,
CO <C-P,
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then this DM is risk-taking.
3.2.2. Measurement of Risk and Risk Aversion
3.2.2.1 Measurement of risk - Risk Function
Why does a DM prefer one option over another? The reason is
because he implicitly assigns a value to each option in his mind, and the
difference in the implied values determines this DM's preference for each
option. Conventionally, this implied value is called the "utility" and usually is
normalized from 0 to 1, where 0 corresponds to the worst possible outcome
and 1 corresponds to the best possible outcome. A utility value can be
illustrated by the Utility Function U(x), where x is the benefit that a DM can
gain. In most literature about decision-making theory and practices, the Utility
Function is typically used to determine the DM's preference to multiple
options. In Chapter 2, we have discussed the most popular utility functions in
details.
However, for the specific problem that this thesis will deal with, the
utility function is not a very good measure to determine the DM's preference.
Unlike other decision-making cases, in which the DM is to make a decision on
how to use his resources to acquire some uncertain bigger resource gains, the
goal of this thesis is to help a nuclear DM decide how to use his resources to
avoid another uncertain larger loss in resources. It was found to be necessary
to introduce a new format of preference value measurement to quantify a
DM's real value of the resource loss. This measurement of preference is
named the Risk Function. As illustrated later in this Chapter, we demonstrate
that the concept of Risk Function is much easier to use for evaluating the
preference among competing options occurring in nuclear plants than is the
Utility Function. The Risk Function is defined as follows:
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Risk Function: If a future event has the probability P to cause a DM to suffer
the consequence of losing resource C, then the risk function
value of this event will depend upon the probability P and the
consequence of C as
R = f(C, P).
For two different events, if their risk function
Event 1 and R2 of Event 2, have relation of:
values, R1 of
R1> R2 , then this DM considers that Event 1 is more risky
than Event 2, or equally so, Event 1 is less preferred
than Event 2 for this DM;
R = R2, then this DM considers that Event 1
Event 2, or equally, Event 1 and
indifferent for this DM;
is as risky as
Event 2 are
R1 <R 2, then this DM considers that Event 1 is less risky than
Event 2, or equally, Event 1 is more preferred to
Event 2 for this DM.
3.2.2.2. Measurement of risk aversion - Risk Aversion Index (RAI)
The risk of a future event can be measured by its risk function value R.
The form of the risk function depends upon the DM's risk attitude and the
nature of the decision that a DM needs to make. From our study, we found
that the risk functions of DMs for decisions regarding nuclear power plants
can be approximated in a simple functional expression as:
R(CP)= Ca p (3.1)
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where a is a parameter defined as the Risk Aversion Index (RAI). It is a
measurement of the magnitude of a DM's risk-aversion. Different DMs may
have different RAI values because of their different risk attitudes. As shown
later, different RAI values represent different risk attitudes, and the higher the
RAI value is, the more risk-averse the DM is. Therefore, the RAI value, a, can
be used as a measurement of risk attitude.
Assume that a DM considers that event (C, P) and the certain event
(Co, 1) to be indifferent. The risk function value R of the event (C, P) and the
risk function value RO of the certain event are:
R = C' -P and RO =C-
Since the DM is indifferent between these two events, we have the result,
RO =R,
or
CO =C.P". (3.2)
The "a" value has three possibilities:
a=1: CO = C -P , thus, the DM is risk-neutral;
a >l: CO > C -P, Since P always has a value in the interval of [0,1],
thus, the DM is risk-averse;
a <1: CO < C -P, thus the DM is risk-taking.
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Every event (C, P) can be represented by a point in the Consquece-
Probability (C-P) plane, for which the consequence, C, is plotted in
logarithmic scale as the X-axis, and the probability, P, is plotted in logarithmic
scale as the Y-axis. For example, an event with consequence of 10 million
dollars and probability of 0.01 is represented by the point 1, and an event with
consequence of 100 million dollars and probability of 0.0001 is represented by
the point 2 in Figure 3.1.
Consequence-Probability (C-P) Plane
iRisk Premium Certainty Equivalent
Ce -- ) Cost, CO
P;
0
1E+O -
1 E-1 -
1E-2 -
1E-3
1 E-4
1IE
I I I I W
1E+4 IE+5 1E+6 1E+7 1E+8+3 1 E+9
Consequence, C (in dollars)
Figure 3.1. Illustration of Consequence-Probability (C-P) Plane, Equivalent
Risk Line (ERL), and Certainty Equivalent Cost (CEC). All events on a
same ERL have equal risk function value, thus are indifferent for the DM.
The CEC value of an event is the intersection between the certainty line
and the ERL through this event.
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Equal Risk
Risk Neutral Line
(Expectation
Value Line) 2
--
Line
In the C-P plane, every point corresponds to a combination of
consequence, C, and probability, P, of events. For any event (C, P), there is a
corresponding risk function value R, which is given by the relationship,
R(C,P)= f(C,P).
Although the R value for a certain event (C, P) may be different for different
DMs, there should be only one R value for an event(C, P) for an individual
DM. If we connect all the points (events) with same risk function value, R, of
a particular DM, then we will define a line named the Equal Risk Line (ERL)
of this DM, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. All the points (events) on an ERL
have equal risk function values for this specific DM. Hence, all the events
along the ERL will be indifferent for this DM. Specifically, if a DM's risk
function is expressed as Equation (3.1),
R(C,P)=Ca .P, (3.1)
then his ERL will be a straight line in the log-log C-P plane, where RAI value,
a, will be the negative of the slope of the ERL. Figure 3.1 illustrates an ERL
for the case of a = 2. If a DM's RAI equals 2, then his risk function value R1
for event 1(107, 10-2) and the risk function value R2 for event 2(108, 10 -4) will
be the same. Both are equal to 1012. Therefore, event 1 and event 2 fall on the
same ERL, as shown in Figure 3.1.
There is an upper probability limit in the C-P plane, which is the P = 1
line. No single event will fall into the area above this line since no events can
have probability larger than unity. This P = 1 line is called the Certainty Line.
Any event located on this line is a certain event because the probability that
this event will occur is unity.
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For any event (C, P), a DM can always draw an ERL through this
event. As shown in Figure 3.1, an ERL through Point 2 is drawn. This ERL
will have an intersection with the certainty line. The corresponding
consequence value of this intersection, denoted as Co, is defined as the
Certainty Equivalent Cost (CEC) of the original event (C, P). The meaning of
this point is that this DM will be indifferent to spending Co for sure versus
spending C for an event with probability P. Or expressed alternatively, Co is
the certainty cost of event (C, P). Moreover, Co is the maximum cost that this
DM is willing to spend for avoiding the event (C, P).
Through point (C, P), we can also draw an Expectation Value Line, on
which all points have same expectation value of events, i.e., the product of C
and P of all events are the same. For example, Figure 3.1 shows the
expectation value line through Point 2. The intersection of the expectation
value line and the certainty line will give the expectation of event (C, P),
which is denoted as CE, as shown in Figure 3.1. The difference between Co
and CE is the Risk Premium (RP), as shown in Figure 3.1.
Now let us go back to see why the RAI value, a, can be a measurement
of DM's risk-aversion.
As shown in Figure 3.2, for the event ($108, 1 0 4), two different DMs,
DM A and DM B, can draw two different ERLs through this point in the C-P
plane because of their different risk attitudes. As an example, DM A has RAI
value aA equal to 2 and DM B has RAI value aB equal to 4/3. Their different
RAI values will give different Certainty Equivalent Costs for the same event.
For DM A, his Certainty Equivalent Cost of event ($108, 104) is $106; for DM
B, his Certainty Equivalent Cost of the same event ($108, 1 0 4) is $10 5 . In
willing to spend 105 dollars. The reason for such a difference is their different
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Different Decision Makers in C-P Plane
COB COA
1E+O -
1 E-1 - Decision-
maker A
aA
1E-2 -
.0
Decision-
S1E-3 - maker B
aB
', Event
1E-4
IE+3 1E+4 1E+5 1E+6 1E+7 IE+8 IE+9
Consequence, C (in dollars)
Figure 3.2. Illustration of the Difference Between Decision Makers With
Different Risk Aversion Index (RAI) Values. For a same event, different
DMs have different CEC values because of their different RAI values.
other words, DM A is willing to spend a maximum of 106 dollars to avoid an
event with $108 consequence with a probability of 10-4, and DM B is only
degrees of risk aversion, which is measured by their RAI values, aA and aB.
As shown in the figure, it is seen that higher RAI value will give a higher CEC
for the same event. Namely, a DM with higher RAI value is more risk averse.
Therefore, the RAI value, a, can be a measurement of the degree of a DM's
risk aversion.
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3.2.3. Determination of Preference By Applying RAI concept
By applying the RAI concept, we can easily compare the values of
different events for a DM. Assuming that a DM has same RAI value for all
events, we can draw a ERL through each event. All these ERLs will be
parallel in the C-P plane. The intersection points of these ERLs with the
Certainty Line will give us the CEC value for each event. The CECs establish
the DM's importance ranking for all the events.
For example, Figure 3.3 illustrates a DM's importance ranking for
three different events. The DM illustrated in this Figure has a RAI value of 2.
The three events shown are event 1($108, 104), event 2($106, 10-2) and
Different Events in C-P Plane
I E+O
.0
0
1 E-1 -
1E-2 -
1 E-3
1E-4 I
I E+3
C02 Co1 C03
1E+4 IE+5 1E+6 IE+7 IE+8 1E+9
Consequence, C (in dollars)
Figure 3.3. Illustration of How A DM's Preferences Can Be Ranked By The
Certainty Equivalent Cost (CEC) Values of Different Events
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Event 2
vent 1
event 3($3.16x10 7, 10-1). Three ERLs with slope of -2 are drawn through those
three events. These ERLs give three CEC values, Coi, C02 , and C03 ,
corresponding to event 1, 2, and 3, respectively. From these CEC values, this
DM can easily determine his importance ranking of three events as
Event 3 > Event 1 > Event 2.
3.3. STUDY OF RAI VALUES
So far, we have assumed that the RAI value of a DM is constant for all
events although different DMs may have different RAI values. However, is
this hypothesis appropriate? We need to study the DMs' risk attitudes toward
different combinations of consequence and probability, and the corresponding
RAI values that characterize their risk attitudes.
3.3.1. Method of Study
The RAI value measures a DM's degree of risk preferences. In order
to obtain a DM's RAI value, we need to study his risk preferences to different
events. The study was done through the interviews with nuclear DMs. DMs
were asked to compare the acceptability of competing events in terms of their
consequence magnitude and probability of occurrence. In these interviews, the
consequence of an event has been abstracted as a general financial outcome
rather than any specific costs associated with the engineering details of
specific problems.
The procedure of interview is summarized as follows.
First, an interviewee was told to assume he is a nuclear plant manager,
which means that he 1) runs a complex engineering system that has initial
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investment of about $2 billion and annual revenue of $200 million to $300
million; 2) has spending power of about a $100 million O&M budget every
year; 3) has requests for spending which are five times more than the budget
that he has; 4) should recognize that he will be unable to spend anything on
some other things if he decides to spend money on a particular item.
Second, the interviewee was asked the questions below. In these
questions, we assumed that the regulatory, oversight (INPO) or public
relations impacts on the action to deal with the problem can be quantified in
terms of budget expense. Thus the consequence in the questions includes all
possible costs should the event occur. Before asking questions, the interviewer
presents a situation as described below:
Probability, P
ProemP- Loss of
Solution:
Cost of $CO
Figure 3.4. Illustration of the Hypothetical Situation Presented to Interviewees:
Existence of A Problem That May Cause Loss of $C With A Probability of
P, and Can Be Eliminated By A Solution With Cost of $Co
In this situation, there is a problem in the plant, which has probability
of P to cause a consequence of loss of C dollars. The interviewee has a
solution to eliminate this problem with cost of CO dollars. This interview is to
determine the maximum values of CO that an interviewee is logically justified
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in spending in order to eliminate the problem for different combinations of
consequence C and probability P. This Co value is the Certainty Equivalent
Cost (CEC) of the corresponding event (C, P).
Each interviewee will be tested with sixteen hypothetical events with
different combinations of C and P. C will be varied from 100 million, 10
million, 1 million to 100 thousand dollars. For each C, the probability will
vary from 10~4 (one in ten thousand chances,) 10- (one in a thousand chance,)
10-2 (one in a hundred chance,) to 10-1 (one in ten chance.)
In order to obtain the CEC value, CO, as accurate as possible, the
interviewer may use some interview techniques:
The first technique is called the "approaching method". For example,
the interviewer is to determine interviewee's CEC value for the event ($108,
10-2). First, the interviewee is prompted by a relatively small amount of Co,
say $105. Usually, most interviewees are willing to spend such an amount of
money to avoid the event ($108, 10-2). The subsequent questions will vary the
amount of Co. The second amount prompted is a relatively large number, say
$5x10 7. Most interviewees will not be willing to spend such an amount. Then
we know that interviewee's CEC, the maximum amount they are willing to
spend, must be some number between $105 and $5x10 7. To find this CEC
value, we try amounts of $5x10 5 and $107, and so on until the range is
sufficiently small and the interviewee can provide the maximum amount
directly. For this example, suppose it is $5x10 6.
The second technique is that an interviewer should ask the CEC values
for different events randomly. For example, after obtaining the CEC for event
($108, 1 0 -4), the interviewer would ask the CEC for another event with
different C and P, say event ($106, 10-2). If the interviewer asks for the CEC
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for event ($108, 10-3) followed by the event ($108, 10-), it is very possible that
the answer to event ($108, 10-3) is influenced by the answer to event ($108, 10-
4). By randomly asking questions regarding events, the influence from
previous answers can be reduced, thus increasing the possibility of obtaining
intuitive CEC values from the interviewee.
For each set of C and P, we will obtain a corresponding CEC value Co.
This Co value with its corresponding combination of (C, P) can be translated
into a RAI value, a, by using the following relationship:
ln P
a = .P (3.3)
InCO -lnC
From each interviewee, we obtained sixteen RAI values. From
nineteen interviewees, we totally obtained 304 RAI values. As demonstrated
in Section 3.3.4, the results of this study show that most RAI values from all
interviewees fall into a relatively narrow range. A generic RAI value can be
obtained by averaging all RAI values from interviewees and for all events.
3.3.2. Background of Interviewees
In this study, two groups of decision-makers are interviewed. The first
group of decision-makers is system engineers. While this group of
interviewees usually makes few final decisions, they are the initiators of the
issues. The values of decision-making attributes for higher level management
decisions come from this group of people. Therefore, their risk preferences
are important in the whole decision-making process because they determine
which issues will be paid attention to. The second group of decision-makers is
plant managers. They include plant vice presidents, engineering directors and
department managers. This group of interviewees is the final decision-makers
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in a nuclear plant. The amount of spending they control may vary depending
upon their positions and responsibilities,. However, they usually have
authority to determine how to use the budgets assigned under their
responsibility.
The interviewees were randomly selected from four US nuclear power
plants. Due to the MIT rules on confidentiality on use of human subject in
research, we cannot reveal the names of these interviewees and the power
plants that they work for. All interviewees' participation in this study was
voluntary.
3.3.3. Data from interviews
The first group of interviewees includes ten engineers from the same
plant. They are noted as El, E2, E3, ... and E10. The second group of
interviewees includes nine mangers from four nuclear power plants, who are
noted as Ml, M2, ... and M9. The results of interviews are summarized in
Table 3.1. Table 3.1 includes 19 sub-tables. Each sub-table contains sixteen
original CEC values that are elicited from an interviewee.
El:
Certainty Consequence, C (Dollars)
Equivalent Cost,
Co, (Dollars) 101 101 101 1W5
101 5.00E+05 0 0 0
103 3.OOE+06 2.OOE+05 0 0
,M 102 8.OOE+06 6.OOE+05 5.OOE+04 0
10' 2.OOE+07 2.OOE+06 2.OOE+05 2.OOE+04
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E2:
Certainty
Equivalent Cost,
Co, (Dollars)
CI
Consequence, C (Dollars)
i01 106
'I 4 I
2.OOE+05 2.OOE+04 0 0
11 1.OOE+06 1.OOE+05 1.OOE+04 0
1- 5.OOE+06 5.OOE+05 5.OOE+04 0
2.OOE+07 2.OOE+06 2.00E+05 2.50E+04
E3:
Certainty
Equivalent Cost,
Co, (Dollars)
$
.0
10-4
Consequence, C (Dollars)
108
I 4 I
1.OOE+06 1.OOE+05
106
0
101
0
10- 5.OOE+06 5.OOE+05 2.OOE+04 1.OOE+04
10-2 1.50E+07 5.OOE+06 5.OOE+05 5.OOE+04
10-1 9.OOE+07 8.OOE+06 8.OOE+05 9.OOE+04
E4:
Certainty
Equivalent Cost,
CO, (Dollars)
0
10-4
Consequence, C (Dollars)
108 101
1 4 4
1.00E+05 1.OOE+04 0 0
101 1.OOE+06 1.OOE+05 0 0
10-2 1.OOE+07 1.OOE+06 5.OOE+04 5.OOE+03
10~1 2.50E+07 2.50E+06 2.OOE+05 2.50E+04
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___________ & ___________
1
101 101
101
101
101
E5:
Certainty
Equivalent Cost,
Co, (Dollars)
10 -4
io-,
10- j 1.OOE+06 2.OOE+05 2.OOE+04 2.OOE+03
10~1
d I I
E6:
Certainty
Equivalent Cost,
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Table 3.1. Original Certainty Equivalent Cost Data Elicited From Interviews
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In addition to the data summarized above, many interviewees also
mentioned that realistically there is upper limit in spending to fix a single
problem. This upper limit varies from plant to plant, and it can be far smaller
than the annual budget. For example, according to a manager of an old plant,
any problem requiring more than $7 million to fix will cause the
decommissioning of his plant. The answers for CEC summarized above are
based upon hypothetical situations. In reality, it may be not possible for a DM
to spend up to his CEC for an event although he is willing to spend.
3.3.4. Analysis and conclusion of the study
3.3.4.1. Meaning of Zero RAI values
As shown in the interview CEC data summarized above, for those events with
low probabilities and low consequences, the CEC is equal to zero. The
probability of event occurrence is so remote or the consequence is so small
that the interviewee does not want to pay attention to it. What are RAI values
corresponding to these zero CEC-s? To answer this question, let us go back to
see what zero-CEC would mean in the C-P plane.
Figure 3.5 shows that, for event ($108, 1 0 -4), if the RAI is 2, the CEC
will be CO, 2; and if the RAI is 4/3, the CEC will be CO, 4/3. Co, 43 is less than
Co, 2. In the other words, we can say that for the same event, if the RAI value
becomes smaller, the CEC will reduce accordingly. We can imagine that the
CEC will move toward the left end of consequence axis when the RAI value
becomes smaller and smaller. If the RAI value becomes zero, the intersection
point of the ERL with the certainty line will be the left infinite end of the
certainty line. The CEC value corresponding to this infinite end is equal to
zero. (Keep in mind that the consequence axis is shown on a logarithmic
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scale.) Therefore, we can also say that the zero CEC value means the
interview's RAI value for this event is equal to zero.
Meaning of Zero-CEC in the C-P Plane
0~
(U
.0
0
I-0~
IE+O
1E-1 -
IE-2 -
1E-3 -
1E-4 L
1 E+3
CO,2
1E+4 IE+5 IE+6 IE+7 1E+8 I E+9
Consequence, C (in dollars)
Figure 3.5. Illustration of the Meaning of Zero Certainty Equivalent Cost. For
a same event, a smaller RAI value yields a smaller CEC value. As RAI
value, a, tends to zero, the CEC value of the event tends to zero.
Therefore, the zero CEC value indicates a corresponding zero RAI value.
3.3.4.2. RAI Values and Comparisons
* Calculated RAI Values
Based upon the data obtained from our interviews, each set of Co and
its corresponding (C, P) combination can give us a value of RAI. The formula
for such a transformation is Equation (3.3). The calculated RAI values are
summarized in Table 3.2. Table 3.2 includes 19 sub-tables. Each sub-table
contains sixteen calculated RAI values from a same interviewee.
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Table 3.2. Risk Aversion Index (RAI) Values Calculated From the Original
Certainty Equivalent Cost Data
Analyses To Be Done
The analysis of RAI values includes two steps. First, the RAI values
tabulated above are analyzed separately for each group of interviewees. By
analyzing the RAI values from same group of interviewees, we hope to
understand the common decision-making pattern within the same group of
people. Also, comparison of the analysis results from two different groups
enables us to discover if any big difference in decision-making patterns exists
between these two groups of people who are at different levels of the decision-
making hierarchy in the nuclear power plant. Second, all RAI values will be
pooled in the hope of deducing some general conclusions about the decision-
making in a nuclear power plant.
For each group of interviewees, their individual RAI values will first
be plotted based on the (C, P) combinations of events. Through these plots,
the variation among individuals will be observed. Then the average RAI
values for same original event (C,P) will be plotted in order to obtain the
general trend of decision-making preferences within a group. The standard
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deviation of each average RAI value will be calculated as well so that the
variability of RAI values can be estimated.
After the RAI values for each group have been obtained, they will be
compared against each other. By such comparisons, we hope to discover the
difference between two groups of DM-s and evaluate the magnitude and
significance of the differences.
Finally, all RAI values will be analyzed together without regarding the
origin of the interviewees. The general trend of RAI value changes will be
deduced from this analysis. In order to emphasize such a generic trend, the
results of generic RAI value analysis will be specially covered in next section:
"Risk Preference Regions in The C-P Plane".
* Analysis of RAI Values From The Engineer Group
The RAI values will be plotted versus the probability of events for a
given consequence. Figures 3.6 to 3.9 show the RAI values versus probability
for the consequence of 100 thousand dollars, 1 million dollars, 10 million
dollars and 100 million dollars, respectively.
68
RAI Values of Engineers v/s Probability
(Consequence = $1 00K)
4;
3.
2.5-
2-
1.5-
0.5-
0N
1 E-04 1 E-03 1 E-02
Probability, P
1E-01 1E+00
-$- el -1- e2 -A-- e3 -- e4 -- e5 -*-e6
-+-e7 - e8 -- e9 -+- e1O -4-Aveage
Figure 3.6. RAI Values of Engineers v/s Probability (Consequence = $ 1OOK)
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Figure 3.8. RAI Values of Engineers v/s Probability (Consequence = $1OM)
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Figure 3.9. RAI Values of Engineers v/s Probability (Consequence = $ 1OOM)
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Some RAI values of interviewee E3 are not shown in the figures
because of their extremely large numbers. The lines with heavier weight in the
figures represent the average RAI values for different original events. The
average RAI value of each event is obtained by averaging the remaining data
without considering the largest and the smallest data points1 . By doing this,
we hope to reduce the scatter caused from those extreme responses. The error
bar of the average line shows the standard deviation of each average RAI
value, which is calculated from the data after the largest and the smallest
samples have been removed.
From the above figures, we can find that for most events, there are no
significant differences among individuals except for one extreme case: E3.
For events with very low expectation values, such as Event ($iM, 104), the
RAI values are equal to zero. For some events with low expectation values,
such as Event ($iM, 10-3), some interviewees prefer to pay attention to them
and the others would like to neglect them. This phenomenon should be
attributed to the characteristics of these events rather than the difference
among DMs. We will discuss this phenomenon and zero RAI cases in detail
in the next section.
All non-zero RAI values have a relatively narrow distribution. Figure
3.10 shows the distribution of all non-zero RAI values from the engineers.
(Note: Except for the point at RAI = 3, all points in the figure are at RAI =
(n+0.5)/10, n=0, 1, 2, ..., 29, i.e., RAI = 0.05, 0.15, 0.25, ... The
corresponding Y-axis value of point at RAI=(n+0.5)/10 represents the number
of non-zero RAI values with n/10 RAI value < (n+l)/10. The point at
1 In cases where more than one data are at an extreme, only one datum was removed.
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RAI = 3 represents the number of data points for which RAI values are greater
than 3.)
Distribution of Non-Zero RAI Values of Engineers
(All Data)
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Figure 3.10. Distribution of Non-Zero RAI Values of Engineers (All Data)
Most RAI values are distributed around 1.6. Among the total of 115
non-zero RAI values, if we disregard the lowest 8% (the lowest 9) and highest
10% (the highest 12) data points, the remaining 82% (94) data points are
within the interval of [1.4, 2.1]. The mean of these 94 RAI values is
approximately equal to 1.6.
If the largest and the smallest RAI values for each event are discarded,
we have a total of 93 non-zero RAI values. The distribution of these 93 RAI
values is shown in Figure 3.11. Most of them are still around 1.6, but now we
have only one RAI value (i.e., 1% of the total) greater than 2.1, and only 6
RAI values (i.e., 6.5% of the total) smaller than 1.4. Therefore, we may
conclude that [1.4, 2.1] is a reasonable range for the RAI values.
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Distribution of Non-Zero RAI Values of Engineers
(The Largest and Smallest Data of Each Event Removed)
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Figure 3.11. Distribution of Non-Zero RAI Values of Engineers Omitting The
Largest and The Smallest data of Each Event
In order to observe the trend of RAI values of the engineers, we
summarize the average RAI values, which are averaged without including the
largest and the smallest data points, in Table 3.3.
Average RAI
Value
1.58
10
0.70 0 0
1.73 1.61 0.73 0
1.79 1.66 1.55 0.92
1.73 1.61 1.43 1.49
Table 3.3. Average RAI Values of Engineers For Different Events
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Engineer Average RAI Values Change v/s
Probability for Given Consequence
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Figure 3.12. Engineer Average RAI Values for Different Events Change With
the Probabilities of Events
These average RAI values are plotted on the C-P plane as shown in
Figure 3.12. The data label beside each data point indicates the number of
non-zero RAI values out of the total of RAI values for this event from
engineers. From this figure, we find that the average RAI values of events
with all non-zero RAI values are around 1.6, consistent with the distribution of
RAI values discussed earlier in this section. We also find some general RAI
trends as follows:
* Higher consequences will make people more risk averse. This is
expected because DMs are usually more conservative for higher
consequence events.
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* If the probability of event occurrence is very low, people tend to be
somewhat risk taking. This is understandable because it is difficult
for most people to imagine the situation of low probability, and it is
a somewhat common psychological phenomenon that people will
take a chance when the hazard seems very remote.
* However, it is interesting that people are also less risk averse when
the probability of event occurrence is very high (such as P = 10-1).
We think this is maybe because the hazard is more certain and then
DMs feel the situation is more realistic and they have more in
control over the hazard.
Fortunately, the differences among these average RAI values are quite
small (except those events with zero-RAI values.) Thus, we may conclude
that the assumption of constant RAI value may hold reasonably.
Analysis of RAI Values From The Manager Group
As mentioned before, total nine managers are interviewed in this study.
Unlike the interviewees in the engineer group, who all are from a same plant,
these nine managers come from four different plants. They also cover almost
all levels of the management hierarchy in the nuclear plant. The reason to re-
emphasize this difference is that we suspect some differences between the
results of two groups are due to the difference of interviewee's backgrounds.
We perform a similar analysis on the data from the manager group as
we did with the data from the engineer group. First, we plot the RAI values
against the probability of an event for a given consequence. Figures 3.13 to
3.16 show how the RAI values change with the event probability for given
consequence of $100K, $1M, $10M and $100M, respectively.
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Figure 3.13. RAI Values of Managers v/s Probability (Consequence = $ 1OOK)
RAI Values of Managers v/s Probability
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Figure 3.14. RAI Values of Managers v/s Probability (Consequence = $1M)
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RAI Values of Managers v/s Probability
(Consequence = 1 E7)
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1 E-04 1 E-03 1 E-02 1E-01 1E+00
Probability, P
-4-ml -I-m2 -*- m3 -X-m4 -)-m5
-4-m6 --- m7 - m8 - m9 -U-Average
Figure 3.15. RAI Values of Managers v/s Probability (Consequence = $1OM)
RAI Values of Managers v/s Probability
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Figure 3.16. RAI Values of Managers v/s Probability (Consequence =$100M)
77
(U
4,
)-K1
The heavy lines in the figures show the average RAI values, which is
calculated from the RAI values respected to each event without considering
the largest and the smallest data points. The error bar of each average RAI
value indicates the standard deviation of this average RAI value, which is also
calculated from data of the RAI values respect to this event without
considering the largest and the smallest data points.
From Figures 3.13 to 3.16, the distribution of RAI values from
managers seems more scattered than that of the engineers. In order to study
the difference, we plot the distribution of RAI values from mangers in the
following figures.
Distribution of Non-Zero RAI Values of Managers
(All Data)
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Figure 3.17. Distribution of Non-Zero RAI Values of Managers for All Data
Figure 3.17 shows the distribution of all managers' RAI values. There
are a total of 95 non-zero RAI values and most of them fall into the interval
[1, 2]. Unlike the data from the engineers, where non-zero RAI values are all
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greater than unity (i.e., the interviewees are all risk averse,) there are seven
data points (7% of total) with values less than unity (i.e., the interviewees are
risk taking,) in the manager group. There are also nine data points (9.5% of
total) with RAI equal to unity, (i.e., the interviewees are risk neutral.)
Additionally, the percentage of very large RAI values from the managers is
less than that of engineers. Only 8% of the total data points from mangers
have values greater than 2.1, compared with the 10% of total data points from
engineers. Based upon the observation of entire set of data points, we can
conclude that the managers have a wider spread in risk attitudes and they are
less risk averse than the engineers.
Now let us see if this conclusion is still valid if we do not consider the
Distribution of Non-Zero RAI Values of Managers
(The Largest and Smallest Data of Each Event Removed)
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Figure 3.18. Distribution of Non-Zero RAI Values of Managers Omitting The
Largest and The Smallest data of Each Event
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extreme values for each event. Figure 3.18 shows the distribution of RAI
values from the managers without considering the largest and the smallest data
of each event. With this adjustment, there are still two data points with values
less than unity and six data points with values equal to unity. Namely, 10.8%
(8 out of total 74) data points exhibit non-risk-averse behavior. On the other
hand, there is only one data point (1.3% of total) with a value greater than 2.1,
which is the same result as that for the engineers.
Therefore, we can reach the conclusion that the managers are less risk
averse than the engineers, and from the shape of the distribution, we find that
the risk attitude of the managers is more spread than that of engineers. The
first result is reasonable because managers usually have more experience in
plant operation and broader responsibility and control over the plant condition.
They usually have many competing options for budget spending, thus their
decision making is usually more based upon the number close to the expected
value of the event, (i.e., they are less risk averse.) The second result may be
due to the background of interviewees. Unlike the engineer group, in which
all interviewees come from the same plant and are almost at the same
professional level, the manager group consist of interviewees from four
different plants and across the spectrum of management layers in a nuclear
plant. The broader distribution of RAI values from the manager group may
reflect the diversity of interviewees' risk attitudes in this group due to their
different backgrounds and responsibilities, while the relatively concentrated
results from engineer group may reflect the risk culture of the plant that
engineers belong to.
About 10.8% of the data points from managers represent the non-risk-
averse attitudes, although those extreme responses have been excluded. This
is a relatively large percentage. It is necessary to get insight into these data
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points by looking into the details. Table 3.4 gives the distribution of these
10.8% (8 out of 74) data points versus the original events.
10 [ 2 2
___________ A. I I
1
Table 3.4. Distribution of Manager's Non-Risk-Averse RAI
Zero-RAI) With Events
Values (Exclude
If we look at Table 3.4 from the standpoint of probability, we find that
the non-risk-averse RAI values are concentrated in events with probability of
10-. If we look from the standpoint of consequence, we find that they are
concentrated in consequence of 107.
What do these results imply? We realize that these two categories of
events describe problems that managers are most likely to encounter every
day; and their responses to these events reflect their daily practices in decision
making and the routine nature of these events. This fact reveals an
inconsistency in decision-making: Managers may somewhat tend to risk-
taking in daily activities while they are risk-averse for those problems that they
are less familiar with.
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We may study the risk attitudes of managers from another standpoint
by putting all event-average RAI values together. Again, the average values
are calculated without considering the largest and the smallest data obtained
from the manager group. Table 3.5 summarizes the average RAI values from
managers. These data are also plotted in Figure 3.19 versus the probability for
a given consequence. The data labels in Figure 3.19 indicate the number of
non-zero RAI values for each event.
Average RAI
Value
1.08
1.34
0
1.26
0
0.43
0
0
10 2 1.68 1.41_{ 1.83 0.74
10-1 1.67 1.31 1.41 1.57
_____________ A I _____________
Table 3.5. Average RAI Values of Managers For Different Events
From Figure 3.19, we find that the trends of risk attitudes that we
observed based upon the data of engineers are still valid for data from
managers. These trends are re-stated as follows:
* Higher consequence will make people more risk averse.
* If the probability of event occurrence is very low, people tend to be
somewhat risk taking. This trend is even more significant for managers.
* On the other hand, people are less risk averse when the probability of
event occurrence is very high (such as P = 10.1).
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RAI Change v/s Probability for Given Consequence
(Average for Each Event, Manager Data)
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Figure 3.19. Event-Average RAI Values Versus Probability (Manager Data)
However, there are some differences in details of risk attitude
distribution between two groups. These differences are:
* Overall, managers are less risk-averse than engineers are. The
overall average non-zero RAI value of managers is 1.49. This is
slightly smaller than that of engineers, which is 1.59.
* The distribution of RAI values from the managers is more scattered
than that of data from engineers. This may be due to the diversity
of interviewee background in manager group. However, it is
possible that this reflects of managers' risk attitudes. We need
further study to get a concrete conclusion on this point.
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* Analysis of RAI Values From All Interviewees
In the previous sub-section, we have analyzed the RAI values for each
group of interviewees. We found that some general trends of RAI values
changed with corresponding probability and consequence of the event. We
also found that some differences exist between the two groups. However,
comparing with the general trend, the differences between the data from the
two groups are minor, thus the differences do not invalidate the general trend.
In this sub-section, we will analyze all the data together in order to reinforce
the general conclusions about RAI values that we obtained above.
Figure 3.20 illustrates the distribution of all RAI values from both of
groups. About 46% (96 out of total 210) of all non-zero RAI values are within
the interval of [1.4, 1.6]. Only 9% of data points have values greater than 2.2.
The distribution of RAI values is concentrated on a relatively narrow range.
Distribution of Non-Zero RAI Values (All Data)
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Figure 3.20. Distribution of All Non-Zero RAI Values From All Interviewees
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If we do not consider the extreme responses for each event, the
distribution of non-zero RAI values will be like what is shown in Figure 3.21.
Now, the clustering of data is more obvious. The percentage of data in the
interval [1.4, 1.6] rises to 51%, while about 80% (152 out of total 188) of data
points are in the interval [1.3, 2.1]. There are only about 4.8% (9 out of 188)
data with values greater than 2.1. The overall average of these Non-zero RAI
values is 1.6.
Distribution of Non-Zero RAI Values
(The Largest and Smallest Data of Each Event Removed)
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Figure 3.21. Distribution of Non-Zero RAI Values From All Interviewees
Without The Largest and The Smallest of Each Event
Now let us study the average value of these RAI data. The method
used to average the data is the same as previously employed. Again the largest
and the smallest data points are removed. These average RAI values are
summarized in Table 3.6, and plotted in Figure 3.22 versus the probability for
a given consequence. In Figure 3.22, each data label indicates the number of
non-zero RAI values for its corresponding event.
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Average RAI
Value
1.29 0.42 0
1.56 1.41 0.62 0
1.74 1.64 1.75 0.93
1.70 1.58 1.51 1.61
Table 3.6. Average RAI Values of All Interviewees for Different Events
RAI Change v/s Probability for Given Consequence
(Average for Each Event, All Interviewees)
1 E-03 IE-02 1E-01
Probability, P
-+-C=1E8 -E-C=1E7 -*--C=1E6 -- C=1E5
Figure 3.22. Event-Average RAI Values Versus Probability (All Interviewees)
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From Figure 3.22 and Table 3.6, we find that the average RAI values
of those events, whose RAI values are all non-zero, range from 1.51 to 1.75.
The trends of the RAI values that we observed from data of individual group
still hold in most cases. These trends are:
* Generally, people are more risk averse for events with higher
consequence. The exceptions of this trend are that the average RAI
value for consequence of $100K is more than those for
consequence of $1M and $10M when the probability of occurrence
is 10'1, and that the average RAI value of Event ($1M, 10-2) is
greater than that of Event ($1 OM, 10-2).
* If the probability of event occurrence is very low, people tend to be
somewhat risk taking.
* In the other hand, people are less risk averse when the probability
of event occurrence is very high (such as P = 10-).
* Interviewees are most risk averse for events with 10-2 probability
of occurrence.
3.3.4.3. Risk Preference Region on the C-P Plane
According to the analysis results in previous section, the RAI value of
an event is generally a function of the consequences and occurrence
probability. Determining how the RAI value changes with consequence and
probability would be important for the successful application of the RAI
concept. In the previous section, we have already discussed the trends of
change of non-zero RAI values. These non-zero RAI values apply mostly to
events whose expectation values are relatively large so that the RAI values for
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such events are all non-zero. In this section, in addition to these all non-zero
RAI events, we also discuss events which have all zero RAI values or partially
zero RAI values. It is our intention to derive an approximate function for RAI
values in the entire C-P plane.
The analytical results in the previous section show that DMs have
zero-RAI values for some events having small expectation values. For some
events have very small expectation values, the RAI values may even all equal
to zero. Table 3.7 gives the number of non-zero RAI values corresponding to
each event. It is important to note that there are total 17 data points for each
combination of consequence and probability since the largest and the smallest
data of each event have been removed.
Number of Non- Consequence, C (Dollars)
Zero RAI
Values 108  101 106 105
101 15 5 0 0
.: 10- 17 16 7 0
C3 1021 17 17 17 9
10- 17 17 17 17
Table 3.7. Number of Non-Zero RAI Values For Each Event (The largest and
The Smallest Data of Each Event Have Been Removed.)
From the data of Table 3.7, we can reasonably draw two lines in the C-
P plane as shown in Figure 3.23. The first line is an equal expectation line
with an expected value of 100. The RAI values of any event in the C-P plane
on or under this line are all equal to zero. All DMs neglect the risk of events
in this area, including those on the line. Therefore, we may call this line as the
Zero RAI Line (ZRL), and the area under this line in the C-P plane as the
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Negligible Risk Region. The second line is an expectation line with an
expected value of 104. The RAI values of events on or above this line will be
all non-zero. It means that all DMs take serious consideration of the risk from
events in this area, including those on the line. Thus, we call this line as the
Non-Zero RAI Line (NRL), and name the area above NRL in the C-P plane
the Serious Risk Region. For those events in the area between ZRL and NRL,
some of their RAI values are non-zero while the rest equal to zero. Namely,
some DMs give serious consideration to the events in this area while others
neglect them. This area is named Important Risk Region.
Risk Preference Regions in C-P Plane
CO, max
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Figure 3.23. Illustration of Risk Preference Regions in C-P Plane
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Interviewees consistently mentioned the existence of a Maximum
Acceptable Cost, CO,,,., which is the maximum amount of money that a plant
is able to spend on improving its performance. If any problem in the plant
requires investment greater than this amount, then it will very probably cause
the decommissioning of the plant. The amount of the Maximum Acceptable
Cost is plant-specific, and varies greatly from plant to plant. As mentioned by
high-ranking managers during the interviews, the value of Co, max varies from
$7 million for an old plant to $400 million for a young plant.
In recognition of the existence of such a maximum acceptable cost, we
introduce the third line in the C-P plane, which is called the Maximum Risk
Line (MRL), as shown in Figure 3.23. The area above MIRL is called the
Saturated Risk Region since it is not viable in practical terms to consider
events within this area which have nominal risk higher than the maximum
acceptable cost. The slope of the MRL is the negative of the average RAI
values for all events in the Serious Risk Region.
It is important to know how the RAI values will change in different
risk preference regions in the C-P plane. As shown in Table 3.6, the average
RAI values for events in the serious risk region are quite concentrated. They
only vary in a relatively narrow range from 1.51 to 1.75. Thus, it would be a
good approximation to use a constant RAI value, ao, for all events in the
serious risk region. We can use the average RAI value of all non-zero RAI-s
as the constant RAI, ao, for events in serious risk region. This average value is
1.6 based upon the current available data, i.e., ao = 1.6. The RAI values of
events on the non-zero RAI line (NRL) are assumed to equal to ao as well.
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From Table 3.7, we know that the RAI values of events in the
negligible risk region are all equal to zero. The RAI values of events on the
zero RAI line (ZRL) are also equal to zero.
It is more ambiguous to obtain the RAI values for the events in the
important risk region. We assume that the RAI values in this region change
from zero on the ZRL to ao on the NRL. The RAI value of a particular event
is proportional to the distance between the point of this event and the ZRL in
the logarithmic C-P plane. Under this assumption, the RAI value for a
particular event (C, P) in the important risk region is given by the following
formula:
a log( C P (3.4)
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For events in the saturated risk region, it is not so meaningful to talk
about the RAI values. For events which have very high expectation values,
people may adopt ao as their RAI value. However, because the cost to be
expended is limited by the maximum acceptable cost (MAC), DMs will apply
the MAC as the certainty equivalent cost (CEC), CO, for all events in this
region. Namely, in the saturated risk region, it is always valid that:
CO = COmax (3.5)
For events in the serious risk region and the important risk region, the
CEC value of each event can be obtained by Equation (3.2), rewritten as
C 0 = Pa .C. (3.6)
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where C and P are the consequence and probability of the event, respectively.
The RAI value, a, is equal to ao for events in serious risk region or can be
obtained by Equation (3.4) for events in the important risk region.
3.3.4.4. Conclusions
Based upon the results presented above, we can reach the following
conclusions about the characteristics of the RAI value:
" Generally, the distribution of RAI values in the C-P plane can be
divided into four regions: the Negligible Risk Region, the
Important Risk Region, the Serious Risk Region and the Saturated
Risk Region.
" The RAI values in the serious risk region can be approximated by a
constant value, ao. Based upon the current available data, ao is
equal to 1.6.
" The RAI values in the negligible risk region are equal to zero.
" The RAI values in the important risk region can be obtained
through interpolation between 0 and ao.
* The RAI value in the saturated risk region is not meaningful. The
CEC values of events in this region are all equal to the maximum
acceptable cost of the specific plant, CO, max.
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3.4. FOUR STEPS To EFFICIENT RESOURCE
ALLOCATION
3.4.1. Identify and Characterize the Problems
An experienced DM is usually capable of identifying the problems
within his responsibility and prioritizing the issues based upon his experience
and judgement. However, due to of the complexity of nuclear plant systems, a
DM in a nuclear plant usually faces many issues at same time. Because of the
limitation in experience and responsibility, it is hardly possible for a DM by
himself to obtain a comprehensive and unbiased understanding of all the
problems that affect a plant's performance. Therefore, it is desirable to apply a
formal approach to collect as much information as possible about the current
plant conditions and potential weaknesses that may degrade the plant's
performance in the future.
3.4.1.2. Identify problems from the historic operational data
A way to gain insight into the nature of plant performance degradation
is to perform a thorough investigation of the industry and plant-specific
operational history. A joint effort between MIT and PECO Energy that
conducted an extensive investigation on the performance of US BWR-4 power
plants is a good example of such an analysis [Brodeur and Todreas, 1997]
[Renick, Li and Todreas, 1997].
In this study, a method to analyze the performance of a specific plant
as well as its peer plants in the industry was developed by MIT and PECO
Energy investigators. This method includes following steps:
o Select the database and sample size;
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* Determine the root causes for each event causing plant
degradation, including plant forced shutdown and power drop, and
categorize the events of plant performance degradation into system,
sub-system, component, or root cause;
* Summarize the impacts on the plant performance from each
system, sub-system and component, so that a list and
comprehensive understanding of the problems that will affect the
plant performance can be obtained.
The first step of this method is the selection of the database and the
sample size. Industry-wide historic data of nuclear plant performance can be
obtained from several databases currently available. These databases include
the following:
" The Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX),
which is a computerized database containing information on the
design characteristics and performance of selected systems and
components at US nuclear plants. EPIX is managed by the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). It succeeded the
former data management system called Nuclear Plant Reliability
Data System (NPRDS), which was also maintained by the INPO.
* The Monthly Reports of Significant Events that are sent to the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) by all nuclear utilities.
The monthly reports of significant events are complied in the
Microsoft FOXPRO format by the Idaho National Engineering and
Environment Laboratory (INEEL).
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* The Licensee Event Reports (LER) that are submitted to NRC by
all US nuclear utilities. LERs are complied and maintained by the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. However, the accessibility to this
database is more limited than to the others.
Plant-specific data are usually maintained by the individual plant.
Compared with the data contained in industry-wide databases, plant-specific
data are usually more detailed but sparser; thus, they give more insight than
the industry-wide databases. Sometimes, the plant-specific data may be
inconsistent with records in the industry-wide databases. Therefore, it is
always a good practice to look at each event closely and cross-check with
plant-specific data if possible.
The sample size is determined by the issue that is of interest. In
general, one should make the sample size as large as applicable. For example,
in order to investigate the performance of a main feed pump, it would be best
if we could obtain historic performance data of all main feed pumps with the
same or similar design. However, due to limitations in time and possible
efforts, this goal is hardly ever achievable. We should select a sample size that
is large enough to provide general characteristics of operation but small
enough so that a detailed review of each event is possible. For example, in the
joint study conducted by MIT and PECO Energy, the sample size is the five-
year (from 1992 to 1997) operational data from the fleet of all nineteen BWR-
4 plants in US, four of which are units of PECO Energy. This sample size
provided enough similarity so that the results from the sample collection are
applicable to the objectives (PECO Energy's BWR-4 plants) of that study,
while the data from this sample size are still of a tractable size. This sample
size covers nearly 100 reactor years of operation history, and a total of 235
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plant outages or load drops in these 100 reactor years can be analyzed in detail
of each event.
The second step of identifying problems from operational data is to
analyze the data in detail for each event of plant performance degradation,
including shutdown and load drop. Through this analysis, the root causes and
the system that is the major contributor to the event can be identified. Then all
events can be categorized by system, sub-system, component, and root causes.
The final step is to summarize the results from the second step. The
events of plant performance degradation with the same system origin are put
together based upon two levels of data sources - industry data and plant
specific data. The impact on the plant performance of each system is
quantified. A list of important systems is generated according to their impacts
on plant performance. On the other hand, the plant-specific performance can
be compared against the industry average performance. If the plant-specific
performance of a system is worse than the industry average, that indicates a
direction for performance improvement. However, this does not necessarily
mean that the plant has better practices if the plant-specific performance is
better than the industry average. This result may be due to other reasons such
as the plant having younger or a shorter time in service for the equipment, so
we need to look into the details of these performance data. If the cause of
better performance is not that the plant has better practice than industry
average, then the fact that plant-specific performance is better than others may
indicate a potential source of problems in future plant operation because the
degradation of equipment in other plants may occur in this plant in the future.
The results of historic operational data analysis should include a list of
important systems, a list of historical problems for each system, a list of
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common weakness of practices, and comparisons between plant-specific and
industry-average data.
3.4.1.2. Predict the potential problems by eliciting expert opinion
Through the analysis of historical operational data, we can understand
the problems that a plant is currently encountering and the problems that a
plant may encounter in the future because of occurrences in other plants.
However, there are always some types of plant degradation that have never
happened either in a specific plant or in the industry, but may occur in the
future with catastrophic consequences to the plant. We need a method to
understand these potential problems.
Such understanding can be obtained through eliciting expert opinions.
The experts are those who closely work with the system that is being studied.
Since they deal with the system every day and their job is to maintain the
system in the best condition, they are the most knowledgeable people about
the system. They understand the inherent weaknesses of the system design,
the potential mechanisms of degradation of system materials, and the potential
consequences of system degradation.
The experts to be elicited should include the system engineers who
perform the daily maintenance on the system; the system managers who
oversee the daily performance of the system; the Instrumentation and Control
personnel who maintain the control parts of the system; the operators who
understand the impacts on the plant performance of the system conditions; and
if possible, the vendor's representatives who understand the design and may
have experience in system operation outside the plant.
The format of expert elicitation can be group discussion or individual
interviews. The group discussion is similar to the FIT team practices at PECO
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Energy. In such a discussion, all experts are summoned to be at a meeting
together. In the meeting, the experts are encouraged to speak out about the
system performance concerns, and the elicitor takes notes and summarizes all
opinions of the experts. Individual interviews are also conducted by the
elicitor with every expert. The interview is held in an informal atmosphere.
The expert is encouraged to say whatever he would like say about the system,
even to complain about wrong management decisions. The elicitor acts as a
listener most of the time, excepts for asking a few questions. Sometimes, the
elicitor may try to cross-examine the expert regarding his opinions about a
specific issue so that a comprehensive understanding of this issue can be
obtained.
The advantages of group discussion are 1) the elicitation can be
completed in a relatively short time interval; 2) the interactions among experts
may stimulate thinking; 3) opinions can be obtained regarding a specific issue
from several different angles simultaneously. However, there are also some
disadvantages. They include: 1) the possibility that the group discussion may
be dominated by a few persons who have strong personalities or possess
authority in the plant while the rest of the group members do not express their
opinions; 2) group members are usually reluctant to confront each other and do
not express differing opinions; 3) many members hesitate to discuss the
management's wrong decisions.
In contrast, individual interviews may take longer and lack interactions
between experts. However, because the interview is person to person and the
interview results are documented anonymously, people are usually more open
in talking and answering the questions. It is easier to obtain different opinions
and a thorough understanding of a specific issue.
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These two different ways to elicit expert opinion have their respective
advantages and disadvantages. We should decide between them according to
the situation and the resources available. Based upon the author's experiences,
individual interviews are recommended for eliciting the expert opinion for
potential problems whenever possible.
3.4.1.3. Characterize problems by their consequences and frequency
When we identify the plant problems, we should characterize the
problems as well. Problems can be characterized by their consequences and
their frequencies of occurrence.
The consequences of a problem include the impact on the plant
performance, (such as plant shutdown, load drop or other direct impacts on
plant power generating capacity,) and the additional costs (labor, materials,
and miscellaneous) incurred. These impacts can be quantified in term of the
money that the plant may lose and have to spend. The overall consequences
are noted as "C", usually expressed in terms of dollars. Additionally, in many
cases, the problem may have consequences in some intangible aspects, such as
regulator confidence, plant performance rating, and public image. These
intangible impacts are usually difficult to quantify, however, they sometimes
dominate decision making in the plant. These important aspects of decision
making in a nuclear plant are categorized here as "imponderable factors",
and will be discussed in detail in Section 3.5.
The frequency of problem occurrence is the ratio of the mean number
of problem occurrences in a given period of time to the total operating time
elapsed in the same period. If the problem is the failure of equipment, then the
frequency of the problem is the failure rate of this equipment. If the problem
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is a human error, then the frequency of the problem is the human error rate.
The frequency of the problem is noted as k with a unit of time-1 .
3.4.2. Rank the problems
After the problems that affect the plant performance have been
identified and characterized by their consequences and frequencies of
occurrence, we can rank the problems in the order of importance.
The importance of a problem is determined by its Certainty Equivalent
Cost (CEC) defined previously. By applying the RAI method developed in
Section 3.2.2, we can calculate the value of the CEC for each problem, or we
can obtain the CEC value of a problem by simply drawing an Equal Risk Line
(ERL) in the Consequence-Probability (C-P) plane.
Let us assume we know that the consequence of a single occurrence of
the problem is C, the frequency of the problem occurrence is X, and the
remaining plant lifetime is T. We can consider the problem as the collection
of possible events (C, P1), (2C, P2), ... (nC, Pa), ... , where the notation of (nC,
P,) represents the event that this problem will occur exactly n times in the
remaining plant lifetime. Pn is the probability that this problem will occur
exactly n times in the remaining plant lifetime For simplicity, we assume that
the consequence of n occurrences of the problem is nC. Of course, there is a
possibility that the consequence of the later occurrence of the problem is no
longer C, instead it may be some number greater than C. However, let us start
by considering the simplest case, and then expend the method to more
complicated cases.
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For the case that X is constant, the probability, Pa, that the problem will
occur exactly n times in the remaining plant lifetime is given by the Poisson
distribution as:
P -, = , (3.7)
n!
where T is the expected number of occurrences of the problem in the
remaining plant lifetime T.
As described in Section 3.2.2, for each possible event, we can calculate
its CEC value by the relationship
= (nC) (3.8)
The overall CEC value of this problem then can be obtained as:
CO CO,n = (nC)J- P =C- P n . (3.9)
n=1 n=1 n=1
Substitute Equation (3.7) into Equation (3.9), we obtain
10(AT)"ne-2T IC 0 = C - [( T ] n . (3.10)
n=1 -
The procedure of acquiring the CEC value of a multi-event problem
can be illustrated in Figure 3.24. The CEC value of each event, (C, P1),
(2C, P2), ..., (nC, Pa), ... , is obtained by the value of the intersection between
the certainty line and the ERL through this event. The overall CEC of the
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problem is the summation of the CEC values of all events. This problem can
be represented by the point of(Co, 1), which is on the certainty line.
Illustration of Obtainning The CEC value of A
Multi-event Problem in the C-Plane
Cos CO,4  CO,3 Co,2 CO,1  C0
IE+00
\\ 40'\(C, P1)
1 E-01 1E-01(2C, P2)
CL
1E-02 A (3C, P3)
\'1(4C, P4)
I E-03
5C, P5)
1E-04
1E+04 1E+05 IE+06 1E+07
Consequence, C (Dollars)
Figure 3.24. Illustration of How to Acquire the CEC Value of A Multi-Event
Problem. The CEC value of each event is obtained by the value of the
intersection between the certainty line and the ERL through this event.
The overall CEC of the problem is the summation of the CEC values of all
events. (The problem shown in the figure has the consequence of single
occurrence as C=$1M, and the expected number of occurrence in lifetime
as XT=0.5. The RAI value is a=1.6.)
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Now let us look at another way to obtain the CEC value of a multi-
event problem. If we denote NE as
NE 00Z (AT)"e- 1
E , (3.11)
n=1 n=1 n
then Equations (3.9) and (3.10) can be rewritten as
C0 =ECN (3.12)
Comparing equations (3.12) with equations (3.2) which give the CEC
of a single event (C, P) as
Co = C.Pa, (3.2)
we find that NE in formulas for multi-event problem is the counterpart of the
probability, P, in formulas for single-event problem. Thus, we may use NE for
multi-event problem in the same fashion as we use P for single-event problem
to evaluate the CEC values in the C-P Plane. However, since the P value is
limited not greater than 1, we should use NE as an analogy of P in the C-P
plane to obtain the CEC values only when the value of NE is less than 1.
However, what does NE mean and what are its properties? From its
definition Equation (3.11), we know that NE is the risk-aversion weighted
expected number of occurrences of the problem in the remaining lifetime. We
thus can call it as Equivalent Number of Occurrences (EMO). NE is a non-
dimensional number like the probability. Figure 3.25 shows how the value of
NE will change versus the real expected number of occurrence XT, given that
the RAI value, a, is equal to 1.6.
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The Equivalent Number of Occurrences vls The
Expected Number of Occurences
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Expected Number of Occurrences for Remaining Lifetime, (XT)
Equivalent Number of Occurrence ------ Expected Number of Occurrance
Figure 3.25. The Equivalent Number of Occurrence NE Change v/s The
Expected Number of Occurrence, T, (RAI =1.6)
From Figure 3.25, we find that if the RAI value is 1.6 as the generic
RAI value in the serious risk region, when the expected occurrences of the
problem in the remaining lifetime, XT, is less than 0.01, the equivalent number
of occurrences, NE, is almost equal to XT. For example, given a = 1.6, if XT =
0.01, NE= 0.011. From the definition of NE, i.e., Equation (3.11), we can
expect that above statement regarding to the value of NE will be still valid if
the RAI value is less than 1.6. Therefore, if the value of T is less than 0.01,
we can simply use the value of T as the value of NE to make the plot in C-P
plane given that the RAI value is equal to or less than 1.6. However, as T
gets larger, we have to use NE to make the plot in the C-P plane. Fortunately,
thanks to the requirement for high reliability in the nuclear plant, many serious
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problems in a nuclear plant have an expected number of occurrences over the
plant remaining lifetime less than 0.01.
Given the RAI value is equal to or less than 1.6, the value of NE can be
approximated by the value of T if T is less than 0.1, so that the relatively
complicated calculation of Equation (3.11) can be avoided. If the value of T
is greater than 0.01, it is still not difficult to obtain the value of NE with the
help of a computer-based spreadsheet. Alternatively, we can obtain the value
of NE through the plot shown in Figure 3.25.
If the value of T is large, then NE may have a value greater than 1. In
this case, we cannot represent this problem by the point (C, NE) in the C-P
plane, and determine its CEC value by the intersection between the certainty
line and the Equal Risk Line through the point (C, NE). Instead, we should use
the point (Co, 1) on the certainty line to represent this problem, as shown in
Figure 3.24.
For most problems under consideration, the expected number of
occurrences T will be less than 10. If T is less than 10, the probability, Pn,
that the problem will occur exactly n times, will be very small when n reaches
30. For example, if T is equal to 10, P30 is only 1.71E-07. If T is smaller,
P30 will be even smaller. Thus, for Equations (3.10) and (3.11), we only need
to consider the first 30 possible events with n 30. Equations (3.10) and
(3.11) can be reduced to be
30 n -AT
CO = C- [ n. (3.13)
n=1 an
and
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0 330 n e- AT
NE IL P a n] a {L [ ]a - ", (3.14)
n=1 n=1
Once we have the value of NE for a problem, we can apply Equation
(3.13) to calculate the Certainty Equivalent Cost (CEC) value, Co, of this
problem. On the other hand, we can obtain the value of Co by plotting an
Equal Risk Line (ERL) through the point of (C, NE) in the C-P plane if the
value of NE is less than unity. The method of obtaining Co value through such
plotting is illustrated in Figure 3.26.
Figure 3.26 shows how to obtain the CEC values of four problems in
different risk preference regions of the C-P plane. Problem 1, which has
consequence of $400M and NE of 0.1, is in the Saturated Risk Region. Its
CEC value, C0,1 , then is the maximum acceptable cost, Co,max, which is $40M
in this example. Problem 2, which has consequence of $10M and NE of 10-2,
is in the Serious Risk Region. Its CEC value is given by the consequence
value of the intersection between the certainty line (P = 1 line) and the Equal
Risk Line (ERL) through point of Problem 2. The negative of the slope of
ERL is the RAI value, which is 1.6 in this region. The intersection gives the
CEC value of Problem 2, CO,2, as $562K. Problem 3 is in the Important Risk
Region because its consequence is $2.5M while its NE is 10 . Equation (3.4)
gives its RAI value, i.e., the negative of the slope of its ERL, as 1.12. The
intersection of the ERL and the Certainty Line gives the CEC of Problem 3,
CO,3 , as $5.19K. The consequence of Problem 4 is $100K while its NE is only
10 4. Thus, Problem 4 is in the Negligible Risk Region. Its CEC value is equal
to zero.
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Illustration of Obtainning CECs From the
C-P Plane
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Consequence, C (Dollars)
Figure 3.26. Illustration of Obtaining CECs From The C-P Plane. Problems
1, 2, 3, and 4 have different consequences and the equivalent number of
occurrences and are in different risk preference region. The CEC values of
problems in the saturated risk region are equal to the maximum acceptable
cost. The CEC values of problems in the serious risk region and the
important risk region are obtained by the intersections between the
certainty line and the ERLs through these problems. The CEC values of
problems in the negligible risk region are equal to zero.
Once the CEC values of all problems are obtained, the importance of
problems can be ranked in the order of their CEC values. In the C-P plane, the
ranking of problems is directly illustrated by the position of each problem's
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CEC value on the Certainty Line. For example, in the four problems shown in
Figure 3.26, the positions of CECs on the Certainty Line the follow the
relation below:
C0 (= Comax ) > CO, 2 > CO3 > CO4 (= 0)
Thus the ranking of the problem importance is:
Problem 1 > Problem 2 > Problem 3 > Problem 4
Therefore, the efforts for improving plant performance should be
focused on Problem 1 first, then Problem 2 and Problem 3. Since Problem 4 is
in the Negligible Risk Region, we do not need to consider Problem 4 further.
So far, we have a simple but logical method of ranking problems.
Some simplifying assumptions were made in the approach. Of course, we can
derive formulas in terms that are more general. However, it will not change
the basic approach that hs been established previously. It only adds detail to
the treatments. The following is a brief discussion of these details and the
modification in approach in order to deal with them.
In previous analysis, we assumed that the consequences of any single
occurrence of the problem are same, thus the product nC can be used as the
total consequence of exactly n occurrences of the event made possible by the
problem of interest. We also assumed that the RAI value, a, is constant. In
fact, for many problems, the consequence of problem occurrence may increase
as the number of occurrences increases, and the RAI value, a, also has a slight
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dependency upon the probability and the consequences of the problem
occurrence. We can accommodate these factors by generalizing the forms of
consequence, C, and RAI, a, in the formula for the CEC value, Co.
We assume that the consequence of n-th occurrence of the problem can
be described by a function, C(n). Then the total consequence of exactly n
occurrences of the problems will be
n
C = C(n). (3.15)
If the probability that the problem will occur exactly n times is P,, then the risk
function value of the event that the problem will occur exactly n times can be
obtained as follow:
Rn = C(C,P n (3.16)
where RAI value, a, is expressed as a function of the consequence, C, and the
probability, Pn. Since Cj is a function of n as shown in Equation (3.15) and Pn
is a function of n, X and T, the RAI value can be re-written as a(n, X, T), a
function of n, X and T. Assuming that the probability, Pn, is Poisson
distributed, we can re-write Equation (3.16) as follow:
n= [ C(n)]" aC"'') (2 T )n e -(TRnnn! (3.17)
Then the CEC value of the event that the problem will occur exactly n times is
obtained by the relationship
I - n ( AT )"n e - A
a Cnj (n) [([T e az (n,,?,T) (.8
.O,n = Rn, ) = [ C(n)] J [ (3.18)
i=1 n!-
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Therefore, the CEC of the problem can be obtained by the summation of all
CEC values as follows:
(AT) n e-AT
= Z CO, = [I C(n)]-[ (]"C" (3.19)
n=1 n=1 i=1
Equation (3.19) is a general formula for calculating the CEC of a
problem. Dependent upon the problem to be studied, DMs can use a
simplified form of this formula, such as Equation (3.13) derived previously.
3.4.3. Formulate solutions for the problems
After the importance of problems has been ranked, we should focus
our efforts on solving those problems with high importance ranking.
The solutions or engineering improvements for a problem may be
formulated either through a group discussion or by obtaining inputs from
various individuals. The group discussion is like a brainstorming process
among a group of experts who are knowledgeable about the problem under
consideration. The group members are encouraged to propose any possible
solutions or improvements. At this stage, no judgement on the proposal will
be taken. All proposed solutions and improvements are documented for
further study of their economic efficiency. The alternative to the group
discussion is solicitation of opinions about solutions or improvements from
individual experts. According to the author's experience, group discussion is
the better way to obtain a comprehensive set of solutions and improvements.
Solutions and engineering improvements are very case-specific. They
are depended highly upon the nature of the problem and the situation that the
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plant is facing. However, there are several basic directions for the formulation
of solutions and improvements. Experts should be prompted to consider all of
these directions in order to generate a range of possible solutions and
improvements.
The first direction is to increase the reliability of equipment.
Increasing reliability means increasing the time between failures of this
equipment. This can be achieved by changing to better designs, using
upgraded parts, adding redundancy, operating under more optimal conditions,
and conducting better maintenance.
The second direction is to increase the equipment repairability. This
means the plant staff should consider how to decrease the average repair time
once the equipment has failed. It can be achieved by means of a better-trained
repair team, on-site repair facility, quicker diagnosis of the failure, and better
material management so that needed parts are easily accessible.
The third direction is to improve the ability of failure prediction and
diagnosis. This can be achieved by extensively applying on-line monitoring
technologies. The merits of improving the ability to predict and diagnose
failures are threefold. First, doing this can significantly reduce the negative
impacts upon the plant performance caused by the equipment failures because
actions can be taken to mitigate the impacts before the consequence becomes
too severe. Second, since it helps to reduce the chance that plant will enter a
transient condition, it indirectly increases the reliability of other equipment.
The third, because it gives plant personnel more lead time to prepare, it can
reduce the repair time for the equipment failure.
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The fourth direction is to enhance the equipment capacity. By
enhancing the capacity of key equipment, the overall plant capacity can be
also increased. Therefore, plant economic performance will be improved.
3.4.4. Make choices from solutions
After the third step of the approach, many engineering improvements
will be proposed to enhance the plant performance. However, due to limited
resources, it is impossible to implement all of them. We need to select those
engineering improvements with the best economic returns. In order to make
such selections, we need a systematic method to evaluate the economic merits
of each proposed engineering improvement.
3.4.4.1. Criteria for Selections
First, we need to set up the criteria for such selections. According to
economics principles, we believe that the following criteria are appropriate.
* In most situations, a DM wishes to maximize the expected Net-
Benefit/Cost ratio (called, return rate, re), given the same level of
uncertainty of the return rate;
* In most situations, a DM wishes to minimize the uncertainty of
return rate (note as S,), given the same level of expected return
rate, re.
The concept of uncertainty of return rate is introduced here. The
reason for introducing such a concept is that effects of engineering
improvements are quite different from improvement to improvement. Some
improvements may have well-defined results while others may have a wide
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range of possible effects. This uncertainty should be considered in the
decision-making process.
3.4.4.2. Calculation of the Expected Return Rate
The next step of the evaluation is to calculate the return rate of each
proposed engineering improvement. In order to obtain the return rate of the
proposed improvement, we need to characterize each engineering
improvement by the combination of consequence and the frequency of
occurrence of the problem that would obtain after the proposed improvement
were implemented. Usually, an engineering improvement cannot totally
eliminate the problem. Instead, it can reduce the consequence once the
problem occurs, or reduce the frequency that the problem will occur. This
transition in problem characteristics is illustrated in Figure 3.27.
CO I
I I
I E+4 1IE+5
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IE+6 IE+7 IE+8 I E+9
Consequence, C
Figure 3.27. Illustration of Engineering Improvement Effects. Problem 1 is
improved to Problem 1' with a reduced consequence, a reduced probability
and reduced uncertainties of the consequence and the probability
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As shown in Figure 3.27, an engineering improvement will change the
nature of a problem from the position of (C, P) to the position of (C', P') in the
C-P plane. The position of (C', P') represents the consequence and probability
that would characterize this problem after the engineering improvement were
implemented. By drawing an ERL through each point, respectively, we can
obtain the CEC of the original problem (Problem 1) as Co, and the CEC of
destination problem (Problem 1') as Co'. The difference between Co and Co' is
the benefit that is obtained from the engineering improvement. (We require
(Co - C'o) > 0 for the improvement to be of interest.)
Figure 3.27 also illustrates the uncertainty of these parameters. The
shadows around the points (C, P) and (C', P') indicate the uncertainties of
events (C, P) and (C', P'), respectively.
If we know the real implementation cost, Creal, of the improvement,
then we can calculate the net benefit, NB, that can be obtained from this
improvement as
NB=C -C' -Ceal. (3.20)
The expected return rate, re, of the investment on this improvement then can be
obtained as
(C0 -C' )-Cea
re = .O (3.21)
Creal
The real cost for implementing the improvement, Creal, may have a
minimum value, named the Threshold Cost, because there is always some
administrative cost below which Creal cannot be reduced. The structure of Creal
in terms of its components is illustrated by the example shown in Figure 3.28.
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Figure 3.28. Example Elemental Structure of Real Cost of an Engineering
Improvement, Creal
3.4.4.3. Calculation of the Uncertainty of Return Rate
As stated before, the return rates of improvement may have very
different distributions for different engineering improvements. A good
decision-making process should take into account factors of uncertainty of the
return rate. Therefore, it is necessary to calculate the uncertainty of return rate
for each proposed engineering improvement.
The mathematical basis for calculating the uncertainty of the return
rate is the theory of error propagation. In this theory, the errors of the mean
values propagate according to Gauss's law of propagation of errors, which is
expressed as follows:
Ify =f(xi, x2, ..., X.), then
= ( - ,2 +- S ) (3.22)
where Szj is the uncertainty (error) of the mean value of the i-th variable in
the function, and S, is the uncertainty (error) of the function value [Wang et
al, 1979].
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We want to determine the return rate of each proposed engineering
improvement. The variables of this question are consequences and
probabilities (C, P), and (C', P') characterizing the events of interest. The
values of these quantities and their uncertainties Sc, Sp, Sc' and Sp, can be
obtained through analyzing the historical performance data and eliciting expert
opinion. The functional relationships between the desired quantity, re, and the
variables are expressed by Equation (3.14) and (3.21). Therefore, the
uncertainty of the return rate, Sr, can be determined by applying the Gauss's
Law as expressed in Equation (3.22).
Given that we have known the values of C, P, C' and P', as well as
their uncertainties, Sc, Sp, Sc, and Sp, the uncertainties of CEC values,
Sco and Sc; , can be obtained as follows:
Sco)2 (+)2+( S )2 (3.23)
Co C a P ,(.3
and
S 2 _IC' )2 + Sp )2
C) C') ( P') . (3.24)
We can assume that the value of Creai can be determined relatively well
since a good manager usually has confidence in estimating the costs for an
improvement. Thus, the uncertainty of Creal can be approximated as being
equal to zero. Given that the values of Sc, and Sc; have been obtained, we
can apply the Gauss's Law again to determine the uncertainty of the return
rate, Sr, as follows:
S2=(S +S 2 i)/C2ai (3.25)
r Co Co rel(.5
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A special case needs to be emphasized here. If the expected number of
occurrences, XT, of a problem is large, this problem may need to be considered
as a multi-event problem. Then this problem should be characterized by the
equivalent number of occurrences, NE, which is given by Equation (3.11) as
00 = ~(AT)" e-ATNEn a _ a
n=1 n=1 ]-
In order to obtain the uncertainty of the CEC value, we have to calculate the
uncertainty of NE, SNE.
Before calculating the uncertainty of NE, we need to obtain the
uncertainty of the frequency of occurrence, Sk, through the data analysis or
expert opinion elicitation. By applying Gauss's Law to the definition of NE
which is described by Equation (3.11), we can derive that the value of SNE is
given by following relationship:
SNE 1 (NE7- .P n (3.26)
n=1 n
where T is the remaining plant lifetime; NE is given by Equation (3.11); P" is
the probability that the problem will occur exactly n times over the remaining
plant lifetime, which is given by Equation (3.7) as
(AT )" e-'T
Pn = . (3.7)
n!
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If the value of expected number of occurrence, XT, is less than 0.01,
the uncertainty of NE, which is given by Equation (3.26), can be approximated
by following relationship:
SNE = S-. (3.27)
3.4.4.4. Ranking of Engineering Improvements
So far, we have described how to obtain the return rate, re, and the
uncertainty, Sr, of each engineering improvement. The results of the previous
steps give us the combinations of re and Sr of all proposed engineering
improvements. However, it is not yet directly apparent which improvements
yield the best economic returns, i.e., those that be implemented.
This section proposes a method to rank the attractiveness of proposed
engineering improvements that are characterized by their combinations of re
and Sr.
We assume that a plant requires a certainty (i.e., Sr = 0) minimum
return rate for any investment. This Minimum Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate
is denoted as r,. The quantity, r0, is a plant-specific quantity, and its value
may vary in a wide range for different plants. According to author's
experience, the requirement for a minimum return rate exists in many plants.
For example, at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station, it is usually required that
a project should have at least a benefit/cost ratio (equivalent to the return rate
plus one) of 5 to be reviewed by the Station Modification Resource Committee
(SMRC), the plant managerial body for the budget allocation. (Note: The
minimum benefit/cost ratio of 5 required by Seabrook SMRC is actually a
mean value of the ratio since the process they adopt uses the mean values of all
quantities to calculate the benefit/cost ratio. This is different from the
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minimum zero-uncertainty return rate that we are concerned with here.
However, by using some elicitation techniques, we are able to obtain the
minimum zero-uncertainty return rate based upon the requirement for the
minimum mean return rate. [See Appendix A])
Logically, for an investment with uncertainty in the return rate, a DM
will demand a mean return rate higher than r. The required addition in the
mean return rate is called the Uncertainty Premium. The uncertainty premium
is a function, f(Sr), of the uncertainty, Sr. Only when the mean return rate, r*,
of an investment can satisfy the relationship
r*= ro + f(S,), (3.28)
would the DM consider that this investment is indifferent to the investment
which gives him a return rate of r. for certain. The uncertain premium f(Sr) is
determined by the weight that people trade off the Sr and re.
We can plot Equation (3.28) and all combinations of re and Sr of
engineering improvements in a plane in which Sr is the horizontal axis and re is
the vertical axis. Every point in this plane represents an engineering
improvement. As shown in Figure 3.29, points A, B, C and D represent the
Engineering Improvement A, B, C, and D, respectively.
The line that represents Equation (3.28), r* = r + f(Sr), is called the
Minimum Return Line, because a DM considers that an investment
represented by a point on this line is indifferent to the investment that gives the
minimum zero-uncertainty return rate, ro. Alternatively, we can state that the
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Equivalent Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate of any investment represented by a
point on the Minimum Return Line is equal to r.
U
rBO
rAo
ro
D
A C Minimum
Return Line:
r* - r0 +f(S,)
Uncertainty, Sr
Figure 3.29. Illustration of Ranking the Engineering Improvements
In order to rank all proposed engineering improvements, we plot
improvements in the Sr-re plane according to their expected return rates and the
uncertainties associated with the expected return rates, and compare their
Equivalent Zero-Uncertainty Return Rates. The steps for ranking these
improvements are as follows:
* Any proposed engineering improvement with the (re, Sr) point
located below the Minimum Return Line will be discarded. For
example, the Engineering Improvement C (Point C) in Figure 3.29
will be considered as a bad choice, although it has higher expected
return rate re than point A.
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" All engineering improvements located above the criteria line are
good candidates. The preference among them is determined by
their Equivalent Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate. The Equivalent
Zero Uncertainty Return Rate of an improvement can be obtained
by drawing a line in the Sr-re plane which passes through the point
representing the improvement and is parallel to the minimum
return line. The intersection of this line with the vertical axis is the
Equivalent Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate of this improvement.
For example, as shown in Figure 3.29, rAO , rB,, ro and r O,0 are
the equivalent zero-uncertainty return rates of improvement A, B,
C and D, respectively.
" By comparing these Equivalent Zero-Uncertainty Return Rates, we
can rank the improvements in the order of descending equivalent
zero-uncertainty return rates. The improvement with the highest
equivalent zero-uncertainty return rate will be ranked as the best,
The improvement with the second highest equivalent zero-
uncertainty return rate will be ranked as the second best, and so on.
For example, the four engineering improvements plotted in Figure
3.29 can be ranked as D, B, A, C in the order of their optimality
since rDO > rBO > rA4 > rCO'
The functional expression of f(Sr) is very important in the process for
ranking the proposed engineering improvements. It directly determines the
optimality of an improvement. Different forms of f(Sr) may give different
rankings of the improvements. See Appendix A for detailed discussion.
The functional form of f(Sr) depends on the DM's risk attitudes,
tolerance of uncertainty, and other subtle factors such as the DM's concerns
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for his career reputation. Complicating these factors, the form of f(Sr) may
vary from person to person and plant to plant. It is much likely impossible to
obtain a general form of f(Sr) that can be applied to all plants.
The plant-specific form of f(Sr) can be formulated through eliciting the
DM's requirement for the expected return rate, r*, that will make him
indifferent to the minimum zero-uncertainty return rate, r0, for a given
uncertainty, Sr. The difference between r* and r is the value of f(Sr). By
changing the value of Sr, we are able to obtain a series of f(S,) values. From
these discrete f(Sr) values elicited from the DMs, the functional expression
f(Sr) can be approximated (Appendix A).
For simplicity, we can imitate the method that is utilized in finance
theory, where the required compensation for uncertainty only depends upon
the market's behaviors rather than upon individual preferences. The
magnitude of the compensation for uncertainty is governed by a mathematical
model named the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) [Brealey and Myers,
1996]. In the simplest imitation of this model, we can just use the relationship
f(Sr) = O.4Sr, (3.29)
to assess the required expected return rate on the investment for improving
nuclear plant performance.*
*: The CAPM gives a simple answer to the question of what is the expected return rate for an
individual stock traded in an efficient market. As the CAPM states, the expected return
rate of a specific stock (investment) is given by the relationship
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r = r" +,8- MP,
where ro is the risk-free (zero-uncertainty) return rate, (for example, the interest rate of
US Treasury Bills). MP is the market premium defined as the difference between the
market return rate and the risk-free return rate, i.e., MP = r - ro. 8is the beta value
of this specific stock (investment), which is given by the statistics
.. im
where oim is the covariance between this specific stock's return rate and the market return
rate, and o;,2 is the variance of the market return rate. The market portfolio's beta is
equal to 1.
The uncertainty premium f(S) that we defined previously is analogous to the market
premium MP in the CAPM. Over the past 30 years, the average market premium value
has been about 8.7% while the standard deviation of the market return rate has been
20.8%. The market premium is about equal to 0.4 of the standard deviation of the market
return rate. This is the analogy that Equation (3.29) comes from.
3.4.4.5. Allocation of Investments to the Best Improvements
According to the ranking of improvements obtained, we disregard all
improvements with equivalent zero-uncertainty return rate values less than r.
Then we allocate the necessary funds fully to implement the best
improvement, then fully to implement the second best improvement, until the
entire budget is allocated. The process of allocating of the budget is illustrated
in Figure 3.30. (Here we do not consider the cases of partially implementing
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the improvements since we can consider any possible partial implementation
of an improvement as another improvement option.) Through this process, an
efficient investment for improving the plant's performance can be achieved.
Allocation of the
Improvement
project Rank
2
3
4
5
6
7
Entire Budget
.VI
Creai of Improvement 1
Crea, of Improvement 2
Creai of Improvement 3
Creai of Improvement 4
Creai of Improvement 5
Creai of Improvement 6
Creai of Improvement 7
Figure 3.30. Illustration of the Investment Allocations Priority
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3.5. CONSIDERATION OF "IMPONDERABLE" FACTORS
3.5.1. Introduction of "Imponderable" Factors
In the previous analysis, we focused on the direct consequences that a
problem may cause for the plant performance, such as the power generating
capacity loss, and the additional costs of labor and materials. These
consequences are usually tangible and can be easily quantified. For many
problems in nuclear plant operation, considering these factors is sufficient to
yield a good decision. However, in some cases, other intangible factors are
important or even dominate the decision-making process. These intangible
factors are usually difficult to quantify and interrelate with each other in many
cases. Thus, we call these factors as the "imponderable "factors.
The major "imponderable" factors include the regulator confidence;
industry peer pressure, such as INPO rating; public image and local
community relations; and the threat of "going out of business" (which mainly
arises from the Board of Directors of the plant owner to terminate operation.)
There are also some other minor "imponderable" factors, such as a DM's
consideration of his future career and professional reputation, which can
sometime affect decision making as well.
It is important to incorporate the "imponderable" factors into the
decision-making process rationally and consistently. However, in observing
current practices of decision making, we find that some DMs do not always
treat the imponderable factors in a rational and consistent manner. DMs easily
go to extremes. They sometime omit consideration of the "imponderable"
factors at the beginning of the decision-making process. However, once these
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factors are taken into consideration, their effects on the plant operations can be
large. They can cause managers to spend a huge amount of resources to
mitigate the impacts caused by these factors which can be sometimes
prevented by spending a small amount of money earlier. On the other hand,
DMs may spend a tremendous amount of resources to avoid the potential
impacts from some "imponderable" factors. However, the expenditure turns
out to be unnecessary and the impacts of these factors are greatly
overestimated. Either case is eventually a waste of the plant limited resources.
Therefore, rational and consistent consideration of the "imponderable" factors
is necessary for good decision-making.
3.5.2. Method to Quantify "Imponderable" Factors
The "imponderable" factors usually take effect as a subsequent
consequence additional to the direct consequences caused by an original event.
However, the occurrence of the original event does not necessarily induce the
occurrence of the subsequent consequence. Whether the "imponderable"
event occurs is governed by a conditional probability, given that the original
event happens. Therefore, the "imponderable" factors should be characterized
by two quantities: The subsequent consequence, Csub, that the "imponderable"
factors would impose on the plant performance, and the conditional
probability, Psub, that these factors come into effect.
A common mistake in current practice is that DMs mix these two
subsequent quantities, Csub and Psub, with the consequence, C, and probability,
P, of occurrence of the original event. They are then confused by the apparent
enormous risk of the problem and do not realize that the conditional
probability that subsequent consequence occurs may be small and highly
uncertain. Thus, as the first step of a correct approach to deal with
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"imponderable" factors, we should separate Csub and Psub from the original C
and P, and explicitly state them in a quantitative manner.
The quantification of Csub and Psub can be achieved through eliciting
expert opinions on the probabilistic distribution, Psub(Csub), of the subsequent
consequence, Cub. Once the probabilistic distribution of Cub is obtained, we
can either use the mean value of Csub and Psub as two independent quantities or
use the probabilistic distribution directly for the quantitative analysis. The
procedure to elicit such a probabilistic distribution is outlined as follows.
1) Identify the imponderable factors that are associated with a specific
engineering problem. It may be not necessary for some engineering
problems to consider the "imponderable" factors because the expected
impacts are so remote, while for others the imponderable factors may have
strong effects. On the other hand, an "imponderable" factor that plays a
strong role may be different for different problems. Therefore, we need to
make sure that we understand whether it is necessary to consider
"imponderable" factors, and if yes, what "imponderable" factors should be
considered.
2) Obtain the direct consequences, C, that this problem may cause without
consideration of imponderable factors; and the frequency, 2,, that the
consequence, C, will occur. The method to acquire these data has been
described in Section 3.4.1.
3) Elicit the probability, P,,b , that the effects of imponderable factors will be
negligible if the direct consequence should occurs. The interviewee is then
asked the question: At what probability do you think that occurrence of
this problem will not result in a serious subsequent consequence from
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NRC action (or INPO rating, public critique or adverse Board of Director
action)?
4) Then, for the situation where the "imponderable" factors have strong
effects for the problem, and where the values of C, P and P,,b have been
obtained, we should elicit the probabilistic distribution of the subsequent
consequences caused by the "imponderable" factors. The elicitor should
ask the interviewee following questions:
a) Questions for the maximum subsequent consequences:
i) What is maximum subsequent consequence that you think may be
caused by the "imponderable" factor, e.g., NRC attention?
ii) How large is this maximum subsequent consequence in terms of a
multiplicative factor (Mmax) applied the direct consequence C?
iii) How large do you think is the conditional probability, Pmax, that
this maximum subsequent consequence would occur, given that the
original event occurs? Is it high, medium, or low?
b) Questions for the most-likely subsequent consequence:
i) What is most likely subsequent consequence that you think may be
caused by the "imponderable" factor, e.g., NRC attention?
ii) How large is this most likely subsequent consequence in terms of a
multiplicative factor (M.a) applied the direct consequence C?
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iii) How large do you think is the conditional probability, Pmax, that
this most likely subsequent consequence would occur, given that
the original event occurs? Is it high, medium, or low?
iv) What is the relative ratio, Rm-, that you believe this high (medium
or low) probability is compared with the medium (low or high)
probability that you assigned to maximum subsequence
consequence before?
c) Questions for the minimum subsequent consequence:
i) What is minimum subsequent consequence that you think may be
caused by the "imponderable" factor, e.g., NRC attention?
ii) How large is this minimum subsequent consequence in terms of a
multiplicative factor (Max) applied the direct consequence C?
iii) How large do you think is the conditional probability, Pax, that
this minimum subsequent consequence would occur, given that the
original event occurs? Is it high, medium, or low?
iv) What is the relative ratio, Rmjn, that you believe this high (medium
or low) probability is compared with the medium (low or high)
probability that you assigned to maximum subsequence
consequence before?
d) Questions for the middle value of the subsequent consequence:
i) Calculate the average value of Mmax and Mm,. Denote this value as
Mxi. Then ask questions:
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ii) How large do you think is the conditional probability, Px1, that a
subsequent consequence with a multiple factor, Mx1, of the original
consequence would occur, given the occurrence of the original
event? Is it high, medium, or low?
iii) What is the relative factor, R,1, that you believe this high (medium
or low) probability is compared with the medium (low or high)
probability that you assigned to maximum subsequence
consequence before?
e) Repeat the step d), but the change the middle value of the subsequent
consequence to M,2, the average value of M,, and Mmin. After
obtained the value of R,2, the ratio of Px2/Pma, change the subsequent
consequence to Mx3, the average value of Mx1 and M and repeat the
step d) to elicit the Px3 and Rx3 for Mx3 subsequent consequence. So
on, keep changing the subsequent consequence to Mx4 , M 5 , ... Mxn,
and elicit the corresponding value of Rxm, until the elicitor feels it is
sufficient to portray the distribution of the subsequent consequence.
5) Re-arrange the data of the subsequent consequence multiple factor, MXX,
and its corresponding probability ratio, Rxx, in an ascending order.
Namely, if the total number of the subsequent consequences that have been
elicited is N, then we denote the multiple factor, Mmin, of the minimum
subsequent consequence as M1, and denote the multiple factor, Mmax, of
the maximum subsequent consequence as MN. The multiple factors of
other subsequent consequence are denoted as M2, M 3, ... M1, ... MN-1 in
the order of ascending value of Mi. The ratio of the conditional probability
that the subsequent consequence will be Mi to the conditional probability
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that the subsequent consequence will be Mmax (i.e., MN) is denoted as Ri
correspondingly.
6) So far, we have obtained the following quantities: (a) The direct
consequences of the problem, C; (b) The probability of occurrence of the
problem, P; (c) The conditional probability, P,.u , that the occurrence of
the problem will not cause impacts from the "imponderable" factors; (d) A
series of combinations of Mi and R, which are defined as
Mi = Csub, / C (3.30)
and
Ri = Pubj /sub,N (3.31)
Then we can calculate the probabilistic distribution of the subsequent
conseuqences.
a) From Equation (3.30), we know that the magnitude of the i-th
subsequent consequence is given by the relationship:
Csub= M, *C. (3.32)
b) The conditional probability, Psub,i, that the I-th subsequent consequence
will occur can be obtained through the following calculations.
i) The overall conditional probability, Psub, that the problem will
cause subsequent consequences is given by the relationship:
Psub - sub . (3.33)
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ii) On the other hand, Psub is the summation of the conditional
probabilities, Psub,i of individual possible subsequent consequence,
i.e.,
N N
sub sub,i = R -Psub,N, (3.34)
i=1 i=1
which gives
P P.p _ sub _ subi
'sub,N N R (3.35)
(R
iii) Combining Equation (3.33) and (3.35), we obtain the relationship
R.__ R.
Psubi = N 'sub N G(-Psub) (3.36)
SRj L Ri
i=1 i=1
3.5.3. Incorporating "imponderable" factors into the decision-
making approach
The "imponderable" factors affect the decision making as additional
consequences on the top of the direct consequence caused by the original
event. The effects of "imponderable" factors can be incorporated into decision
making in two ways: 1) Treat the effects of the "imponderable" factor as an
additional event which has a consequence of the mean subsequent
consequence, with a probability equal to the overall unconditional probability
that the "imponderable" factor will come into effect; 2) Treat the effects of the
"imponderable" factors as a series of probabilistic distributed subsequent
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consequences. We will discuss these two methods in detail in following
paragraphs.
Before going into the details of methods for incorporating
"imponderable" factors, we need to clarify a basic assumption for these
methods. It is assumed that the DM will not allow the subsequent
consequence of "imponderable" factors to occur more than once. This equally
states that the DM will act to eliminate the problem if the occurrence of a
problem causes "imponderable" factor effects. This is a reasonable
assumption since the impacts of "imponderable" factors on the plant
performance are usually very serious.
3.5.4.1. Incorporate "imponderable" factors as a mean subsequent
consequence with overall conditional probability
The mean subsequent consequence, Csub, can be calculated from the
distribution of subsequent consequences elicited in previous section as follow:
N
L sub,i * Csub,i N R.
Csub= - = ZCubj - u' (3.37)
sub 
=Ri
i=1
The unconditional probability that "imponderable" factors will take
effect will be the product of the conditional probability, Psub, that
"imponderable" factor will take effect, which is equal to 1 - Psub , multiplied
by the probability that the problem will occur in the remaining plant lifetime.
Given that the frequency of occurrence is X and the remaining lifetime is T, the
probability, P, that the problem will occur in the remain lifetime is given by
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P=1-e-'" . (3.38)
Thus, the unconditional probability, Pimp, that "imponderable" factors will take
effect is given by the relationship:
imp s(1ubeT)-PUb. (3.39)
By applying Gauss's Law to Equation (3.39), we can obtain the
uncertainty of Pimp by Equation (3.40)
Sp =SA * Te~A - Psub + (1 -e- C T ). S . (3.40)
The CEC value of the "imponderable" factor can be obtained by
relationship:
C.~m = C * a = 0 A)On = sub imp sub= Cs  [( -1e) -Pub . (3.41)
The uncertainty of Co,imp can be obtained by using Equation (3.23)
since we have know the uncertainties of Csub and Pimp.
3.5.4.2. Incorporate "imponderable" factors as a series of probabilistic
distributed subsequent consequences
Incorporation of "imponderable" factors as a series of probabilistic
subsequent consequences is similar to incorporation of "imponderable" factors
as a mean subsequent consequence, except that the risk from "imponderable"
factors now is the summation of a series of distributed subsequent
consequences. i.e, the Rimp now is given by the relationship:
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Rimp = Cu, - ) -Psubj, = (1 - e~T)P Cb . isubi . (3.42)
i=1
where Psub,i is given by Equation (3.36).
Substitute Equation (3.36) into (3.42), we obtain the relationship:
N R
Rimp = (1 - e- )Z Cub N sub
i=1 > Ri
N. (3.43)
e- N ssub,i 
- R
R i=1
i=1
Therefore, the CEC of the problem then can be obtained by
relationship:
COimP = [(1 - CAT ) P N 1sub bCa - R aN L.subii
Z R =
i=1
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(3.44)
NN
i=1
Chapter 4
EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION WITH
CONSIDERATION OF "IMPONDERABLE"
FACTORS
4.1. INTRODUCTION
In order to demonstrate how to apply the decision-making approach
described in Chapter 3, this chapter gives two examples. The first example is
decision-making for upgrading the moisture separator and reheater (MSR)
system in a PWR plant. This example is a pure power generation problem
without involvement of the "imponderable" factors. The second example is
the upgrade of a PWR SF6 system. This example combines the considerations
on power generation and safety impacts. Also, "imponderable" factors,
including unwanted attention by the safety regulator and public relation
concerns, are taken into account in deciding upon responses in important but
not dominating role.
Organization of this chapter is as follows. Each example is introduced
in a background section, followed by four steps of the decision-making
approach. First, by applying the method developed in Chapter 3, problems
associated with each example is identified and characterized. Based upon the
characteristics of the problems, we rank order the problems and then formulate
the solutions and improvements for those of most significance. By applying
the method described in Chapter 3, we evaluate the improvements for each
136
example and make recommendations for the most efficient improvements and
investment allocations. Finally, as a demonstration of plant level decision
making, we compare results from the two examples, and make
recommendations for investment allocations at the plant level.
4.2. UPGRADE OF THE MOISTURE SEPARATOR
REHEATER (MSR) SYSTEM IN A PWR PLANT
4.2.1. Background
Moisture separator reheaters (MSR) are used in the turbine cycle of
nuclear power plants. The function of a moisture separator reheater is to
remove moisture from the wet steam that exhausts from the high-pressure
turbine and to reheat the dried steam into the superheat region before it flows
to the plant's low pressure turbines. The reduction of moisture increases
turbine mechanical efficiency, reduces the plant heat rate, and reduces the
potential for erosion or corrosion damage in the low-pressure turbines.
Historically, nuclear utilities have experienced MSR degradation that
increased low-pressure turbine moisture content and increased the plant heat
rate. Typical performance losses due to ineffective MSRs can be as high as 10
to 15 MWe per plant. Therefore, upgrading the MSR performance is very
important for improving the nuclear plant's economic performance.
This example presents the proposed MSR upgrade project at the
Seabrook Nuclear Power Station (SNPS). The Seabrook station is a four-loop
Westinghouse design PWR plant with 1220 MWe rated power. There are four
identical MSRs in the plant's main steam cycle loop. The MSR at Seabrook is
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the General Electric single-stage, external header, vertical U-tube design. The
material for the U-tubes is 90/10 copper nickel. The MSRs are large
horizontal, cylindrical pressure vessels 46 ft in length and 12.5 ft in diameter.
Figure 4.1 shows the longitudinal and transverse cross-sectional views of this
design.
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A MSR consists of a moisture separator section and a reheater section.
The steam enters the moisture separator section through circular inlet nozzles.
The steam flow is divided and directed by impingement baffles and secondary
flow guides so that the steam flow is evenly distributed throughout the inlet
plenum. The inlet plenum directs the steam against the inlet face of the
moisture separator panels. These panels are constructed with layers of
chevron-type vanes. The droplets flow down the vanes into a drain, through
which they are directed to the heater drain tank for recovery by the heater and
drain system.
After leaving the separator panels, the dried steam flows up around the
reheater tube bundle. The dried steam is heated by reheat steam to a
superheated state. The reheat steam comes directly from the steam generator.
After passes the reheater tube bundle, the reheat steam loses thermal energy,
causing it to condense. This condensate is directed to the reheater drain tank,
which discharges to feedwater heater No.26 or the condenser.
Seabrook Station has been experiencing degradation of MSR
performance for many years. The average Terminal Temperature Difference
(TTD, a measurement of MSR efficiency) is about 430, compared with the
industry standard of 250. Furthermore, the existence of copper in the reheater
tubes has the potential to accelerate the degradation of the steam generator.
Engineers at Seabrook have been interested in a MSR upgrade since 1994 and
have proposed several plans for the upgrade. However, the plant management
has not yet reached a decision concerning whether to conduct such a upgrade.
This example is mainly an issue of plant performance enhancement
without involvement of "imponderable" factors. Through this example, we
illustrate the basic concepts of the methodology.
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4.2.2. Identification and Characterization of Problems
4.2.2.1. Identification of Problems
Through analysis of historical data and opinions elicited from system
engineers, the current MSR system problems are identified as follows:
" Problem 1: Accelerated degradation of the steam generators
because of the presence of Cu in current MSR tubes;
" Problem 2: Decrease in overall thermal efficiency because of the
incomplete moisture separation and insufficient reheating of the
cycle steam;
" Problem 3: Potential Low Pressure(LP) turbine blade erosion
because of the potential existence of moisture in the steam
admitted to the LP turbines;
" Problem 4: Plant Trip or Power Reduction because of other
miscellaneous MSR system failures and incorrect responses to the
transients that they may cause.
4.2.2.2. Characterization of Problems
Each problem will be characterized by its consequence, C, and the
frequency of occurrence, X, (which is used for determining the equivalent
number of occurrences, NE, in the remaining lifetime), as well as the
uncertainties of these quantities. However, before characterizing the
problems, we need to determine two quantities: the maximum acceptable cost,
Co, max, and the remaining lifetime of this plant, T.
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In order to obtain the plant maximum acceptable cost, Co, max, we asked
plant managers to estimate the maximum cost that their board of directors
would tolerate for solving plant-related problems the costs without ordering
plant decommissioning. Summarizing the answers from the mangers, the
extreme tolerable case would have a direct cost of $200 million plus a 9-month
shutdown. In term of monetary costs, it would be about 400 million dollars.
The remaining plant lifetime is important because it determines the
amount of time over which benefits due to an investment can be reaped. The
length of remaining plant lifetime can be obtained by the remaining time of
current license plus possible extensions by re-licensing the plant. For this
example plant, the remaining time of current license is about 30 years. If it
can be extended for another 10 years by re-licensing, the total remaining
lifetime of this plant would be about 40 years.
* Problem 1: Degradation of Steam Generator
Plant chemical engineers claim that they can maintain the steam
generator integrity without significant impact from the existence of copper in
the system for the whole plant lifetime if the water chemistry is carefully
controlled. However, there is always a possibility that control of the water
chemistry will be lost. In that case, the existence of copper will dramatically
increase the rate of degradation of steam generator.
The consequences of steam generator failure can be determined with
little uncertainty. Materials and labor costs for replacement of steam
generators are about $100 million, with a work period about 50 days. If the
work is planned to be done during a refueling outage, the extra outage days for
steam generator replacement is about 10 to 15 days compared with the regular
refueling outage. If we assume that the replacement power cost is 2.5 cents
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per KWHr, for this plant with a rated power of 1220 Mwe, a 10 to 15 day extra
outage means an extra replacement power cost of 7 to 11 million dollars.
Therefore, the overall cost for steam generator replacement is about $110
million. Depend upon the quality of the work planning, this number can
decrease or increase by about $20 million.
What we are concerned about with this problem is the increase in the
chance of steam generator replacement during the remaining plant lifetime due
to the existence of copper, given that the water chemistry is not well-
controlled. This can be illustrated in Figure 4.2:
Cumulative Bad chemistry control, with
Probability of copper existence
Steam
Generator
Failure, Q(t), Bad chemistry control, without Chance of
by Time, t existence Problem 1
Occurrence
Good chemistry control
Current
Operation Time, t Plant life time,T
Figure 4.2. Illustration of the Probability That We Are Concerned About With
the Problem of Steam Generator Failure in the MSR Example: The
Increase in Failure Probability Due to the Existence of Copper
In order to obtain the equivalent number of occurrences, NE, that
characterizes this problem, we elicited from the plant staff the increase of
frequency of steam generator replacement due the existence of copper given
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loss of water chemistry control. Since the probability of losing water
chemistry control is very small, and copper assisted steam generator
degradation is slow, the increase of steam generator replacement probability is
low. According to expert opinions, the increase of the frequency of problem
occurrence is about 10-4 to 10-5 per year. If we assume that the value of X is
uniformly distributed within the interval [10-4/year, 10-5/year], then the mean
of the frequency is about 5.5x10~5 per year, and the uncertainty (i.e., the
standard deviation) of the frequency is 2.6x10-5 per year.
Because the value of expected occurrence, XT, (which is equal to
(5.5 x 10~5 ) x 40), is smaller than 0.01, we can use the value of XT as the NE
value of the problem. Therefore, Problem 1 can be characterized as an event
having a consequence of $100M with an uncertainty of $20M, and the
equivalent number of occurrences, NE, of 2.2x10-3 with an uncertainty of
1..Ox10-3
* Problem 2: Reduction of Thermal Efficiency
The probability of this problem is easy to quantify because it is being
experienced now, i.e., the probability is equal to unity.
The consequences of this problem are more difficult to quantify. First,
the characterization of the influence of individual factors upon the thermal
efficiency is a complicated problem. A change in MSR performance will
change the whole loop's thermal hydraulic characteristics and then affect the
thermal efficiency by means of overall changes in the loop condition. Second,
no effective instrument is available that can provide a credible MSR thermal
performance measurement. Currently, the most common-used measurement is
that of the Heater Terminal Temperature Difference (TTD). Based upon the
operation experience and theoretical analysis results, some correlation has
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been proposed between the TTD change and the thermal efficiency change.
For the MSR design at this plant, the correlation is: 0.015% decrease in
thermal efficiency for each degree F increase in TTD.[EPRI, 1997]
This plant's design value for the TTD is 250F. The current average
TTD value is about 430F. According to the correlation, this 18 0F increase in
TTD means that the problems of MSR are causing about a 0.27% decrease in
the thermal efficiency. The rated power of this plant is 1220 MW. Thus a
0.27% decrease in thermal efficiency means the loss of 3.3 MW generating
capacity. One MW is worth about $200K per year if the replacement power
cost is 2.5 cents per kWh and the overall capacity factor is 90%. Therefore,
the consequence of current thermal efficiency loss is about $660K per year. If
remaining plant lifetime is 40 years, the overall undiscounted consequence is
about $26.4M.
The uncertainty of the consequence will come from 1) the inaccuracy
of the TTD measurement thus the inaccuracy of the current MW loss (which
may be only 0.15% loss in thermal efficiency, i.e., 1.8 MW loss); 2) the
approximation of the correlation between the thermal efficiency and the TTD;
3) the simplification of the future thermal efficiency degradation development;
4) simplification of replacement power cost. According to expert opinions,
these factors may give plus or minus about 50% of the base number that we
calculated previously, or in term of absolute value, $13.2M.
* Problem 3: Turbine Erosion
The consequence of turbine erosion is twofold. First, it reduces the
thermal efficiency; second, it increases the repair cost for the eroded turbine
parts. The reduction in thermal efficiency due to the turbine blade erosion is
small, and may result in about 2.5 MW reduction in generating capacity. In
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the monetary terms, it is worth about $500K per year. The increase in repair
cost is about $100K for every refueling outage. Assuming that the refueling
cycle is 2 years, this annual cost is about $50K per year. Thus, the total value
of Problem 3 consequence is about $550K per year. The overall consequence
of the problem over the remaining lifetime is about $22M.
The uncertainty of the value of consequences comes from uncertainties
in 1) the reduction of thermal efficiency due to the turbine erosion; 2) the
increase in repair cost; 3) the replacement power cost; 4) the discount rate.
According to expert opinions, the overall uncertainty can be as high as 50% of
the base value, which is about $11 M in monetary terms.
As elicited from experts, the occurrence frequency of this problem is
relatively low. It is about 104 to 10-5 per year. Again we assume the
frequency is uniformly distributed within the interval of 104 to 10-5 per year.
Then the mean of the frequency is equal to 5.5x10~5 per year and the
uncertainty of k is 2.6x10 5 . Therefore, again we can use the value of XT as
the equivalent number of occurrences to characterize this problem. This value
is about 2.2x10-3 with an uncertainty of 1.0x10-3.
* Problem 4: Plant Trip or Power Reduction
The consequence of this problem is about a 3-day plant shutdown with
one-day variation. In monetary terms, it is worth about $2 million, with a $1
million variation. However, the frequency that the MSR would cause plant
trips or power reductions is very low. According to experts, it is only about
10-6 to 10-1 per year. Assuming the frequency is uniformly distributed, then
the mean is 5.5x10-7 per year and the uncertainty (i.e., the standard deviation)
of k is 2.6x10-7. Thus, the equivalent number of occurrences is about 2.2x10-5
with an uncertainty of 1.0x10 5.
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* Summary
We summarize the consequence and equivalent number of occurrences
that characterize each problem, as well as the uncertainties associated with
these two quantities in Table 4.1.
Equivalent
number of
Expected Uncertainty occurrences Uncertainty
Problem Consequence, of C, over remaining of NE,
Description C Sc lifetime, NE SNE
Problem 1:
Degradation of $11OM $20M 2.2x10-3  1.0x10-3
Steam
Generator
Problem 2:
Decrease of $26.4M $13.2M 1 0Thermal
Efficiency
Problem 3: LP
Turbine Blade $22M $1 iM 2.2x10-3  1.0x10~3
Erosion
Problem 4:
Plant Trip or $2M $1M 2.2x10 5  1.0x10 5
Power
Reduction
Table 4.1. Summary of Characterizations of Problems
Separator Reheater Example
in Moisture
4.2.3. Ranking of Problems
We plot the (C, NE) combination of each problem in a C-P plane, as
shown in Figure 4.3. Each problem is represented by a point in the C-P plane.
As shown in Figure 4.3, Problems 1, 2 and 3 fall into the Serious Risk Region,
while Problem 4 is in the negligible risk region. We thus need not consider
problem 4 further.
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Ranking of Problems
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Figure 4.3. Ranking of Problems in Moisture Separator Reheater Example By
Their Certainty Equivalent Cost Values
In order to rank the importance of the other three problems, we need to
determine the CEC value (i.e., CO value) of each problem. Before we
determine the respective CEC value, we need to determine the appropriate
RAI value, a, for each problem.
For those problems in the Serious Risk Region, we can use the generic
RAI value of 1.6 as described in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.
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For problems falling into the Important Risk Region, we should use
Equation (3.4) to calculate the appropriate RAI value:
a = - --log( 2 ), (3.4)
2 102
where ao is the generic RAI value; C, P are consequence and probability of the
problem, respectively.
For the MSR example, Problems 1, 2 and 3 are all in the Serious Risk
Region of the C-P plane, thus the RAI values of these problems are equal to ao,
i.e.,
al =a 2 =a3 =1.6.
Using Equation (3.12),
CO = C. NE , (3.12)
the CEC values of Problems 1, 2 and 3 are obtained as follows:
Co = $2.40 x 10 6,
CO,2 = $2.64 x 10 7 ,
and CO3 = $4.80 x 10 5 . (4.1)
In fact, since the probability of Problem 2 is equal to unity, the
consequence of Problem 2 is the CEC value of this problem.
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From the CEC values of problems, it is clear that the importance
ranking of these four problems is:
Problem 2 > Problem 1 > Problem 3 > Problem 4
Using Equation (3.23), which is re-written as follows:
(Sco)2 _(S)2+(I$E)2 (3.23)
Co C a NE , 3.3
we obtain the uncertainties of these CEC values as follows:
SCO,1 = $8.10 x105 ,
SCO, 2 = $1.32 x10 7 ,
and SCO,3 = $2.76 x 105 . (4.2)
4.2.4. Formulation of Potential Engineering Improvements
The engineering improvements should be formulated for the problems
in the order of their importance rankings. The most important problem is the
reduction of thermal efficiency due to the degradation of MSRs. The second
important problem is the existence of copper in the MSR reheater tubes, which
may accelerate the degradation of steam generator. The third most important
problem is the turbine erosion that is caused by the moisture in the steam due
to inefficient moisture separation and reheating. Thus, the first priority of the
solution is to improve the thermal efficiency, and then to change the material
of the MSR tubes. Once the performance of MSR is improved, the moisture in
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the steam will be naturally reduced, therefore, the problem of turbine erosion
can be prevented as well.
Since the degradation of MSR system is a common problem in nuclear
plants, upgrading the existing MSR system has been developed into a
sophisticated business. The Senior Engineering Company is a specialist in
MSR upgrades. They provide a nuclear utility with a comprehensive package
for MSR upgrading with the most recent designs. It can also adjust the
package for the plant's specific needs. Several options are currently available
for Seabrook Station to improve its MSR performance. These improvement
options are as follows:
" Option 1: Upgrade entire MSR system to a new design, which
includes changing the reheater tube bundles to the new two-stage
four-pass design with stainless steel materials, and changing the
moisture separator to a new chevron design. This option costs
about $7.5 million.
* Option 2: Replace the MSR reheater tube bundles by the stainless
steel tube bundles in basic design. This option costs about $4.3M;
* Option 3: Replace the moisture separator to a new design of
chevron panels. This option costs about $3.2M.
All these options can be implemented within a refueling outage period.
Of course, in addition to these options, management always has the option to
do nothing.
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4.2.5. Selection of Improvement Options
4.2.5.1. Expected Return Rate, re, and Uncertainty, Sr, of Each Option
In order to select among options, we need to know the expected return
rate, re, and the uncertainty, Sr, of the return rate. In this sub-section, we
calculate these quantities of each improvement option by using the method
developed in Chapter 3.
0 Improvement Option 1: Replace Entire MSR System by New Design
First, we need to know the effects of implementing this engineering
improvement. According to the system engineers at Seabrook and the
information provided by the Senior company, if the MSR system at Seabrook
is replaced by the 2-stage, 4-pass new design offered by the Senior
Engineering Company, the current Terminal Temperature Difference (TTD) of
43"F can be reduced to only 20F. The 20'F TTD is even better than the
design standard, which is 25*F. Therefore, if the replacement is successful, the
degradation in thermal efficiency (Problem 2) will be eliminated. However,
there is a small probability that the expected TTD will not be achieved. As
speculated by the plant engineers, this probability is 10~3 to 104. If we assume
that this probability is uniformly distributed, then the mean of this probability
is 5.5xl04 and the uncertainty (the standard deviation) is about 2.6xl04. If
the new design does not work well, then the TTD that will be achieved can be
anything between the current 43F to the design standard 25"F. This range of
TTD corresponds to the range of generating capacity loss from 3.3 MWe to
zero MWe. If the replacement power cost is 2.5 cents per KWHr, the overall
consequence in remaining plant lifetime will be $26.4M to zero. If the
distribution of the consequences is uniform, the mean consequence is about
$13.2M and the uncertainty is about $7.6M.
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Then Problem 2', the destination of Problem 2 (thermal efficiency
reduction) after implementation of Option 1, can be characterized by a
consequence of $13.2M with an uncertainty of $7.6M, and the probability of
5.5xlO with an uncertainty of 2.6x10 4 .
Since this engineering improvement will use stainless steel as the
reheater tube material, the possibility that MSR material would cause steam
generator degradation can be eliminated. Thus, Problem 1', the destination of
Problem 1, is an event with a probability of zero.
If this improvement is implemented, the probability of causing turbine
erosion will be reduced by two orders of magnitude, while the consequence of
turbine erosion may be reduced by one order of magnitude, according to
expert opinions. Thus, Problem 3', the destination of problem 3, is an event
that has consequence of $2.2M with an uncertainty of $L.IM, and probability
of occurrence of 2.2x10-5 with uncertainty of 1.0x105 .
Equivalent
Effects of Uncertainty number of Uncertainty
Implementing Consequence of C' occurrences of NE'
Improvement 1 C9 Sc' NE' SNE'
Problem 1':
Degradation of $110M $20M 0 0
Steam Generator
Problem 2':
Decrease of $13.2M $7.6M 5.5x10 4  2.6x10'
Thermal Efficiency
Problem 3': LP
Turbine Blade $2.2M $1.1M 2.2x10-5  1.0x10-
Erosion I I I 1 _11
Table 4.2. Destinations of Problems in the MSR Example As Results of
Implementing Improvement 1
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The destinations of three problems as results of implementing
engineering improvement 1 are summarized in Table 4.2.
The effects on the three problems of implementing engineering
Improvement 1 can be illustrated in Figure 4.4. Problem 1 would be
eliminated. Thus its destination Problem 1' cannot be shown in the figure
since the probability of Problem ' is equal to zero. Problem 2 will be
Effects of Improvement 1 (MSR Example)
C'02= Co3= Co1 = C02 = Co, max =
8.53E+04 4.80E+05 2.40E+06 2.64E+07 4.OOE+08
1E+00
Problem 2 uated
Ris egion
1E-01
Serious Risk
Region
IE-02
Problem I
a1 1.6
E-3-Problem 3
a3 =1.6C-
Negligible Problem 2'
Risk Region a2' = 1.491 E-04 --
Problem 3' Important
* Risk Region
1E-05 M I
IE+04 IE+05 1E+06 IE+07 1E+08 1E+09
Consequence, C (Dollars)
Figure 4.4. Effects of Implementing Improvement 1 (MSR Example): Problem
1 Is Eliminated. Problem 2 Is Transformed Into Problem 2', Problem 3 Is
Transformed Into Problem 3'.
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transformed to Problem 2', which is in the Important Risk Region. Problem 3
will be improved to become Problem 3', which is in the Negligible Risk
Region.
By applying the method developed in Chapter 3, the CEC values of
these problem destinations can be obtained as follows:
C01 = 0 ,
C' 2 =$8.53 x 10 4,
and C0'3 = 0. (4.3)
Using Equation (3.24), which is re-written below for easy reference,
(c6) (2 +(2)2 
, (3.24)
we can obtain the uncertainties of these destination CEC values as follows:
ScI = 0,
Sco,2 = $5.61x10 4 ,
and SCO,3 = 0 . (4.4)
We summarize the CEC values and their uncertainties of problems
before and after the implementation of engineering Improvement 1 in Table
4.3.
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Table 4.3. CEC Values and Associated Uncertainties
After the Implementation of Improvement
of Problems before and
1 (MSR Example)
From the CEC values and their uncertainties shown in Table 4.3, we
can calculate the expected return rate, re,1, of investing in Improvement Option
1 and the uncertainty of the return rate, Sr,.
As given by Equation (3.21), the expected return rate, re,1, of
investment on the improvement option 1 can be obtained as:
(X C01 -1C') -Cr
r-= .1 0 r, (4.5)
Creal
The real cost for implementing this improvement option is $7.5M.
Thus, the expected return rate of this option is
re, = 289%. (4.6)
The uncertainty of the return rate is given by Equation (3.25). For this
specific case, we re-express the Equation (3.25) as follows:
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CEC of Uncertainty CEC of Uncertainty
Problem Problem of Co Destination of C'O
Description Co Sco C'o Sco'
Problem 1:
Degradation of $2.4M $0.81M 0 0
Steam Generator
Problem 2:
Decrease of $26.4M $13.2M $85.4K $56.1K
Thermal Efficiency
Problem 3: LP
Turbine Blade $480K $276K 0 0
Erosion I I I _I
a I
S,. = C2 (4.7)
real
Equation (4.7) gives us the uncertainty of return rate of the investment
on Option 1 as:
Sr, =176%. (4.8)
* Improvement Option 2: Replace Reheating Tube Bundles Only
The effects of implementing this engineering improvement can be
obtained from the results in other plants that have implemented such
improvements and from the information provided by plant engineers and the
Senior Company. If the MSR reheating tube bundles at Seabrook are replaced
by the stainless steel tube bundles offered by the Senior Engineering
Company, at least half of current loss in thermal efficiency can be recovered.
The generating capacity gain can range from 3.3 MW, the total current loss, to
1.7 MW, half of current loss. If the replacement power cost is 2.5 cents per
KWHr, the overall consequence in remaining plant lifetime will be $13.2M to
zero. If we assume the distribution is uniform, the average consequence is
about $6.6M and the uncertainty is about $3.8M.
Then the destination of Problem 2 (thermal efficiency reduction) after
implementation of Option 2 can be characterized by a consequence of $6.6M
with an uncertainty of $3.8M, and a probability of unity with zero uncertainty.
As with Option 1, this engineering improvement would use stainless
steel as the reheater tube material. Therefore, the possibility that MSR
material could cause steam generator degradation can be eliminated. Thus
Poblem 1 becomes Problem 1', an event with a probability of zero.
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The effect of this improvement upon the turbine erosion problem
would be same as that of Option 1. The destination of Problem 3 is the event
that has consequence of $2.2M with an uncertainty of $1.1M, and probability
of occurrence of 2.2x10~5 with uncertainty of 1.0x10~5.
The destinations of three MSR problems as of the results of
implementing engineering Improvement option 2 are summarized in Table 4.4.
Equivalent
Effects of Uncertainty number of Uncertainty
Implementing Consequence of C' occurrences of NE'
Improvement 1 C' Sc, NE' SNE'
Problem 1':
Degradation of $110M $20M 0 0
Steam Generator
Problem 2':
Decrease of $6.6M $3.8M 1 0
Thermal Efficiency
Problem 3': LP
Turbine Blade $2.2M $1.1M 2.2x10~5  1.0x10-5
Erosion I I I _1_1_
Table 4.4. Destinations of Problems in the MSR Example
Implementing Improvement 2
As Results of
These effects are also illustrated in Figure 4.5. Problem 1 would be
eliminated. Problem 2 would be improved to become Problem 2'. Problem 3
would become improved to be Problem 3', which is in the Negligible Risk
Region. By applying the method developed in Chapter 3, the CEC value of
these problem destinations can be obtained as follows:
C,01 = 0 ,
C02 = $6.6 x 106,
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and CO3 = 0. (4.9)
Effects of Improvement 2 (MSR Example)
C03= Co1 = C'02= C02 = Co, max =
4.80E+05 2.40E+06 6.60E+06 2.64E+07 4.OOE+08
IE+00 
.....
Problem 2' Problem 2 ated
Ris egion
1E-01
Serious Risk
Region
1E-02 Problem I
a1 =1.6
Problem 3o IE-03
a3 = 1.6
Negligible
I E-04 - Risk Region
Problem 3' Important
* Risk Region
1E-05
IE+04 IE+05 IE+06 IE+07 IE+08 1E+09
Consequence, C (Dollars)
Figure 4.5. Effects of Implementing Improvement 2 (MSR Example): Problem
I Is Eliminated. Problem 2 Is Transformed Into Problem 2', Problem 3 Is
Transformed Into Problem 3'.
Again, by using Equation (3.24), we can obtain the uncertainties of
these destination CEC values as follows:
Sc 1 = 0,
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and
Scf, 2 = $3.8 x 10 6 ,
SC6,3 = 0 . (4.10)
Table 4.5 summarizes the CEC values and their uncertainties of
problems before and after the implementation of Improvement 2.
CEC of Uncertainty CEC of Uncertainty
Problem Problem of CO Destination of C'0
Description Co SCO C'o Sco'
Problem 1:
Degradation of $2.4M $0.81M 0 0
Steam Generator
Problem 2:
Decrease of $26.4M $13.2M $6.6M $3.8M
Thermal Efficiency
Problem 3: LP
Turbine Blade $480K $276K 0 0
Erosion I I I 1 _1_
Table 4.5. CEC Values and Associated Uncertainties of Problems before and
After the Implementation of Improvement 2 (MSR Example)
From these CEC values and their uncertainties, we can calculate the
expected return rate, re,2, of investing in Improvement Option 2 and the
uncertainty of the return rate, Sr,2. The real cost for implementing this
improvement option is $4.3M.
By using Equation (4.5), the expected return rate, re, 2, of this option is
obtained as
re2 = 427%
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(4.11)
The uncertainty of return rate of Option 2 is given by Equation (4.7)
as:
Sr, 2 = 320%. (4.12)
* Improvement Option 3: Replace Separator Chevron Panels Only
According to the engineers at Seabrook and the information provided
by plant engineers and the Senior Company, if the MSR separator chervon
panels are replaced by the new design offered by the Senior Engineering
Company, at least 80% of current loss in thermal efficiency can be recovered.
The generating capacity gain then can range from 3.3 MW, the total current
loss, to 2.6 MW, 80% of current loss. If the replacement power cost is 2.5
cents per KWHr, the overall consequence of problem 2' over the remaining
plant lifetime will range from $5.28M to zero. Assuming the distribution of
the consequences is uniform, we can obtain the mean consequence of about
$2.64M and the uncertainty of about $1.52M. Therefore, Problem 2', the
destination of Problem 2 (thermal efficiency reduction), after the
implementation of Option 3 can be characterized by a consequence of $2.64M
with an uncertainty of $1.52M, and a probability of unity with zero
uncertainty.
Since this improvement would not change the reheater tube material,
the copper would still exist in the loops. The possibility that MSR material
causes steam generator degradation would not change. The destination of
Problem 1, Problem 1', is still an event that has consequence of $11 OM with
an uncertainty of $20M, and probability of 2.2x10 3 , with an uncertainty of
1.0x10 3 .
The effect of this improvement option on the turbine erosion problem
will be same as that of Option 1. The destination of problem 3 is the event that
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has consequence of $2.2M with an uncertainty of $1.1M, and probability of
occurrence of 2.2x10 5 with uncertainty of 1.0x10-5.
The destinations of three problems as of the results of implementing
engineering improvement option 3 are summarized in Table 4.6.
Equivalent
Effects of Uncertainty number of Uncertainty
Implementing Consequence of C' occurrences of NE'
Improvement 1 C' Sc, NE' SNE'
Problem 1':
Degradation of $110M $20M 2.2x10-3  1.0x10-3
Steam Generator
Problem 2':
Decrease of $2.64M $1.52M 1 0
Thermal Efficiency
Problem 3': LP
Turbine Blade $2.2M $1.1M 2.2x10~5  1.0x10 5
Erosion I II_1_1_
Table 4.6. Destinations of Problems in the MSR Example
Implementing Improvement 3
These effects are also illustrated in Figure 4.6.
these problem destinations are as follows:
C' =$2.4 x 10 6,
C'r =$2.64 x 10 6 ,
and
As Results of
The CEC values of
C0,3 = 0. (4.13)
The uncertainties of these destination CEC values as follows:
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Scop = $8.1x10 5,
SCO,2 = $1.52 x10 6 ,
and Sco,3 =0. (4.14)
Effects of Improvement 3 (MSR Example)
C03= Co1 = C' 02= C02 = Co, max =
4.80E+05 2.40E+06 2.64E+06 2.64E+07 4.OOE+08
IE+00
Problem 2' Problem 2 ated
Ris egion
1E-01
Serious Risk
Region
1 E-02 %I.,,,Problem I
a1 =1.6
o1E-03 -::Problem 3
- a3 =1.6
Negligible
1 E-04 -Risk Region
Problem 3' Important
* Risk Region
1E-05
1E+04 1E+05 1E+06 1E+07 1E+08 IE+09
Consequence, C (Dollars)
Figure 4.6. Effects of Implementing Improvement 3 (MSR Example): Problem
I Is Unchanged. Problem 2 Is Transformed Into Problem 2', Problem 3 Is
Transformed Into Problem 3'.
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Table 4.7 summarizes the CEC values and their uncertainties of
problems before and after the implementation of Improvement 3.
From these CEC values and their uncertainties, we can calculate the
expected return rate, re,3, of investing in Improvement Option 3 and the
uncertainty of the return rate, Sr,3. The real cost for implementing this
improvement option is $3.2M.
CEC of Uncertainty CEC of Uncertainty
Problem Problem of CO Destination of C'O
Description Co Sco C'0  Sco'
Problem 1:
Degradation of $2.4M $0.81M $2.4M $0.81M
Steam Generator
Problem 2:
Decrease of $26.4M $13.2M $2.64M $1.52M
Thermal Efficiency
Problem 3: LP
Turbine Blade $480K $343K 0 0
Erosion I I 1 11
Table 4.7. CEC Values and Associated Uncertainties of Problems before and
After the Implementation of Improvement 3 (MSR Example)
Again, by using Equation (4.5), the expected return rate, re,3, of
implementing Improvement 3 is obtained as
re,3 = 658%. (4.15)
Given by Equation (4.7), (however, we do not need to include the
contribution from problem 2 since it is unchanged,) the uncertainty of return
rate of Option 3 is:
Sr 3 = 415%. (4.16)
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* Summary of Expected Return Rate and Uncertainty of Return Rate
Table 4.8 summarizes the values of r, and Sr obtained above.
Expected Return Rate, Uncertainty of Return
Improvement Options re Rate, Sr
Option 1 289% 176%
Option 2 427% 320%
Option 3 658% 415%
Table 4.8. Expected Return Rates and Uncertainties of Return Rate of
Improvement Options (MSR Example)
4.2.5.2. Ranking and Selection of Options
Before we rank the engineering improvement options, we need to
know the Uncertainty Premium, f(Sr), that can be applied to this plant, and the
Minimum Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate, ro, required by this plant.
We can use the formula analogous to the uncertainty premium of the
financial market return rate as the uncertainty premium for decision making in
this plant. The functional expression of this analogy is given by Equation
(3.29) as:
f(S,) = 0.4Sr. (3.29)
At the Seabrook station, it is usually required that a project should at
least have a benefit/cost ratio (equivalent to the return rate plus one) of 5. This
is equivalent to demanding a minimum return rate of 4. However, this
required minimum benefit/cost ratio is actually a mean value of the ratio since
the mean values of all quantities are used to calculate the benefit/cost ratio.
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This is different from the minimum zero-uncertainty return rate, ro, that we
are concerned with here. It is actually a point on the Minimum Return Line
that we defined in Section 3.4.4.4.
We can assume that the average uncertainty of this required minimum
return rate of 4 is equal to 4. Then from the definition of the minimum return
line, we can derive the value of r as:
ro = r* 
-f(Sr). (4.17)
Given that r*= 4, Sr = 4 and f(S) = 0.4S, we have r = 240%.
The engineering improvement options are plotted in Sr-re plane as
shown in Figure 4.7. The Equivalent Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate, ro ',of
option i is given by the relationship:
r= reJ -0.4S,.
The values of roi are as follows:
r,1 = 219% for Option 1,
rO,2= 299% for Option 2,
r = 491% for Option 3. (4.19)
From Figure 4.7, it is seen that the ranking of options is in following
order:
Option 3 > Option 2> Option 1. (4.20)
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(4.18)
and
Ranking of Improvement Options
700%
Option 3
600% -
500%
cU rO, 3=491% Option 2
400%
r0,2=299% Minimum
Return Line:
% r N Option 10-- / r* =ro +f(S,)
a 200% ro,1=219%x
LLI
100% -
0% _ii
0% 100% 200% 300% 400% 500% 600% 700%
Uncertainty of Return Rate, S,
Figure 4.7. Ranking of Improvement Options (MSR Example)
This means that the replacement of the MSR separator chevron panels
is the most economically efficient engineering improvement, and the
replacement of reheater tube bundles is next. The replacement of whole MSR
system is the least efficient option.
Furthermore, because the Equivalent Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate of
Option 1, r,, , is less than the Minimum Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate, ro, we
know replacement of entire MSR system is not a good option.
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4.3. UPGRADE OF THE SF6 SYSTEM IN A PWR PLANT
4.3.1. Background
The Seabrook Nuclear Power Station 345KV distribution system
consists of an SF6 gas insulated switchyard and transmission lines. The SF6
system connects the supply of offsite power from the New England gird to the
Seabrook onsite 345KV distribution system. Connections from the switchyard
to the plant's two Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (RATs) and the three
generator step-up transformers (GSUs) are also made by SF6 bus ducts. The
section of SF6 bus duct that connects the 345 KV side of the GSUs to the
switching station is designated as gas zone GS#4. The section of SF6 duct that
connects the 345 KV side of the RAIs to the switchyard is designated as gas
zone GS#2.
Each bus duct section consists of a tubular center conductor that is
surrounded by a concentric metal enclosure filled with SF6 gas. The function
of SF6 gas is to insulate the conductor. The conductor is centered and isolated
from ground (i.e., the metal enclosure) by conical epoxy insulators. Figure 4.8
illustrates the longitudinal and transverse views of the SF6 bus duct.
The SF6 gas used as the electrical insulation within the bus ducts is
extremely stable and inert at ambient temperature. However, if the
temperature rises above 1050C, decomposition of SF6 can occur. If partial arc
discharge occurs due to the presence of moisture or other contaminating gas,
SF6 decomposes and forms a variety of corrosive byproducts. With these
byproducts present on the insulator surface, flashover can occur and the
contact springs can erode.
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Figure 4.8. Cross-Sectional Views of the SF6 Bus Duct
The SF6 system at the Seabrook station has experienced a number of
failures due to inherent inadequacies of the system design. An evaluation
performed by a special task team in 1988 recommended building a repair
facility on-site and replacing two critical gas zones (the RAI section, GS#2,
and the GSU section, GS#4) with an improved bus duct design. The repair
facility has been completed and is being utilized. These two critical gas zones
also have been rebuilt using a superior bus duct design provided by
Westinghouse.
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This is a project for which decisions have been made and
improvements have been implemented. The purpose of analyzing this
example is to illustrate of the methodology developed in this thesis because the
problems involved in this example include the consideration of
"imponderable" factors. It is not our intention to judge whether the decisions
that have been made were right or wrong.
4.3.2. Identification and Characterization of Problems
4.3.2.1. Identification of Problems
From the historic data, we can determine that the most significant
problem in the SF6 system is the failure of the epoxy insulator due to inherent
design inadequacies.
Although there is only one major problem in the SF6 system, the
consequences of its occurrence are multifold. The potential consequences of
SF6 system failure includes:
" Loss of generation. A fault in the Zone GS#4 bus duct (GSU section)
would cause a loss of load and subsequent plant trip. A fault in Zone
GS#2 (RAT section) would require a plant shutdown after 24 hours due to
a Tech Spec requirement.
* Safety impact. The failure of the SF6 system has the potential to cause
loss of offsite power.
" Environmental impact. The failure of the SF6 system may cause the
leakage of SF6 gas into the atmosphere.
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Following these direct consequences, there are several possible
subsequent, or dependent, consequences:
" The plant trip caused by a fault in the SF6 system is a challenge to turbine
control system and turbine integrity. These stresses might result in severe
damage to the turbine;
* Due to its impact upon plant safety, a fault in the SF6 system might attract
additional attention to the plant from the NRC;
" The release of SF6 gas into the atmosphere may cause local public
concerns about the plant.
4.3.2.2. Characterization of Problems
According to the degree to which these direct and subsequent
consequences occur, the problem of the SF6 system can be considered to be a
collection of the following four potential events:
* Direct Event: The event has direct consequences C, and frequency of
occurrence, k;
* Sub-Event 1 (Sub-turbine): Given that the SF6 system fails, the subsequent
consequence of turbine damage is Cburbine , and the conditional
probability that the turbine damage will occur is Psub-turbine
* Sub-Event 2 (Sub-NRC): The subsequent consequence of NRC attention is
Csub-NRC , and the conditional probability that the NRC will pay additional
attention to the plant given that the SF6 system failure causes the loss of
offsite power is Psub-NRC . By applying the method described in Chapter 3,
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Section 3.5.2, the NRC factor can be characterized in a more detailed way,
such as the probabilistic distributed subsequent consequences, i.e., in terms
of a set of (Csub-NRCj 5 sub-NRC,i) pairs.
* Sub-Event 3 (Sub-public): The subsequent consequence and the
conditional probability that the public will become more concerned about
the existence of the plant given the SF6 system fault are Cubpubic and
Psub-pubic, respectively. By applying the method described in Chapter 3,
Section 3.5.2, this public concern factor can also be characterized in a
more detailed way, such as the probabilistic distributed subsequent
consequences, i.e., a set of ( CubpubliC , Psub-public,) pairs.
The characteristics (C and P values) of these four events are
formulated as follows.
* Direct Event: Loss of Generation
The direct consequence of the problem is a plant shutdown for about
eight days with a variation of plus or minus one day. If the replacement power
cost is 2.5 cents per KWHr, for this plant with a rated power of 1220 MWe, an
eight day outage means a replacement power cost of $5.86M. The uncertainty
of the direct consequence is about $730K, which is the value of one day of
shutdown.
According to results from the analysis of the SF6 system historic
performance data, The frequency, k, of occurrence of the direct consequence is
about 0.189 per year, and the uncertainty of k, Sx, is about 0.04 per year, as the
estimate of experts. Based upon these two quantities, we can calculate the
Equivalent number of occurrences, NE, and its uncertainty, SNE as follows.
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The value of NE of the direct consequence can be obtained by applying
Equation (3.11) as
NE [zn a
n=1
(0 T)"e-2T I
a __ II Ia .nI
n=1 n!
which gives
NE 124 (4.21)
The uncertainty of NE, SNE, can be obtained by using Equation (3.26)
SNE =T -S -(NE)
n=1
P
n-I _
pn
1) (3.26)
which gives
SE =48.6. (4.22)
The NE of this direct event is much larger than the unity, thus, we will
directly represent this direct event by its CEC value, CO, on the certain line in
the C-P plane. The CEC value of this event is given by Equation (3.12),
C0 =ECNE. (3.12)
which gives
Co = $1.19x10 8 . (4.23)
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(3.11)
The uncertainty of CO can be obtained by using Equation (3.23). The
value of the uncertainty is as follows:
SC. = $3.28 x 10 7 . (4.24)
* Sub-Event 1 (Sub-turbine): Severe Turbine Damage
The subsequent consequences of turbine damage include plant
shutdown for about 2 months, which is equal to a replacement power cost of
$44M, and the cost of repair of damaged turbine structures of about $20M.
Hence, the total subsequent consequence, Cub_rbineI is about $64M. The
uncertainty of this subsequent consequence comes from the duration of the
outage and the severity of the damage. According to expert opinion, the range
of values these factors could be 20% of the total estimated cost, i.e., the
uncertainty of Csub,rbine is about $12.8M.
The conditional probability, Pubturbine , that the turbine damage would
occur given failure of the SF6 system was elicited from plant engineers.
According to expert opinion and the fact that the turbine damage has never
occurred although the plant has experienced sixteen SF6 system failures, it is a
reasonable estimate that Pub_,rbine has a value of order 10-3 to 104. If we
assume that the distribution is uniform within this interval, the mean value of
P is 5.5x10 4 and the uncertainty, S is about 2.6x104.
sub-turbine Pub-turbine'
As discussed in Chapter 3, since the subsequent consequences are so
severe, it is unlikely that the plant management will allow the subsequent
consequence to occur more than once. Therefore, the unconditional
probability, Pimp-trbine, that this subsequent consequence will occur can be
obtained from Equation (3.39) which is rewritten as:
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(4.25)
' mp-turbine _(1 - e-AT I-sub-turbine ,
where X is the frequency of original problem occurrence.
equal to 0.189 per year with an uncertainty of 0.04 per year.
Equation (4.25) gives the unconditional probability
due to the SF6 system failure as
imp-turbine =5.5x1-.
In this case, it is
of turbine damage
(4.26)
The uncertainty of Pimp-tubine can be obtained by Equation (3.40)
S imp S TeA - Pb (I -e-" ) - S,ub (3.40)
From Equation (3.40), we obtain the uncertainty Of Pimp-turbine as
S imp-turbine = 2.6 x 10- 4 (4.27)
* Sub-Event 2(Sub-NRC): Additional NRC Attention
The NRC's attention might be attracted if the failure of SF6 system
were to cause the loss of offsite power. By applying the method described in
Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2, the subsequent consequences, Csub-NRC,i, and
corresponding conditional probability ratio, Ri, was elicited from plant
mangers given that NRC's additional attention has been attracted. Ri is
defined by relationship:
Ri = sub-NRC,i
sub-NRC,N
(4.28)
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The distribution of subsequent consequences is summarized in
Table 4.9. The monetary costs are obtained by assuming the replacement
power cost is 2.5 cent per KWHr. The index 1 represents the minimum
subsequent consequence, which is a three-month plant shutdown or $65.9M in
dollar terms. The index, N, which is equal to 7 in this case, represents the
maximum subsequent consequence. The maximum subsequent consequence
in this case is a nine-month plant shutdown or a value of $197.6M in dollar
terms. The most likely subsequent consequence, which is represented by the
Index 4, is a six-month shutdown. In dollar terms, it is worth $131.8M.
i
1 (Minimum) 3 months
sub-NRC,i
$65.9M 1
2 4 months $87.8M 1.5
3 5 months $109.8M 1.8
6 months $131.8M 2(Most Likely)
5 7 months $153.7M 1.8
6 8 months $175.7M 1.5
7 (i.e., N) 9 months $197.6M 1(Maximum)
Table 4.9. Distribution of the Subsequent Consequence of NRC Attention
(SF6 Example)
Based
probabilistic
upon the data contained in Table 4.9, the conditional
distribution of the subsequent consequence of receiving
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additional NRC attention is plotted in Figure 4.9. The Y-axis in Figure 4.9 is
the conditional probability that the subsequent consequence of this attention is
Csub-NRC,i given that the NRC has paid additional attention to the plant. The
value of this conditional probability is equal to Ri / I R .
Distribution of Subsequent Consequence
of NRC Attention (SF6 Example)
C
.0
0
U.
0
C)
0
U
0
0.2
0.16
0.12
0.08
0.04
0
65.9 87.8 109.8 131.8 153.7 175.7 197.6
Subsequent Consequence, Csub.NRC,I, (Million Dollars)
Figure 4.9. Conditional Probabilistic Distribution Function of the Subsequent
Consequence of NRC Attention (SF6 Example)
The mean value of the subsequent consequence can be obtained from
the distribution by using Equation (3.37),
Csub-NRC = C sub-NRC,i ' N
i=1
(3.37)
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where R(2 ) is the conditional probability ratio which is defined by Equation
(4.28).
Hence, the mean value of subsequent consequence caused by the NRC
attention is obtained as:
Csub-NRC - $1.32 x 108 (4.29)
The uncertainty of the subsequent consequence can be obtained by the
standard deviation of the distribution. The value of the uncertainty is:
SC = $3.91 x 10 7 . (4.30)
According to the plant managers, given that failure of the SF6 system
causes a loss of plant offsite power, the overall conditional probability,
Psub-NRC ,that NRC will devote extra attention to the plant is high but with a
large uncertainty. Its plausible value ranges from 0.2 to 0.8. If we assume the
distribution of Psub-NRC in this range is uniform, then the mean value of the
conditional probability, Psub-NRC, is 0.5 and the uncertainty, Sb-NRC is about
0.17.
In order to obtain the unconditional probability, ~mp--NRC, that the NRC
will pay additional attention because of failure of the SF6 system, we need to
know the frequency that SF6 system failure will cause a loss of the offsite
power. According to the plant safety analysis, the frequency, )of, of losing
offsite power due to SF6 failure is 6.99xl0A per year, with an uncertainty of
2.0x10-4 per year.
Then through Equation (3.39), which is rewritten as
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imp-NRC sub-NRC, (4.31)
we obtain the unconditional probability of attracting NRC increased attention
as:
imp-NRC 1.38 x1 -2  (4.32)
Again, using Equation (3.40), we obtain value of the uncertainty of mp-NRC as
Smp-NRC = 8.67 x 10-3 . (4.33)
* Sub-Event 3 (Sub-public): Increased Public Concerns About the Plant
Elicited from the plant managers, the subsequent consequence,
CsubP,_,ubc, of increasing public concerns about the plant is about $5M, with an
uncertainty S Csb_,ub,,c , of $1M. The conditional probability is about 10-2 to
10~3. Assuming the conditional probability is uniformly distributed within this
range, then the mean of the conditional probability, Pubpubi, is 5.5x10-3 and
the uncertainty, S ,ubpublic' is 2.6x10-3.
The unconditional probability of causing public concerns can be
obtained from Equation (3.39), which is re-written as
Pimp-public = s - pub-public, (4.34)
where k is the frequency of original problem occurrence. In this case, it is
equal to 0.189 per year with an uncertainty of 0.04 per year. The value of
Pimp-public is as follows:
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,,,pubic = 5.5 x 10-3.
The uncertainty of Pimp-public can be obtained by using Equation (3.40),
which gives the value of the uncertainty of Pimp-public as
S = 2.6 x 10-3. (4.36)
* Summary
We summarize the consequences and the equivalent number of
occurrences or the probability that characterizes each event or sub-event, as
well as the uncertainties associated with these two quantities in Table 4.10.
Equivalent
Number of UncertaintyConsequence, Uncertainty Occurrences, of NE, SNE,
or of C, Sc, or NE, or or
Subsequent Uncertainty Unconditional Uncertainty
Event Consequence, of Csub-x, Probability, of Pimp-x,
Description Cs. SCsub-x Pimp-x Spimp-x
Direct Event:
Loss of $5.86M $0.73M 124 48.6
Generation
Sub-turbine:
Turbine $64M $12.8M 5.5xlO 2.6x10-4
Damage
Sub-NRC:
NRC $132M $39.1M 1.38x10-2 8.67x10-3
Attention
Sub-Public:
Public $5M $1M 5.5x10-3  2.6x10-3
Concerns I I
Summary of Characterization of Primary and
Events in SF6 System Example
Subsequent
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Table 4.10.
(4.35)
4.3.3. Ranking of Problems
Since there is only one major problem in this example, we do not need
to rank the problem. However, we still can plot the direct consequence and the
subsequent consequences of this problem in the C-P plane so that the
importance of each event can be illustrated. Figure 4.10 shows the positions
and the CEC values of these events in the C-P plane. The point labeled
"Direct" represent the direct event, the points labeled "Sub-turbine", "Sub-
NRC", and "Sub-public" represent sub-event 1, sub-event 2, and sub-event 3,
Importance of Events (SF6 Example)
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Figure 4.10. Illustration of the Importance Ranking of The Direct Event and
Subsequent Events in SF6 Example
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Direct
Ri
Sub-NRC
aSN = 1.6
Sub-p lic
asp = 1. Sub-turbine
asT = 1.6
Serious Risk
Region
Important
Negligible Risk Region
Risk Region
at a
respectively. The direct event is represented by its CEC value, CO,D, directly
because the value of NE of the direct event is greater than unity.
As shown in Figure 4.10, all events are in the Serious Risk Region.
Thus, we can use the generic RAI value, ao, to calculate the CEC values of
these events, i.e.,
aD= asi aS2  aS3 = 1.6.
The CEC values of direct and subsequent events are given by Equation
(3.12) or Equation (3.41),
CO =C NE (3.12)
1 1
C0 imp =Csub 'r imp sub [(1- e~' sub, I (3.41)
Therefore, the CEC values of the direct event and sub-events are obtained as:
Co,D = $1.19 x 108 ,
CO,ST = $5.87 x 105 ,
COSN = $9.08 x 10 6
and CO0s, = $2.75 x 10 4 . (4.37)
From the CEC values, we can easily determine that the importance
ranking of these events is as follows:
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Direct Event > Sub-Event 2 > Sub-Event 1 > Sub-Event 3
The direct consequence of the problem, i.e., the loss of power
generation capability, is the most important. However, the potential that the
SF6 system failure would cause increased NRC attention is quite important,
too. The decision-maker should include the consideration of this subsequent
consequence in his decision-making process.
The uncertainties of these CEC values can be obtained by using
Equation (3.23),
(Sc 02 _ )Sc_ 2 +)Sp )2
CO/ ~ C /a P ,(3.23)
as follows:
SCoD = $3.28 X 10 7
SCOST = $2.10 x10 5 ,
SCoSN = $4.46x 106,
and Sco's, = $6.91 x 104 . (4.38)
4.3.4. Formulation of Improvements
Engineering improvements were proposed by a task team that was
formed to evaluate the performance of SF6 system. The recommended
improvements include the following:
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" Improvement 1: Build a repair facility on-site so that the repair
time for a failure of the existing system can be reduced. This
improvement costs $0.49M;
* Improvement 2: Replace GS # 2 zone (the Reserve Auxiliary
Transformers section) with an improved bus duct design. This
improvement costs about $2.2M;
" Improvement 3: Replace GS # 4 zone (the Generator Step-up
Transformers section) with an improved bus duct design. This
improvement costs about $2.44M;
All these options can be implemented within a refueling outage period.
Of course, in addition to these options, management always has the option of
doing nothing.
4.3.5. Selection of Improvement Options
4.3.5.1. Expected Return Rate, re, and Uncertainty, Sr, of Each
Improvement
In order to select among options, we need to know the expected return
rate, re, and the uncertainty, Sr, of the return rate. In this sub-section, we
calculate these quantities of each improvement option using the method
developed in Chapter 3.
* Improvement Option 1: Build a On-Site Repair Facility
The effect of this improvement is the reduction in repair time. It does
not affect the system failure rate and does not change the conditional
probabilities of subsequent consequences. Therefore, implementation of this
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improvement will only change the direct consequence. All three subsequent
consequences will not be changed.
By implementing this improvement, the plant shutdown time due to a
SF6 system failure can be reduced to five days from the previous eight days.
The designation of the direct consequence now is $3.66M, and still with an
uncertainty of one-day shutdown, i.e., $0.73M. The equivalent number of
occurrences and associated uncertainty are not changed.
The destinations of the direct event and three sub-events as of the
results of implementing improvement 1 are summarized in Table 4.11.
Destinations of Events in the SF6 Example
Implementing Improvement 1
As Results of
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Equivalent
Consequence, Uncertainty Number of Uncertainty
Cs of C', S'c, Occurrences, of N'E, S'NE,
or or N'E, or or
Subsequent Uncertainty Unconditional Uncertainty
Event Consequence, of C'sub.x, Probability, of P imp-x,
Destination C'8 u- Sc'subx P'imp-X SPimp.x
Direct':
Loss of $3.66M $0.73M 124 48.6
Generation
Sub-turbine':
Turbine $64M $12.8M 5.5x10~ 2.6x,04
Damage
Sub-NRC':
NRC $132M $39.1M 1.38x10-2  8.66x10-3
Attention
Sub-Public':
Public $5M $1M 5.5x10~3  2.6x10-3
Concerns I I I I
Table 4.11.
The effect on these events of implementing engineering improvement
1 can be illustrated in Figure 4.11. Only the direct event is moved. Again, the
direct event and its destination are represented by their CEC values directly
because their NE values are greater than unity.
Effects of Improvement I (SF6 Example)
Co,sp= COST =
1.94E+05 5.87E+05
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1E-05 -
1E+04
I I
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Consequence, C (Dollars)
IE+09
Figure 4.11. Effects of Implementing Improvement 1 (SF6 Example)
By applying Equation (3.14), the CEC of the direct event destination
can be obtained as follows:
C',D = $7.46 X 10 7 . (4.39)
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Using Equation (3.24),
)2 SC )2 +(1 S )2
C1 ~ , a (3.24)
we can obtain the uncertainty of this destination CEC as follows:
Sco,D = $2.35 x10 7 . (4.40)
We summarize the effects of implementing engineering improvement
1 in Table 4.12. From these CEC values and their uncertainties, we can
calculate the expected return rate, re,1, of investing in Improvement Option 1
and the uncertainty of the return rate, Sr,1.
CEC of Uncertainty CEC of Uncertainty
Event of CO Destination of C'O
Event Description Co SCO C'o SCO'
Direct Event $119M $32.8M $74.6M $23.5M
Loss of Generation
Sub-turbine: $587K $210K $587K $210K
Turbine Damage
Sub-NRC: NRC $9.08M $4.46M $9.08M $4.46M
Attention
Sub-Public: Public $193K $69.1K $193K $69.1K
Concerns I I II
Table 4.12. CEC values and CEC Uncertainties of Events and Their
Destinations After Implementing Improvement 1 (SF6 Example)
As given by Equation (3.21), the expected return rate, re,, of
investment on the improvement option 1 can be obtained by the relationship:
(4.41)re = ( C,, - C') - Creal
Creat
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The real cost, Creai, for implementing this improvement option is
$0.49M. Thus, the expected return rate of this improvement is
re = 9050%. (4.42)
The uncertainty of the return rate is given by Equation (3.25). For this
specific case, we re-express the Equation (3.25) as follows:
Sr, i = I 2 i (4.43)
Since the sub-events do not change, we do not need to take into
account the contributions from three sub-events. Then the uncertainty of
return rate is given by Equation (4.43) as:
SrJ = 8231% . (4.44)
* Improvement Option 2: Replace GS # 2 Zone With An Improved Bus
Duct Design
By replacing the bus duct in the critical GS#2 zone (The Reserve
Auxiliary Transformers section) by an improved design, the reliability of the
SF6 system can be improved. The frequency of SF6 failures can be reduced to
0.108 per year from the previous value of 0.189 per year. The uncertainty of
the failure frequency is reduced to 0.023 per year, accordingly. The reduction
of the system failure frequency results in reduction of the equivalent number
of occurrences of the direct consequence, and reductions of the unconditional
probabilities that subsequent consequences will occur. Therefore, much
improvement in plant performance can still be realized although the magnitude
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of the direct consequence and subsequent consequences are not changed by
implementing this improvement.
By implementing this improvement, the frequency of system failure is
reduced to 0.108 per year. This results in the equivalent number of
occurrences, NE, of the direct consequence being reduced to 44.7 from the
previous value of 124. The uncertainty of NE is reduced from the previous
48.6 to 33.1, accordingly. The monetary value of the direct consequence is
still $5.86M with an uncertainty of $0.73M.
The implementation of this improvement does not change the
conditional probability that turbine severe turbine damage will occur given the
failure of SF6 system. However, because the probability of SF6 failure
occurrence is reduced due to the reduction in failure frequency, the overall
unconditional probability that this subsequent consequence will occur has a
slight reduction. The unconditional probability, Pimp-turbine, is reduced to
5.43x10-3 from the previous value of 5.50x10-3. The uncertainty of Pirm-turbine
is slightly increased from 2.6x10-3 to 2.63x10-3. The changes are negligible
regarding the magnitudes and the uncertainty associated with them. The
magnitude of the subsequent consequence is unchanged. It is still $64M with
an uncertainty of $12.8M.
Similarly, the implementation of this improvement does not change the
conditional probability that NRC would pay additional attention to the plant
given that the failure of SF6 system causes a loss of the offsite power.
However, the probability of losing offsite power due to an SF6 system failure
is greatly reduced. Thus, the overall unconditional probability of attracting
NRC attention, Pimp-NRC, is reduced to 4.42x10-3 from the previous value of
1.38x10-2. The uncertainty of Pip-NRC is reduced as well from 8.67x10 3 to
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2.79x10~3 . The magnitude of this subsequent consequence is unchanged. It is
still $132M with an uncertainty of $39.1M.
Similar to the effect on Event Sub-Turbine, the effect of implementing
this improvement on Event Sub-public is negligible. The conditional
probability that public concerns will be raised given the failure of SF6 system
is unchanged. However, because the probability of SF6 failure occurrence is
reduced due to the reduction in failure frequency, the unconditional probability
of the occurrence of this subsequent consequence, Pimp-public, is slightly reduced
to 5.43x10-3 from the previous value of 5.50x10-3. The uncertainty of Pimp-pubic
is slightly increased from 2.60x10-3 to 2.63x10-3. The magnitude of the
subsequent consequence is still $5M with an uncertainty of $1M.
Equivalent
Consequence, Uncertainty number of Uncertainty
C, of C', S'c, occurrences, of N'E, S'NE,
or or N'E, or or
Subsequent Uncertainty Unconditional Uncertainty
Event Consequence, of C'sub.x, Probability, of P imp-X,
Destination C',u- SC'sub-x P imp.x S_____
Direct':
Loss of $5.86M $0.73M 44.7 33.1
Generation
Sub-turbine':
Turbine $64M $12.8M 5.43x10~4  2.63x1O-4
Damage
Sub-NRC':
NRC $132M $39.1M 4.42x10~3  2.79x10 3
Attention
Sub-public':
Public $5M $1M 5.43x10-3  2.63x10-3
Concerns I I _I__ __ _
Destinations of Events in the SF6 Example
Implementing Improvement 2
As Results of
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Table 4.13.
The destinations of the direct event and three sub-events as the result
of replacing GS#2 zone bus duct are summarized in Table 4.13.
The effects of replacing GS#2 zone bus duct on the direct event and
sub-event 2 are illustrated in Figure 4.12. Because the effects of implementing
this improvement are negligible for Event Sub-turbine (the turbine damage)
and Event Sub-public (the public concerns), we will not include the
contributions from these two sub-events in following analysis.
Effects of Improvement 2 (SF6 Example)
1E+00
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Figure 4.12. Effects of Implementing Improvement 2 (SF6 Example)
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By applying the method developed in Chapter 3, the CEC of the direct
event destination can be obtained as follows:
C'D = $6.29 x 10 7 . (4.45)
The uncertainty of this destination CEC is obtained as follows:
ScO'D = $3.02 X10 7 . (4.46)
The CEC of Event Sub-NRC destination can be obtained as follows:
Co),SN =$4.46 10 6 . (4.47)
The uncertainty of this destination CEC is obtained as follows:
ScoSN= $2.20x 106. (4.48)
The effects of implementing engineering improvement
summarized in Table 4.14. From these CEC values and their uncertainties, we
can calculate the expected return rate, re,2, of investing on Improvement Option
2 and the uncertainty of the return rate, Sr,2.
CEC of Uncertainty CEC of Uncertainty
Event of CO Destination of C'O
Event Description Co Sco C'o Sco'
Direct Event: $119M $32.8M $62.9M $30.2M
Loss of Generation
Sub-NRC: NRC $9.08M $4.46M $4.46M $2.20M
Attention I I I
Table 4.14. CEC values and CEC Uncertainties of Events and Their
Destinations After Implementing Improvement 2 (SF6 Example)
The real cost, Crea, for implementing this improvement option is
$2.20M. Using Equation (4.49),
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2 are
re,2 ( Co -I C') - Crea (449)
Crai
the expected return rate, re,2, of replacing GS#2 zone bus duct is obtained as
re, 2 = 2678%. (4.50)
The uncertainty of the return rate is given by Equation (4.51),
C ZS + 'i JS2
Sr,2= C2 . (4.51)
Creal
Using this equation, the magnitude of the uncertainty is obtained as
Sr,2 = 2026%. (4.52)
* Improvement Option 3: Replace GS # 4 Zone With An Improved Bus
Duct Design
By replacing the bus duct in the critical GS#4 zone (the Generator
Step-up Transformers section) by an improved design, the reliability of SF6
system can be improved. The frequency of SF6 failure can be reduced to
0.111 per year from the previous value of 0.189 per year. The uncertainty of
the failure frequency is reduced to 0.023 per year, accordingly. The reduction
of the system failure frequency results in reduction of the equivalent number
of occurrences of the direct consequence, and reductions of the unconditional
probabilities that subsequent consequences will occur. Therefore, a large gain
in plant performance still can be realized by implementing this improvement
although the magnitude of the direct consequences and subsequent
consequences are not changed.
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By implementing this improvement, the frequency of system failure is
reduced to 0.111 per year. This results in the equivalent number of
occurrences, NE, of the direct consequence being reduced to 46.8 from the
previous value of 124. The uncertainty of NE is reduced from the previous
value of 48.6 to 33.7, accordingly. The monetary value of the direct
consequence is still $5.86M with an uncertainty of $0.73M.
The implementation of this improvement does not change the
conditional probability that turbine severe turbine damage will occur given the
failure of SF6 system. However, because the probability of SF6 failure
occurrence is reduced due to the reduction in failure frequency, the overall
unconditional probability that this subsequent consequence, Pimp-turbine, is
reduced to 5.43x10-3 from the previous value of 5.50x10~3 . The uncertainty of
Pimp-turbine is slightly increased from 2.60x10~3 to 2.63x10~3. The changes are
negligible regarding the magnitudes and the uncertainty associated with them.
The magnitude of the subsequent consequence is unchanged. It is still $64M
with an uncertainty of $12.8M.
Similarly, the implementation of this improvement does not change the
conditional probability that NRC will require corrections given that the failure
of SF6 system causes a loss of the offsite power. However, the probability of
losing offsite power due to an SF6 system failure is greatly reduced. Thus, the
overall unconditional probability of attracting NRC attention, Pimp-NRC, is
reduced to 4.43x10~3 from the previous value of 1.38x10 2 . The uncertainty of
Pimp-NRC is also reduced from 8.67x10-3 to 2.80x10-3. The magnitude of this
subsequent consequence is unchanged. It is still $132M with an uncertainty of
$39.1M.
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Similar to the effect on Event Sub-turbine, the effect of implementing
this improvement on Event Sub-public is negligible. The conditional
probability that public concerns will be raised given the failure of SF6 system
is unchanged. However, because the probability of SF6 failure occurrence is
reduced due to the reduction in failure frequency, the unconditional probability
of the occurrence of this subsequent consequence, Pimp-public, is slightly reduced
to 5.43x10-3 from the previous value of 5.50x10~3. The uncertainty of Pimp-public
is slightly increased from 2.60x10-3 to 2.63x10-3. The magnitude of the
subsequent consequence is still $5M with an uncertainty of $1M.
The destinations of the direct event and three sub-events as the result
of replacing the GS#2 zone bus duct are summarized in Table 4.13.
Equivalent
Consequence, Uncertainty number of Uncertainty
C, of C', S'c, occurrences, of N'E, S'NE,
or or N'E, or or
Subsequent Uncertainty Unconditional Uncertainty
Event Consequence, of C'sub.., Probability, of P imp-x,
Destination C 'subx S -x P imp-x Sprimp-x
Direct':
Loss of $5.86M $0.73M 46.8 33.7
Generation
Sub-turbine':
Turbine $64M $12.8M 5.43x10 4  2.63xlO~4
Damage
Sub-NRC':
NRC $132M $39.1M 4.43x10-3  2.80x10-3
Attention
Sub-Public':
Public $5M $1M 5.43x10~3  2.63x10-3
Concerns _ _ I I
Destinations of Events in the SF6 Example
Implementing Improvement 3
As Results of
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Table 4.15.
The effects of replacing GS#4 zone bus duct on the direct event and
Event sub-NRC are illustrated in Figure 4.13. Again, because the effects of
implementing this improvement are negligible for Event Sub-turbine (the
turbine damage) and Event Sub-public (the public concerns), we will not
include the contributions from these two sub-events in following analysis.
Effects of Improvement 3 (SF6 Example)
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Figure 4.13. Effects of Implementing Improvement 3 (SF6 Example)
By applying the method developed in Chapter 3, we can obtain the
CEC of the direct event destination as follows:
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4.46E+06 Direct Direct
Serious Risk Sub-NRC
Region aSN = 1.6
Sub-NRC'
aSN' = 1.6
Important
Risk Region
Negligible
Risk Region
C'D $6.48 X10 7 . (
The uncertainty of this destination CEC is obtained as follows:
SCOD =$3.03 X10 7 . (4.54)
The CEC of Event Sub-NRC destination can be obtained as follows:
CoSN = $4.46 x 10 6 . (4.55)
The uncertainty of this destination CEC is obtained as follows:
ScoSN = $2.20 x 106. (4.56)
The effects of implementing Improvement 3 are summarized in Table
4.16. From these CEC values and their uncertainties, we can calculate the
expected return rate, re,3, of investing on Improvement Option 3 and the
uncertainty of the return rate, Sr,3.
CEC of Uncertainty CEC of Uncertainty
Event of CO Destination of C'O
Event Description Co Sco C'0  Sco'
Direct Event: $119M $32.8M $64.8M $30.3MLoss of Generation
Sub-NRC: NRC $9.08M $4.46M $4.46M $2.20MAttention
Table 4.16. CEC values and CEC Uncertainties of Events and Their
Destinations After Implementing Improvement 3 (SF6 Example)
The real cost, Creal, for implementing this improvement option is
$2.44M. Using Equation (4.57),
re,3 = C0 ' - Z - CrealCrea (4.57)
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(4.53)
the expected return rate, re,3, of replacing GS#4 zone bus duct is obtained as
re= 2329%. (4.58)
The uncertainty of the return rate is given by Equation (4.59),
SS3 i += C S2Sr,3 =C2
Ireal
(4.59)
Using this equation, the magnitude of the uncertainty is obtained as
Sr,3 =1828%. (4.60)
* Summary of Expected Return Rate and Uncertainty of Return Rate
Table 4.17 summarizes the values of re and Sr of three engineering
improvement options for the SF6 system upgrade example.
Expected Return Rate, Uncertainty of Return
Improvement Options re Rate, S,
Option 1: Build An On- 9050% 8231%Site Repair Facility
Option 2: Replace the 2678% 2025%GS#2 Zone Bus Duct
Option 3: Replace the 2329% 1828%GS#4 Zone Bus Duct
Table 4.17. Expected Return Rates and Uncertainties of Return Rate of
Improvement Options (SF6 Example)
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4.3.5.2. Ranking and Selection of Options
As in the MSR example, we can use of the analog to the uncertainty
premium of the financial market return rate as the uncertainty premium for
decision making in this plant. The functional expression of this analogy is
given by Equation (3.29) as:
f(S,) = 0.4S, (3.29)
As in the MSR example, we have the minimum zero-uncertainty return
rate as ro = 240%.
The engineering improvement options of the SF6 example are plotted
in the Sr-re plane as shown in Figure 4.14. The Equivalent Zero-Uncertainty
Return Rate, ro g ,of option i is given by the relationship:
rO, = re, -0.4Sr. (4.61)
The values of ro, are as follows:
ro = 5758% for Option 1,
rO,2 =1868% for Option 2,
and r, 3 =1598% for Option 3. (4.62)
All three improvement options have good economic returns. From
Figure 4.14, it is seen that the economic ranking of options are in the order:
Option 1 > Option 2> Option 3. (4.63)
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Figure 4.14. Ranking of Improvement Options By the Expected Return Rates
and the Uncertainties of Return Rate (SF6 Example)
This means that construction of an on-site repair facility is the most
economically efficient engineering improvement, and the replacement of
GS#2 zone bus duct is next efficient investment. The replacement of GS#4
zone bus duct is the least efficient investment. Therefore, we should build the
on-site repair facility first, and then replace the GS#2 zone bus duct. If the
budget is still available, we can replace the GS#4 zone bus duct. In fact, the
Seabrook plant implemented these improvements in the exact sequence as
described here.
199
Option 1
Minimum
ro,=5758% Return Line:
r* = ro +f(,)
Option 2
r0,2=1868a/
. 8Option 3
ro,3=1598%
S=2407o
4.4. SELECTION OF IMPROVEMENT OPTIONS IN THE
PLANT LEVEL
We can pool the improvement options available in these two examples
together and make decisions for investment at the plant level. The expected
return rates and the uncertainties of return rate of all available improvement
options are summarized in Table 4.18. MO1 refers to the improvement option
1 for MSR system upgrade, which is replacement of entire MSR system.
M02 refers to the improvement of replacing the MSR separator chevron
panels only. M03 refers to the improvement of replacing the MSR reheater
tube bundles only. So1 refers to the improvement option 1 for upgrading SF6
system, i.e., build an on-site repair facility. S02 refers to the replacement of
GS#2 zone bus duct. S03 refers to the replacement of GS#4 zone bus duct.
Equivalent Zero
Improvement Expected Uncertainty of Uncertainty
Options Return Rate, re Return Rate, S,. Return Rate, ro,
MOl 289% 176% 219%
M02 427% 320% 299%
M03 658% 415% 491%
SOl 9050% 8231% 5758%
S02 2678% 2025% 1868%
S03 2329% 1828% 1598%
Table 4.18. Expected Return Rates and Uncertainties of Return Rate of
Improvement Options (MSR and SF6 Examples)
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These engineering improvements are plotted in a re-Sr plane as shown
in Figure 4.15. It is seen that the optimality of these improvements is in the
order as follows:
SO1 > S02 > S03 > M03 > M02 > MOl. (4.64)
Therefore, if the budget is limited, we should spend money on the
improvement SO first and fully implement it. (In fact, there is no way to
implement this option partially since we can not build a partial repair facility.)
Ranking of Improvement Options (SF6
10000% Example)
.j 7500%-
E MinimumS ro.so 1 5758% Return Line:
o 5000% - r*=ro+f(S)
W 2500% - S03
rosoz=1868% -
ro.S0 3=1598% =20
r.0 3=491% M03 ro=240%
rOA0 2=299%
rMol=21 9 % 01
0%
0% 2500% 5000% 7500% 10000%
Uncertainty of Return Rate, S,
Figure 4.15. Ranking of Improvement Options By the Expected Return Rates
and the Uncertainties of Return Rate (Two Examples Together)
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Then if we still have money, we should invest on the improvement S02, i.e.,
the replacement of GS#2 zone bus duct of the SF6 system. So on, until all
budgets are assigned. If we allocate the budget for improving the plant
performance in this way, we will be able to achieve an economically efficient
investment.
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Chapter 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Faced with increasing competition from coal and gas power industries
in the current deregulated power generation market, nuclear utilities must
focus on strategies that can improve their economic performance and make
nuclear plants an attractive altemative to other power generation options.
High equipment operational reliability is essential for a nuclear plant to
achieve good economic performance. However, while the aged plants require
more equipment maintenance and replacements, the operation budget is
getting tighter because of the pressure from market competition. Now
managers in nuclear plants need to be concerned with maintenance spending
efficiency more than ever.
Nuclear utility managers are frequently confronted with the
requirement to decide upon which alternatives they should invest for plant
upgrades, repairs and maintenance activities. They usually make these
decisions based upon their experience without complete considerations on all
decision-making attributes, especially without a clear, consistent treatment of
the uncertainties associated with these attributes. Some decision-making
attributes, such as the socio-political implications of a severe plant failure, are
highly uncertain and very difficult to quantify. The lack of a method that can
treat these decision-making attributes explicitly and consistently may
ultimately degrade both the plant's economic performance and safety.
Therefore, nuclear utilities which both want to achieve high plant performance
and to minimize the expenses necessary for operation and maintenance,
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urgently need a methodology that enables managers to structure their decision-
making process in a systematic, explicit manner so that they can ultimately
allocate their limited resources efficiently.
The goal of this thesis is to develop such a methodology taking into
account considerations of uncertainty and the decision-maker's degree of risk
aversion. In order to achieve this goal, a new parameter named Risk Aversion
Index (RAI) was developed to quantify the DM's degree of risk aversion.
Based upon this concept, methods were developed for quantifying the
importance of issues in nuclear plants and for evaluating the decision-maker's
preference for plant improvement options.
The concept of the Risk Aversion Index (RAI) is the basis for the
methodology developed in this thesis. It is defined based upon two
assumptions. The first assumption is that the decision-maker's preference
concerning an event is determined by the risk value of the event. If any two
events have equal risk values, the decision-maker will be indifferent between
these two events. If an event has higher risk value than the other, the decision-
maker will prefer the event with the lower risk value. The second assumption
is that a decision-maker's risk value of an event can be expressed by a function
with the form of
R=C .P,
where C is the consequence if the event occurs, P is the probability that the
event may occur, and a is the risk aversion index of this decision-maker. If the
value of "a" is greater than one, the decision-maker will attach a greater risk
value to an event than its expected value, (which is given by the product of C
and P.) The existence of a difference between an event's risk value and its
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expected value is because of decision-maker's aversion to uncertain risk. The
higher the value of "a" is, the higher is the difference between these two
quantities (i.e., the risk aversion). Thus, the value of "a" exhibits the decision-
maker's degree of risk aversion.
A study of the values of the RAI among different DMs and under
different situations was conducted in order to obtain a good understanding of
this quantity. Based upon the results of this study, we can reach the following
conclusions about the characteristics of the RAI value:
* The value of RAI depends on the consequence, C, and the probability, P,
of the event occurrence.
* If we represent the event by a point in the Consequence-Probability (C-P)
plane, the distribution of RAI values in the C-P plane can be divided into
four regions: the Negligible Risk Region, the Considerable Risk Region,
the Significant Risk Region and the Saturated Risk Region.
* The RAI values in the significant risk region can be approximated by a
constant value, ao. Based upon the data currently available, ao is equal to
1.6.
* The RAI values in the negligible risk region are equal to zero.
* The RAI values in the considerable risk region can be obtained through
interpolation between 0 and ao.
* The RAI value in the saturated risk region is not meaningful. The values
of events falling into this region are equal to the maximum acceptable cost
of the specific plant.
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A four-step approach to the efficient investment allocation was
developed as follows: 1) Identify and characterize the problems in the plant; 2)
Rank the importance of the problems; 3) Formulate engineering solutions and
improvements for those most important problems; 4) Rank the attractiveness
of the solutions and improvements and then allocate the investments to those
improvement options offering with the best economic returns. The RAI
concept was utilized in step 2 and step 4 for ranking and evaluating the
importance and DM's preferences.
The uncertainty of an improvement option's economic returns was also
considered. A method was developed for choosing among different
combinations of expected return and associated uncertainty. The concept of
Uncertainty Premium was developed and is utilized in this method.
One of emphases of this thesis is to incorporate consideration
concerning "imponderable" factors, such as regulatory attention to the plant's
problems, plant performance rating, public image factors in the decision-
making process. These factors are very important, and sometimes are
dominant in decision making. However, since they are usually difficult to
quantify, plant managers commonly have difficulty in treating these factors in
a rational, consistent and explicit manner. The method developed in this thesis
provides a tool for nuclear decision-makers to address these issues in a
consistent, explicit fashion.
To demonstrate the validity and utility of the methodology developed
in this thesis, it was applied to two real cases of decision-making in a PWR
plant. These two examples are the upgrade of a PWR moisture separator
reheater system and the upgrade of a PWR switchyard SF6 insulation system.
By applying these methods, step by step, the historic and potential weaknesses,
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i.e., problems, of these two examples were identified and characterized; the
importance of these problems were ranked and the solutions and
improvements for those most important problems were formulated; the
proposed engineering solutions and improvements were ranked according to
their expected economic returns and their respective associated uncertainties.
Then the final recommendations for improvement implementation were
reached.
The methods were successfully applied to these two example projects
for improving plant performance. The decision-maker's risk aversion and the
uncertainties associated with the decision-making attributes were reasonably
addressed. The "imponderable" factors were considered, and the final
recommendations for engineering improvements were reached in a consistent
and explicit way. Therefore, we can conclude that the methodology developed
in this thesis can be useful as a systematic decision-making tool for nuclear
plant managers to use in enhancing their decision-making capabilities for
allocating their limited resources, and for reaching rational, explicit decisions
for improving plant performance.
The examples presented in this thesis for illustrating the application of
this methodology are two projects for enhancing plant power generating
capability. However, the methodology developed in this thesis is expected to
be generally useful. This methodology can also be applied to the areas of
optimizing investments for improving safety, improving decision-making on
work process and optimizing maintenance activities.
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Chapter 6
FUTURE WORK
The future studies should extend to following three aspects: 1) Better
understanding of basic concepts; 2) Improvement in methodology; 3)
Extended application of the method.
6.1. BETTER UNDERSTANDING IN BASIC CONCEPTS
The most important concept in the methodology developed in this
thesis the Risk Aversion Index concept. This thesis conducted a preliminary
study of the general pattern of the RAI values based upon the results of
interviews with 19 DMs in nuclear plants. The results are encouraging.
However, in order to reinforce the basis of the methodology developed in this
thesis, the understanding of the RAI values should be refined through more
interviews with DMs in nuclear plants. Furthermore, for more general
conclusions, interviews can be conducted with DMs in non-nuclear industries.
The future study on RAI values should include the following
investigations:
" General pattern of the RAI variations. Especially the dependency
of the RAI on the probability, P, and the consequence, C;
" Other possible factors that affect the DM's RAI;
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" Differences of RAI values among different groups of DMs and
different plants, and the reasons behind these differences;
" More diversified DMs should be interviewed. Especially, more
high level DMs need to be interviewed.
Another important concept in this methodology is the Uncertainty
Premium function, f(S,). The value of Uncertainty Premium eventually
determines the selection of the engineering improvements. A better
understanding of this quantity will be helpful for the successful application of
this method.
Future studies on the uncertainty premium function, f(Sr), should be
focused on following aspects:
" Develop a method for easy formulation of the plant-specific
uncertainty premium function, f(Sr).
" Understand how DMs in nuclear plants would like to trade off the
additional return rate with the uncertainty;
" Understand the differences of the uncertainty premium functions
among different plants, in hope to obtain a generally applicable
form of the function, f(Sr).
A more detailed understanding on how the "imponderable" factors
affect DM's decision making will improve to this methodology. Currently, the
decision making involved with "imponderable" factors is highly person-
dependent. The DM's personality dominates in making such kind of
decisions. Study on the effects of "imponderable" factors is difficult also
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because this problem is complicated by the mixing of the original problem and
the subsequent consequences from "imponderable" factors. The method
developed in this thesis has provided a basic tool to separate the effects of
"imponderable" factors from the mixed reactions of DMs to the problem with
"imponderable" factors. Thus, detailed studies on the effects of
"imponderable" factors will be possible. Studies should be focused on the
general mechanisms of "imponderable" factor effects and the differences
among different "imponderable" factors.
Studies for the uncertainty premium function, f(Sr), and the mechanism
of "imponderable" factors taking effects can be conducted through the
investigations on decisions that are made in nuclear plants before or interviews
with DMs for some given hypothetical situations.
All efforts for better understanding of basic concepts at least should be
focused on (but not limited to) a basic purpose. This basic purpose is that we
should always try to minimize the effects from the individual attitudes and
preferences. Rather, the general pattems behind these individual attitudes and
preferences are our goals for the studies.
6.2. IMPROVEMENT IN METHODOLOGY
Models for treating the "imponderable" factors and the uncertainty
premium, f(Sr), can be improved based upon a better understanding of the
"imponderable" factors and the uncertainty premium.
More examples of the application are necessary to demonstrate and
refine the methodology developed in this thesis. The two examples presented
in this thesis are system upgrades that may improve the plant performance or
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retard the plant degradation that may occur if the upgrades are not made.
Further examples may include the decision making for increase in safety of
plant operation and environment. From further examples, we expect to learn
about areas of needed improvement in the method that were not identified as
important factors in previous applications, although we believe that the most
rapid refinements have been made in the early applications.
In addition to the refinement of the methodology, successes of more
application examples can also provide a solid basis for convincing potential
users that the method is worth their attention and efforts. Further examples of
application should be conducted with industrial collaborators so that we can
maximize the applicability of the method.
6.3. APPLICATIONS
The methodology developed in this thesis should be translated into an
easily applicable procedure for decision-making in nuclear plants. This
requires the development of a complete set of educational materials that can
train the plant staff to understand the method and use the method correctly. A
computerized package is also desirable so that DMs in nuclear plants can use
this method easily without special assistance. It will be optimal if this
computerized package only requires that the DMs provide the initial
parameters, such as consequences, C, and probabilities, P, of problems, and
gives the recommendations for decision making directly.
We may use the method developed in this thesis as a measurement of
DM's decision making efficiency, in hope of rationalizing the difference in
plant performance in different plants. Through this method, we hope to
identify weaknesses in management's decision making in a specific plant.
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Particularly, it may be a good method to identify some of the reasons that
plants with similar design and budgets have totally different performance
records.
This method can be used to evaluate the efficiency of current
maintenance practices so that the routine maintenance can be improved.
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Appendix A
CONSIDERATIONS OF THE
UNCERTAINTY PREMIUM
As described in Chapter 3, section 3.4.4.4, the uncertainty premium,
f(Sr), is very important in the process for ranking the proposed engineering
improvements. It directly determines the optimality of an improvement.
Different forms of f(Sr) may give different rankings of the improvements.
Thus, it is worthwhile to discuss the uncertainty premium in more detail.
A.1. DEFINITION
We assume that a nuclear plant management always requires a
Minimum Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate, ro, for any proposed improvement in
the plant. For an investment with uncertainty in the return rate, Sr, a DM will
logically demand a mean return rate higher than r,. The required increase in
the mean return rate is called the Uncertainty Premium. The uncertainty
premium is a function, f(Sr), of the uncertainty, Sr. Only when the mean return
rate, r*, of an investment can satisfy the relationship
r*= ro+f(Sr), (3.28)
would the DM consider that this investment is indifferent to another
investment which would give him a return rate of ro for certain. The
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uncertainty premium f(Sr) is determined by the weight that the DM applys in
trading off the uncertainty, Sr, versus the expected return rate, r,.
A.2. PROPOSED METHODS FOR STUDYING THE
UNCERTAINTY PREMIUM
A.2.1. Obtaining The Functional Form Of f(S,)
, The functional form of the uncertainty premium, f(Sr), can be obtained
by means of eliciting the responses from plant decision-makers by giving them
a set of hypothetical combinations of the expected return rate, re, and the
uncertainty associated with the return rate, Sr. The elicitation should be
conducted through personal interviews with plant decision-makers. The
procedure for the interviews can be set up as follows.
We start the interviews with Interviewee 1. Step 1, the interviewee is
given the following two options where the uncertainty of return rate, Sr, is
given its initial value S,1 and is then changed to other values in following
steps.
We ask the DM to consider two options:
* Option A: An engineering improvement in his plant that would give him a
return rate roi for certain.
" Option B: An engineering improvement that would give him an expected
return rate, re, with an uncertainty of Sri 1.
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Then we ask this DM's preference between these two options. If he prefers
Option A, then we increase the value of re11 (and keep the value of Sri
unchanged,) and ask him the same questions again. If he prefers Option B,
then we decrease the value of re1 (and again keep the value of Sri1
unchanged,) and ask for the preference between the two options again. This
procedure is repeated until we find the value of rel that makes this DM
indifferent between these two options. We then record the values of roi and
(rei, Sri).
Step 2, the interviewee is given Option A and Option C, instead of
Option B. Option C is described as:
* Option C: An engineering improvement that would give him an expected
return rate, re12 with an uncertainty of Sr2.
The value of the uncertainty now is changed to Sr12, which is different from the
value of Sri 1. Again, the procedure described in Step 1 is repeated until we
obtain the expected return rate, re12, that makes the DM indifferent between
Option A and Option C. We record the value of expected return rate and its
corresponding uncertainty of the return rate, (re12, Sre12).
Step 3, we change the value of uncertainty to Srii. We repeat Step 2 to
obtain the value of the expected return rate, re13 , that makes the DM indifferent
between Option A and the option that gives an expected return rate of reli with
an uncertainty of Srii. We keep changing the value of the uncertainty, Srii,
until we obtain sufficient data points, e.g., a total of N data points, that cover
the range of Sr that we are interested in.
Now we obtain a series of combinations of (reli, Sri) for which this
DM is indifferent in contrast to the option that give him a return rate of roi for
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certain. As with Step 4, let us summarize these numbers and calculate the
value of the uncertainty premium, f(Sr), that corresponds to each option of
(reni, Sli) in Table A. 1 as follows.
Uncertainty of Return Expected Return Rate, re Uncertainty Premium,
Rate, Sr f(Sr)
Srll rel1 rel - roi
Sr12 re12 re12- rO
Srli reli reli -rOl
Sr1N reIN reIN-rOl
Table A. 1. Summary of the Interview Results of The Combinations of The
Expected Return Rate, re, and Its Corresponding Value of Uncertainty, Sr,
That An Interviewee Considers To Be Indifferent With Respect to the
Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate, roi. This Table also Gives the Uncertainty
Premium Values, f(Sr), for Various Values of Uncertainty. The
Uncertainty Premium is the Difference Between The Expected Return
Rate, rei, and The Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate, roi.
Since we now have the expected return rate, re, and the uncertainty
premium values, f(Sr), that correspond to various uncertainty values, Sr, we
can plot these data points in a Sr-re plane, as shown in Figure A. 1. By
applying numerical analysis techniques, we can obtain a best-fit curve for
these data points. This best-fit curve is restricted to pass through the point (0,
roi). We can choose various forms and orders of function to fit the data. The
functional expression of the best-fit curve then can be used as an
approximation of the uncertainty premium, f(Sr). Figure A.1 shows an
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example of a series of (Sr, re) data points and the best-fit curve using a second
order polynomial function.
Obtaining The Functional Form of The
Uncertainty Premium, f(Sr)
C
C.,
00.
4000%
3000% -
2000% -
1000% 1
0%
0% 1000% 2000% 3000% 4000%
Uncertainty of Return Rate, Sr
Figure A. 1. Illustration of Obtaining The Functional Form of The
Uncertainty Premium, f(Sr), through The Best-Fit Curve for The (Sr, re)
data points Elicited From Decision-Makers. (The cases Shown In This
Figure Have An Equivalent Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate of 10. The
Best-Fit Curve Is A Second Order Polynomial Function.)
The example data shown in Figure A. 1 are some hypothetical data,
which are summarized in Table A.2. The Equivalent Zero-Uncertainty Return
Rate for this example is roi=10. The functional expression of the best-fit curve
is shown as Equation (A. 1):
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f(Sr)= 0.0011Sr2 + 0.47Sr I
Table A.2. A Hypothetical Example of the Expected Return Rate, re, the
Uncertainty of the Return Rate, Sr, and the Corresponding Uncertainty
Premium, f(Sr), Which Can Be Elicited From Decision-Makers. These
Hypothetical Data Are Also Plotted in Figure A. 1.
f(S,) = 0.001 IS,2 + 0.47S, (A.1)
We can repeat the steps described above to obtain the approximation of
f(Sr) from another interviewee. Depending upon the functional form we
choose to fit the data, we may have different number of parameters that need
to be used to describe the functional form of f(Sr). For example, if we use a
second order polynomial function to fit the data, then we need two parameters
to describe f(Sr). They are "a" and "b" in Equation (A.2).
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Uncertainty of Return Expected Return Rate, re Uncertainty Premium,
Rate, Sr f(Sr)
0 10 0
5 13 3
10 14 4
15 17.5 7.5
20 21 11
25 22 12
30 24 14
35 27.5 17.5
40 31 21
f(S,)=a. S2 +b -S,
From each interviewee, we can obtain a pair of "a" and "b" values.
Then we can average the values of "a" and "b" respectively to obtain the
generally applicable values of these two parameters. For example, if the
average values of these two parameters are i and b , respectively, we can the
following functional form as an approximation of the uncertainty premium
f(Sr):
f(S)= -S,2 +b -S (A.3)
A.2.2. Obtaining The Value Of The Minimum
Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate, ro
As described in Chapter 3, the methodology developed in this thesis
utilizes a concept termed the Minimum Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate, ro, to
determine the attractiveness of engineering improvement options. Any
improvement with an Equivalent Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate value less than
ro will be considered as an undesirable choice and will not be funded for
implementation. Therefore, it is important to obtain the value of ro for plant
managers who intend to apply the methodology developed in this thesis to
make their decisions.
The management of a nuclear plant usually requires a minimum return
rate, r*, for any proposed engineering improvement to be reviewed. (In many
cases, this minimum return rate, r*, is expressed as the minimum benefit/cost
ratio, which is equal to return rate plus one.) This minimum requirement for
the return rate is not the minimum zero-uncertainty return rate. It is a
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( A.2)
minimum expected return rate with some uncertainty although the magnitude
of the uncertainty may not be explicitly addressed.
We can elicit the value of the uncertainty, Sr*, embedded in the
minimum return rate, r*, from plant managers. In order to obtain this value,
we should ask managers the following question:
Do you think an improvement having an expected return rate of r* and an
uncertainty of return rate of Sr is worth being reviewed for adoption?
By varying the value of Si, we can obtain the maximum value of Sr for which a
DM thinks the improvement would still be worth a review. This maximum
value of Sr is the value of Sr* that we want to elicit from mangers.
After we elicit the functional form of the uncertainty premium, f(Sr),
e.g., a form as Equation (A.3), and the value of Sr*, we can calculate the value
of the Minimum Zero-Uncertainty Return Rate as follows:
ro = r *-f(Sr*). (A.4)
A.3. POSSIBLE PROPERTIES OF THE UNCERTAINTY
PREMIUM
The first property of the uncertainty premium, f(Sr), is that it should be
a monotonically increasing function. It is reasonable because DMs logically
demand more compensation in the expected return rate for the options with
higher uncertainties.
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For simplicity, we can use a linear function to approximate the
uncertainty premium, f(S,). However, the value of f(Sr) may increase non-
linearly with the value of uncertainty, S,. Depending upon the results of the
elicitation, we may have to use a high order function to approximate f(Sr).
As mentioned by a nuclear executive, there may be a limitation in the
uncertainty that can be tolerated. Namely, if a proposed improvement has an
uncertainty greater than this limitation value, the improvement will be
considered to be an untrustworthy option and will be discarded without further
Illustration of Possible Shape of The
Uncertainty Premium, f(Sr)
CD
CL
I-
0
Srrmax
Uncertainty of Return Rate, Sr
Figure A.2. An Illustration of Possible Shape of The Uncertainty Premium,
f(Sr). There Is A Limitation in the Uncertainty, Sr,max. Improvements With
Uncertainty Greater Than Sr,max Will Demand Very Large (Perhaps Infinite)
Uncertainty Premium, Thus They Are Considered To Be Bad Options.
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consideration. Combine this possible property with the possible non-linear
characteristics, a functional form of the uncertainty premium, f(Sr), may have a
shape as shown in Figure A.2.
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